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Indeed, when it comes to the Hegelian concept of consciousness and 
self-consciousness, it has been chiefly the description of self-consciousness 
in the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit that has attracted great 
attention from Hegel scholars. Especially, Kojève’s interpretation of the 
dialectic of lord and bondsman had a great deal of influence on the French 
Marxists of the early and mid-20
th
 century (Kojève 1947). The influence of 
Wahl’s interpretation of the unhappy consciousness was also compelling 
among the post-existentialists at his time (Wahl 1929). In contemporary 
philosophy, we can also see that the self-consciousness in this chapter is 
revisited by many American Hegel scholars, representative in Pippin’s 
attempt to defend non-metaphysical Hegel (Pippin 1989). In contrast, 
relatively less attention has been paid to Hegel’s concept of consciousness, 
so that even in cases where it became an object of serious attention, it was 
 
ii 
dealt with only partially or indirectly in regard to Hegel’s epistemological 
position as it is presented in the Phenomenology (Westphal 2009), or to the 
idea of “science of experience of consciousness” which concerns the peculiar 
methodology of the Phenomenology (Schlösser). However, Hegel’s concept 
of consciousness deserves more serious attention, especially in the context of 
his philosophy of spirit as a whole. In this regard it should first be pointed 
out that, entitling the second part of the Subjective Spirit in the Encyclopedia 
as “Phenomenology of Spirit: Consciousness”, Hegel constructs this part 
with the three sub-parts; consciousness as such, self-consciousness, and 
reason, which correspond to the first three parts of the Phenomenology. In 
according to this architectonics of the Encyclopedia, we would thus have to 
say that the consciousness is a comprehensive concept, including the self-
consciousness as its moment. This point could also be defended on the fact 
that the thought of the practical nature of conscious being—as it is 
conceptualized through the second potency of the consciousness, labor and 
instrument, in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04—is also found in the 
description of the self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Thus a 
comprehensive study of Hegel’s concept of consciousness, especially in 
terms of its relation to the architectonics of the system as well as the concept 
of the spirit, is needed. On these bases, this paper attempts to clarify Hegel’s 
concept of the consciousness, especially as it is presented in the philosophy 
of the spirit of 1803-04. The main questions addressed in this paper are: what 
the subject matter that Hegel wanted to conceptualize through the concept of 
the consciousness was and which problems Hegel intended to think of by 
elaborating it. 
 What we call the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 indicates the third 
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part of the lecture notes that Hegel wrote for his lessons of the 1803-04 
winter semester at Jena under the title of the “system of speculative 
philosophy”. It has been evaluated as a crucial work in tracing Hegel’s 
project of the system at Jena; given that the triple composition of this 
system—constituted by logic and metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and 
philosophy of spirit—is identical with the architectonics of the system in 
Encyclopedia. More significantly, in this “philosophy of spirit” Hegel 
established the thesis that the system should be that of the spirit and thereby 
separated himself from Schelling’s identity philosophy. This is a reason why 
the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 is important in elucidating the origin of 
his concept of the spirit and of the further progression of the system of the 
spirit. Admitting this point, however, this paper attempts to reconstruct it as a 
theory of consciousness, instead of confining its implications within the 
framework of the development of Hegel’s idea of the system of the spirit. 
This reconstructive approach can above all be justified on the composition of 
its content: establishing the definition of the consciousness as the concept of 
the spirit first, and setting forth an account for its moments with the term 
potencies—memory and language, labor and instrument, and family and 
possession. This reconstruction in terms of the Hegelian theory of 
consciousness, then, will hopefully contribute to elucidate the more concrete 
and real implications of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04—beyond its 
metaphysical significance concerning the system, spirit, and the absolute. 
Inversely, it will also be instrumental in making sense of the significance and 
status the concept of consciousness has in regard to the Hegelian system of 
the spirit.  
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 For the supposed reconstruction this paper first defends that the 
particularity of the concept of consciousness in the philosophy of spirit of 
1803-04 lies in its ontological definition. Briefly stated, consciousness is 
here defined as the unity of what it is conscious of and that of which it is 
conscious; meaning that it is the mediating whole which generates the 
conscious opposing relation. Contrasting to the view that what it is conscious 
of is in opposition to that of which it is conscious, or what is active in 
opposition to what is passive. Thus this consciousness, so understood, cannot 
be made sense of in its epistemological function of cognizing an external 
object. Rather it should be understood as what produces its being through 
such a self-meditating movement. Based on this ontological understanding of 
the consciousness, this paper next reconstructs the theory of three potencies 
of consciousness as an account about three different moments constituting 
the being and activity of the consciousness. Especially it attempts to defend 
the hermeneutical perspective that Hegel does not simply intend to present a 
certain combination constituted by such and such accidental elements that 
could probably be related to the being and activity of the consciousness, but 
rather to present a sequential argument to draw a more complete 
determination of consciousness according to the conceptual, logical necessity. 
Finally, it argues that this theory of the consciousness can be categorized as 
the Hegelian anthropology in the sense that what Hegel conceptualizes 
through it eventually refers to a human being who speaks, labors, runs 
economic life, and transmits the cultural tradition. Additionally for Hegel, 
this human being theorized through the concept of the consciousness is 
distinct from an animal being of which the singularity comes from the 
 
v 
internal self-feeling in sensation, in that its absolute singularity comes into 
being as the externalized self through speech. The distinction also lies in that 
the universal generated in human family, the cultural tradition is 
fundamentally different from the natural universal called the genus, due to its 
ideal character. Thus this paper adjunctively attempts to clarify this 
distinction by addressing how Hegel theorizes the organic unity in the last 
fragment of the philosophy of nature of these 1803-04 lessons, and by paying 
attention to its continuity with the concept of consciousness presented in this 
philosophy of spirit of 1803-04.  
 On the other hand, to justify the claim that the theory of the 
consciousness in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 can be determined as 
the Hegelian anthropology, it seems necessary to make sense of the 
methodological peculiarity of this anthropology, in addition to the simple 
interpretation that this consciousness refers to a human being. This is 
because the Hegelian theory of consciousness, or the Hegelian anthropology 
unlikely falls under an anthropological study in general sense where diverse 
cultural phenomena are empirically researched. In this regard, this paper 
takes the perspective defended by Bourgeois and Derrida that the Hegelian 
anthropology can be characterized as speculative. First, the “speculative” 
means that this anthropology does not address empirical phenomena of 
human beings as such, nor that its methodology can be empirically justified. 
But its more fundamental meaning lies in that this anthropology 
conceptualizes the being and activity of a human being in terms of the 
mediator or holder of the spirit’s movement. At this point, the second part of 
this paper is devoted to Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of 
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spirit of 1803-04 in Glas, noting that it outstandingly elucidates the 
speculative character of the Hegelian anthropology. Indeed, the main issue of 
the reading of Hegel in Glas as a whole is the Hegelian system. Especially 
the first half of Glas, which is the primary focus in this paper, sheds light on 
the Christian, or onto-theological origin of the Hegelian concept of the spirit 
and to problematize the Hegelian system of the spirit by centering on the 
concept of family. Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 plays a significant 
role for this Derridian twofold approach, since it is through a thorough 
analysis of it on which Derrida develops the twofold approach. Beyond that 
it is also in these Jena lessons that Derrida sees through the fundamental 
logic on which Hegel’s system stands, that is, “reappropriation of absolute 
loss”. On these bases, the second part of this paper first recapitulates the 
problem of the Hegelian system by articulating its circular structure—the 
identity between starting and ending point, and between the introduction to 
the system and the system itself, as it is argued for in the Logic of Science, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, and Encyclopedia. Next, the main aim of the 
second chapter of this section is to articulate Derrida’s two approaches by 
examining from which perspective and on what base he determines the 
Hegelian spirit as onto-theological; and how he reconstructs Hegel’s idea of 
Sittlichkeit with primacy given to the family. Finally, the last chapter of this 
paper is entirely devoted to Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of 
spirit of 1803-04. The main concern in dealing with this Derridian 
interpretation is to make sense of the thematic extension conducted by 
Derrida, from the family in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 to the family 
in the Philosophy of Right. Specifically Derrida’s problematization of the 
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Hegelian concept of love and death, which holds up the Hegelian idea of the 
family as a whole according to him, will offer an incisive insight into 
elucidating the dialectical methodology and thereby the specular character of 
Hegel’s anthropology.  
 
  
Keywords: Hegel’s Philosophy of spirit of 1803-04, Consciousness,  
Sittlichkeit, family, System, Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel.  
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Through modern western philosophy, consciousness was repeatedly 
thematized in a web of relationship of various concepts and problems such as 
mind-body or soul-body problem, personal identity, and possibility and 
condition of true knowledge. Decartes for example, presented the concept of 
the cogito as evidential basis of true knowledge and thereby provided an 
anthropological definition of a human being as res cogitans. In this way, 
consciousness was regarded as a substance for philosophers such as Decartes 
or Leibniz, whereas it referred to a series or association of ideas or sensation 
occurring only within human mind for Locke and Hume. In contrast to this 
empirical-psychological understanding, Kant considered consciousness in 
terms of a synthetic function that conditions all knowledge of object by 
distinguishing transcendental from empirical consciousness. It is also well 
known that the concept of consciousness played an important role for post-
Kantian scholars such as Reinhold and Maimon to address the unresolved 
problem of the thing in itself in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. By 
extension, Fichte’s consideration of consciousness in terms of the 
Tathandlung and his continuous attempts to elaborate a meta-theory of 
science through conceptualization of the I or self-consciousness are still 
controversial themes among contemporary scholars.
1
 While it is widely 
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 From the perspective of the theory of self-consciousness, Henrich highly rates 
Fichte’s merits, claiming that with the Fichtean idea of the self as the product of 
reflection, we could for the first time escape from the circularity of the modern 
reflective theory of self-consciousness, which presupposed the self as a reflecting and 
thinking subject. See: Dieter Henrich, “Fichte’s Original Insight”, (tr.) David R. 
Lachterman, in: (ed.) Darrel E. Christensen, Manfred Ridel, Robert Sparemann, Reiner 
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admitted that the Fichtean transcendental questioning of principles of true 
science contributed, positively or negatively, to the development of later 
German idealism, the Hegelian concept of consciousness has been mainly 
elucidated revolving around the Hegelian critique of knowledge presented in 
his Phenomenology of Spirit. 
 However, due to the manifoldness of involved issues and their 
complicated relations, doubt arises as to whether it would be appropriate to 
deal with all the previously mentioned modern thoughts under one category, 
consciousness; as if there has been a clear problem domain covering all of 
them. Furthermore, it seems impossible to draw a consistent definition of 
consciousness, nor to identify the object to which those thoughts are 
addressed in common with. The difficulty deepens when we trace 
etymologically the usage of the term consciousness. The Latin term 
conscientia—which is the common origin of the English term consciousness 
and the French term conscience, and supposed to be a translation of the 
Greek term synaisthesis—did not only refer to knowledge of something else 
but is also concerned with moral judgment of our activities in Scholastic 
                                                                                                            
Wiehl, and Wolfgang Wieland, Contemporary German Philosophy Volume 1, The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982. According to Henrich, it is not the self but 
the reflective theory of the self that is involved in circularity between subject and 
object—which thus precludes from understanding of production or expansion of 
knowledge. In this context, Henrich thinks that the entire early modern theories of self-
consciousness fell into the trap of circularity of reflection. In this regard, Thiel raises 
doubts about Henrich’s treatment of the early modern philosophy. According to Thiel, it 
is unfair to identify all of early modern philosophers as theorists of reflection. Early 
modern discussions of consciousness and self-consciousness, for Thiel, are more 
complicated and rich than viewed from the perspective of later thought. See: Udo Thiel, 
The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and personal identity from Decartes to 
Hume, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.17-18. 
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thought. But with the Cartesian concept of the cogito, conscientia no longer 
had the moral connotation of conscience, but was only considered as 
accompanied knowledge of a subject while doing something else. Then, 
translating the Cartesian concept of conscientia into the German term 
Bewußtsein, Wolff confined it to consciousness of what is thought; which 
probably implies that the concept of consciousness was understood in a 
certain metaphysical context, thereby concerned with intellectual thought of 
all entities in the world. Thus, in order to adquately deal with each theory, it 
is needed to carefully discern diverse contexts wherein it is involved—for 
example, epistemological, ethical, ontological, and metaphysical contexts, 
etc.  
 In spite of all these difficulties, one can see through the crux of the 
matter addressed by the modern philosophers, the relation between 
consciousness and self-consciousness—awareness of an object and 
awareness of oneself. More precisely, it is compelling to see the particularity 
of modern thoughts of consciousness in the thematic entanglement of 
consciousness and self-consciousness; awareness of something else has been 
considered, or even identified with awareness of oneself, or self-
consciousness has been regarded as condition of knowledge of an object.
2
 In 
                                           
2
 A comprehensive understanding of the modern theories of consciousness seems to be 
appropriately obtained in terms of the development of the concept of subjectivity. See: 
Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and personal identity from 
Decartes to Hume, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.1-32; Klaus Brinkmann, 
“Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and the Modern Self”, History of the Human 
Sciences, 18 (4) (2005). Both authors find the particularity of the modern concept of 
subjectivity in that self-consciousness became the key issue in dealing with 
consciousness. Specifically, Thiel affirms that discussions on the self and personal 
identity developed since the seventeenth
 
century, though not explicitly thematized in 
terms of consciousness and self-consciousness, was essential for the following 
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this regard, Hegel seems to share basic concepts of consciousness and self-
consciousness—awareness of an object and awareness of oneself—with 
modern thinkers, as well as the idea that self-consciousness conditions 
consciousness. The point is clear in that Hegel determines consciousness as 
the relation of a subject to an object, self-consciousness as a relation to 
oneself; and that self-consciousness is presented as the truth of consciousness 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Nonetheless, Hegel’s concepts of 
consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be simply understood on a 
schematic distinction between knowledge of another and of oneself. This is 
because Hegel deals with these themes within the context of his philosophy 
of spirit, the metaphysical context of self-developing movement of the 
absolute. So understood in terms of the spirit, Hegel’s concept of 
consciousness then seems to deviate from a set of problems that we normally 
count for a theory of consciousness.  
 Let us briefly delineate the constellation of problems which the 
Hegelian concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness are embedded in. 
The first material to consider is the Phenomenology of Spirit. In the 
Phenomenology, including three sorts of epistemic activities—sense certainty, 
perception, and understanding—in consciousness, Hegel defines them as 
knowledge of another and characterizes them as grounded on a dualistic 
                                                                                                            
development of the theory of human subjectivity until German idealism around 1800. 
According to Brinkmann, subjectivity is not a discovery of modernity as far as the 
concept of self-referential entity is already present in the Aristotelian thought. However, 
widely examining the historical development of the concept of subjectivity from 
Aristotle via Decartes, Locke, and Kant to Husserl and Sartre, Brinkann argues that the 
modern concept of subjectivity is distinguished from ancient thought, in that self-
consciousness has been regarded as a condition of object-consciousness and 
consciousness has been considered in terms of intentionality, by modern philosophers.  
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separation between consciousness and its object. Following this, self-
consciousness is presented as knowledge of itself, of which any object does 
not have its independent existence (Selbstständigkeit). Self-consciousness, 
for Hegel, is concerned with practical activities such as desiring and laboring, 
and therewith, the liberty of such a practical agent becomes the core issue in 
his thought of self-consciousness. Specifically liberty, Hegel argues, is 
effectively realized only when self-consciousness becomes the spirit. It is not 
as a singular individual but through the universal spirit, the communal, 
ethical, and inter-subjective life that self-consciousness realizes its liberty. 
On these bases one may say that for Hegel, consciousness refers to epistemic 
activities, which presupposes an ontologically dualistic opposition between 
cognizing subject and cognized object, and self-consciousness designates an 
agent living in this world who is supposed to effectively realize its liberty 
through the spirit. However, when we examine the Encyclopedia next, the 
distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness no longer appears 
so clear. Consciousness, the second chapter of the part on the subjective 
spirit in the Encyclopedia, includes self-consciousness, having sub-chapters 
on consciousness itself, self-consciousness, and reason—which are relevant 
to the first three parts of the Phenomenology, followed by the chapter on the 
spirit. It therefore seems plausible to conclude that consciousness includes 
self-consciousness and thus consciousness is a more comprehensive concept 
for Hegel. This does not imply however that consciousness is a higher-
ordered concept regarding self-consciousness, nor that self-consciousness is 
considered in terms of consciousness for Hegel. Rather the point is definitely 
clear that self-consciousness is the fundamental concept supporting Hegel’s 
idea of the spirit. Specifically, defined as the relation to itself within a 
relation to the other, self-consciousness determines form and structure of the 
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movement of the spirit. Or, as far as what knows itself as the spirit is spirit, 
the Hegelian spirit is basically characterized as self-conscious. If so, the 
relation between consciousness and self-consciousness presented in the 
Encyclopedia should be specified precisely as the relation between 
consciousness and the self-consciousness which is not yet true self-
consciousness. To put it another way, if consciousness includes self-
consciousness as argued here, this is so only insofar as this self-
consciousness, not being the spirit itself, only refers to a singular 
individual—which practically lives the world but is not capable of realizing 
its liberty. Henceforth, if we can appropriately discern Hegelian theory of 
consciousness, this theory may first be defined as anthropology in the sense 
that it is concerned with the existence mode and the way of life of a human 
being, considered in terms of a singular individual. A significant issue this 
theory will necessarily involve is then: in what sense consciousness is not yet 
the spirit and how it can become the spirit.  
 The philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 shows an important turn of 
Hegel’s thought of system and spirit.
3
 Diverging from Schelling’s 
                                           
3
 In the 1803/04 winter semester, Hegel gave his lessons and intended to present the 
complete system of speculative philosophy, constituted by three parts; logic and 
metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. The lecture notes, of which 
the greater part was fragmentarily written, were first published with the title of Jeneser 
Realphilosophie I by Hoffmeister in 1932. Indicating only philosophies of nature and of 
spirit, this title seems to be inappropriate to expose Hegel’s project of presenting the 
complete system and to cover all parts of the system. On the other hand, the new 
publication of these notes with a comprehensive title was realized by Düsing and 
Kimmerle in 1975: G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Systementwürfe I: Das System der 
speculativen Philosophie, (ed.) Klaus Düsing and Heinz Kimmerle, Hambourg: Meiner, 
1986. We have translated versions only of the philosophy of spirit, both in English and 
in French: G.W. F. Hegel’s System of Ethical life and First Philosophy of Spirit: An 
English Translation of G. W. F. Hegel’s System der Sittlichkeit and of Philosophie des 
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philosophy of identity, Hegel begun to develop the idea that the absolute, or 
the absolute unity should be considered in terms of the spirit—rather than 
indifferent substance, and so the idea was clearly present through the project 
of the system of 1803-04 that the system can be completed by presenting the 
movement of the spirit; the spirit, initially as logical Idea and absolute 
substance, externalizes itself into nature and then becomes itself. Nature, 
therefore, cannot be merely a facticity but rather the spirit for Hegel—where 
the spirit, existing as its other, is concealed. But the most distinct feature of 
the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 is that it, as a whole, is presented as a 
theory of consciousness. This is based on the idea that consciousness is the 
concept of the spirit. In other words, the idea is that consciousness directly 
expresses essence of the spirit—becoming itself through being its other—in 
that it is the unity of opposed terms, what is conscious and that of which it is 
conscious, or the active and passive. Consciousness is, therefore, the identity 
having opposition and difference as its indispensable factor. Furthermore, 
Hegel put forward this theory of consciousness by conceptualizing three 
potencies of consciousness; memory and language, desire and labor, and 
family and possession. So considering consciousness as a singular human 
being who perceives, speaks, labors, marriages, educates a child, and 
manages private possession, the last part of this theory of three potencies is 
devoted in dealing with the problem: how does this consciousness, so 
understood in terms of its singular individuality, become the spirit, more 
precisely the people-spirit? In this way, this theory of consciousness in the 
                                                                                                            
Geistes, (ed. & tr.) H. S. Harris & T. M. Knox, New York: State University of New York 
Press Albany, 1979; G. W. F. Hegel, La pemière pilosophie de l’esprit: Iéna, 1803-04, 
(tr.) Guy Plenty-Bonjour, Paris: PUF, 1969; G. W. F. Hegel, Le premier système: La 
philosophie de l’esprit 1803-04, (tr.) Myriam Bienenstock, Paris: PUF, 1999. 
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philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 addresses the problem of the becoming of the 
spirit, at both levels of form and content. Also it covers main issues of 
Hegel’s concept of consciousness mentioned before: human singular 
individuality as subject of epistemic and practical activities and the 
becoming of the spirit. Therefore, the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 is 
important material not only in tracing the development of Hegel’s project of 
the system, but also in exploring his whole concept of consciousness.  
 On the other hand, Derrida intensively addresses the problem of the 
Hegelian system in his Glas. In particular, we can discern two approaches in 
his dealing with Hegel’s system: (1) an interpretation of Hegelian onto-
theology through exploring earlier theological writings of Hegel and (2) the 
problematization of Hegel’s speculative theory of Sittlichkeit through 
examining the Philosophy of Right and especially through the analysis of 
story of Antigone given by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit. These two 
approaches finally lead Derrida to reflect Hegel’s thought of religion. As it is 
well known, Derrida’s reading is deconstructive as he intends to reveal that 
the factor supporting the whole Hegelian system simultaneously undermines 
the system. More precisely for Derrida, the very factor grounding Hegelian 
onto-theology, that is the family, undermines the theory of Sittlichkeit. In this 
regard, Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 plays an important role in 
Derrida’s problematization of Hegelian system. Specifically, by characterizing 
Hegelian anthropology as speculative through consideration on Hegel’s 
concepts of love and death and by articulating the problem of sexual 
difference therewith, the reading of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 
enables Derrida to connect the two approaches mentioned before. Through 
this reading, Derrida clarifies how the familial filiation grounding Hegel’s 
onto-theology is concerned with love as the principle of Sittlichkeit and 
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prepares a further step for his deconstructive reading of Hegel’s Antigone. 
This Derridian reading, then, will contribute to elucidate the problems of the 
Hegelian system of the spirit which the concept of consciousness of Hegel is 
involved in. It will also provide a suggestive interpretation in regards to the 
Hegelian concept of Sittlichkeit in terms of his anthropology.  
 On these bases, this paper first attempts to address the Hegelian 
theory of consciousness in his philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. We will first 
clarify the particularity of Hegel’s definition of consciousness as well as of 
his ontological dealing with it in terms of the spirit. For the second step, we 
will conduct a detailed reading of fragment 15, which is the last part of the 
philosophy of nature and is relevant to the genus-process presented in the 
Encyclopedia. This reading seems necessary for making sense of the 
Hegelian concept of consciousness as far as Hegelian consciousness is 
concerned with the life of a human being, distinct from an animal being. The 
last section of this study on the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 will be 
devoted to the theory of three potencies of consciousness, including a study 
on Hegel’s idea of recognition and the passage of consciousness to the 
people-spirit. The second part of this paper will mainly deal with Derrida’s 
interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. For this study, we 
will first recapitulate the problem of Hegel’s system as well as Derrida’s 
problematization of it in his Glas. Following this, we will attempt to 
articulate Derrida’s two approaches, that is, to the Hegelian onto-theology 
and to the Hegelian speculative theory of Sittlichkeit. Finally, we will 
exclusively examine how Derrida interprets Hegel’s theory of three potencies 





I. Hegel’s Theory of Consciousness in his Philosophy of Spirit 
of 1803-04 
  
1. The Ontological Concept of Consciousness and its Implication for the 
System Problem  
 
The essence of consciousness is that there is absolute unity of the 
antithesis immediately in an aetheric identity. It can only be this in 
as much as immediately, so far as it is opposed, both terms of the 
antithesis are consciousness itself, [and are] in themselves, as terms 
of the antithesis, immediately the opposite of themselves, [i.e.,], they 
are the absolute difference cancelling itself, they are the superseded 
difference, they are simple. […] Consciousness itself, although in its 
essence it is equally the supersession of both, appears only on one 
side, the side which is characterized as active and hence as 
cancelling; it posits only itself as consciousness, not that of which it 
is conscious; and it is therefore only singular, formal, negative, not 
absolute consciousness. (JS I 189/212)  
 
The most distinct feature of Hegel’s theory of consciousness that we find 
in his 1803/04 lessons is the twofold definition of consciousness: absolute 
consciousness and empirical-phenomenal consciousness. First of all, Hegel 
maintains that consciousness is the absolute unity of the opposing terms—
what is conscious and that of which it is conscious. But this unity is not an 
external connection between heterogeneous elements; since Hegel defines it 
as the relation in which each of the opposing terms immediately opposes 
itself. Such an internal relation characterizes the absolute consciousness and 
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further allows Hegel to conceptualize it as a whole generating itself. This is 
also the way that absolute consciousness forms its unity, proving it to be the 
previously affirmed relation in which each term is immediately its own 
opposite. In this sense, Hegel asserts that the difference between what is 
conscious and that of which it is conscious is simultaneously sublated. On 
the other hand, Hegel defines consciousness as empirical and phenomenal— 
making clear the point that consciousness appears only as one side in the 
opposing relation. Namely, only as what is conscious, and thus as what is 
active. Empirical-phenomenal consciousness is thus basically defined as the 
relation to the other that stands outside of it. Also, what characterizes this 
relation of the empirical-phenomenal consciousness to its other is the 
negativity, meaning that the consciousness, as empirical and phenomenal, 
exists only by annihilation of its other and attaining its unity thereby.  
 Then the question arises as to the relation between these two sorts of 
consciousness. However, it does not seem easy to elucidate the relationship 
between them. This is because the absolute consciousness determines the 
whole structure of consciousness and thus has no empirical aspect; whereas 
the empirical-phenomenal consciousness is concerned with empirical 
appearance as well as the negative, practical relation to the empirical other. 
In some sense we may then say that the relation of the empirical-phenomenal 
consciousness to the other originates from the internal self-relation of the 
absolute consciousness—the former is conditioned, or constituted by the 
latter, or influenced in some way. But the more fundamental idea Hegel 
supposes is that the relation between these two sorts of consciousness should 
be considered from the perspective of becoming. Thus Hegel states, “the 
empirical consciousness must be absolute consciousness” (JS I 189-190/212). 
Then, a generation of empirical-phenomenal consciousness will not 
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necessarily follow from an already existing absolute consciousness. Rather 
for Hegel, what exists is only empirical-phenomenal consciousness and what 
should be examined is it becoming absolute. This becoming occurs when the 
empirical-phenomenal consciousness negates its other so that there will be 
no longer any absolutely independent being from it. However, the supposed 
negation of the other by the consciousness does not simply mean absolute 
elimination of the other or even alterity itself in a violent manner. Rather, 
Hegel maintains that the other remains as the other even in absolute 
consciousness, holding the form of being-other than consciousness. What is 
changed to become equal to consciousness is thus its form. In other words, 
the absolute consciousness is devoid of its own content while maintaining 
the formal difference from its other, and it will gain its content when the 
empirical-phenomenal consciousness accomplishes its transformation, 
whereby becoming absolute. In this sense, the absolute consciousness is “the 
goal, the absolute reality of consciousness” (JS I 190/213). 
 Obviously, the twofold definition of consciousness exceeds what we 
normally consider in terms of mental state, perception, ability to relate to 
itself etc. The relation to the other of consciousness is negative and practical 
rather than epistemic, and its relation to itself forms a certain reality, beyond 
a formal concept. These points will be more clearly elucidated by examining 
the concept of the middle: 
 
Consciousness is ideality of the universality and infinity of the 
simple in [the] form of opposition. […] The two [aspects of 
university and infinity] are distinct and external to one another in 
consciousness, they separate themselves; their unity thus appears as 
a middle between them, as the work of both, as the third whereby 
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they are related, in which they are one, but [as] that wherein they 
likewise distinguish themselves; the conscious being distinguishes 
this middle from himself, just as he distinguishes himself from what 
is distinguished in consciousness; but with the difference(Unterschied) 
that he also relates both [himself and the object of consciousness] to 
this middle; absolute universality comes to be the middle only in the 
subject, in the isolating of the antithesis. As this middle it [subjective 
consciousness] is itself an opposite, or it has therein the form of its 
existence; for its existence is that wherein it is an opposite. (JS I 
191/214) 
 
This citation gives a more strict definition of the unity of consciousness 
as the unity between two sorts of consciousness, absolute consciousness and 
empirical-phenomenal consciousness. This definition also suggests that each 
type of consciousness marks each aspect of the unity of consciousness—the 
ideality of universality and the infinity of the simple, respectively. Also, the 
middle here is presented as the medium in which these different aspects are 
separated and unified simultaneously. As such a medium the middle is 
relevant to the third term which is irreducible to none of them. However, this 
does not imply that Hegel suggests a third concept of consciousness. 
According to the citation above, we can probably identify the middle with 
empirical-phenomenal consciousness, therewith taking the empirical-
phenomenal consciousness as having twofold opposition in itself: the 
opposition to its object and the opposition to itself. On this base it can then 
be said that the middle is the concept for making sense of the unity of 
consciousness from the perspective of empirical-phenomenal consciousness. 
Specifically it also presents an ontological definition of consciousness in the 
sense that the twofold opposition is considered in terms of the mode of 
 
15 
existence of consciousness therewith.
4
 To put it another way, for Hegel, 
consciousness exists and it exists only as the twofold opposition, or as the 
dynamic relation between its absolute and empirical-phenomenal moment. In 
this context, the definition of consciousness as the middle eventually means 
that consciousness exists as the middle. Which implies again the formal 
discordance between absolute and empirical-phenomenal consciousness and 
the necessity of the latter to become the former.  
On this base, to clarify the ontological context in which the Hegelian 
thought of consciousness is involved, it appears necessary to examine it from 
the philosophy of nature presented in these 1803-04 Jena lessons. This is 
because Hegel considers the existence of consciousness in its relation to 
nature, affirming that consciousness exists as a part of nature. Thus Hegel 
states, “it [the consciousness] is at first in [a] negative relation with nature, 
and in this negative relation it exists as tied to nature itself within the relation; 
the mode of its existence is not a particular [or] a singular aspect of nature, 
but a universal [moment] of nature, an element of it” (JS I 192/214-5). It can 
then be said that consciousness is also a natural being for Hegel. Specifically, 
tt is the universal aspect of nature, and this universality makes it distinct 
from a natural thing which is enclosed in singularity. Indeed Hegel does not 
develop a more detailed account for such universality of nature in these 
lessons, but only suggests therewith that consciousness has a negative 
relation to nature. In this regard, we will later see that Hegel considers the 
                                           
4 “It [the consciousness] exists in as much as it is that wherein both terms, the self-
conscious being, and that of which he is self-conscious, are posited as one, and also 
oppose themselves to it; in other words consciousness itself is in this way something 
affected with a determinate character, as existent” (JS I 191/ 214). (“As existent” is 
italicized for emphasis by me.) 
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universality of nature—the natural mode of existence of consciousness—in 
terms of the idealization of nature by consciousness. In other words, 
consciousness exists as the universal aspect of nature by universalizing it.  
 Then, the question arises whether the supposed relation between 
nature and consciousness is no more than a tautology. Are not consciousness 
and nature merely in a conceptual circularity in which each refers to each 
other? Or, by affirming the identity of consciousness and of a being that is 
established by the activity of consciousness—universalization and 
idealization—does not this ontological consideration of consciousness fall 
under the subjective or constitutive idealism? These questions lead us to 
examine how Hegel accounts for the activity of consciousness. To begin with, 
Hegel presents a concrete account for conscious existence through the 
concept of the totality of three factors: language and memory, work and 
instrument, and possession and family. Especially, Hegel here considers the 
totality of consciousness in terms of dualistic opposition between ‘the being 
of the consciousness’ and ‘simple union [einfaches Einssein]’ (JS I 193/216), 
coupling the former to language, instrument, and wealth and the latter to 
memory, work, and family. This opposition also corresponds to the 
opposition between what is conscious and that of which it is conscious; 
language, instrument, and wealth correspond to what is conscious, whereas 
memory, work, and family belong to that of which it is conscious. Then, we 
can match the former with activity of consciousness and the latter with its 
passivity. However, Hegel does not think of the dualistic understanding of 
the activity of consciousness to be plausible as such. Rather, Hegel 
emphasizes that the activity in question consists in relating between them: 
“But the truth is that speech, instrument, and family goods are not merely the 
one side of the antithesis that is opposed to [the subject] who posits himself 
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as conscious, they are just as much related with him” (JS I 193/216). So, 
Hegel will admit that the activity of consciousness certainly opposes the 
passivity of that of which is conscious. However, he also asserts that it 
should essentially be considered in terms of relation to itself, within itself. 
Therefore, speech, instrument, and family goods mean creating a relation to 
the other or producing such relatedness with the other, rather than as a part of 
antithesis. In this way, Hegel also thinks of the activity of consciousness 
from a certain overall perspective of generating a conscious relation. More 
specifically, the idea is that the activity of consciousness does not only 
consist in the individual negation of the other—in particular, destroying 
singular beings—but in the universalization of nature occurring through it 
whereby it equally becomes universal. Therefore, activity means the 
universalization of both ideas, and therein lies the unity of consciousness.
5
 
In this way, the existence, unity, and activity of the consciousness consist 
altogether in the relation of two terms of opposition to Hegel, instead of 
being just one term of opposition. From this, Hegel gives a further account 
on the difference between the existence modes of nature and of 
consciousness. For him, if natural beings exist as immediately singular 
beings, the existence of consciousness consists in its universality—it 
becomes itself universal through the universalization of nature, particularly 
by idealizing natural elements in its opposing, negating relation to them. In 
line with this, Hegel asserts that consciousness attains its absolute existence 
                                           
5
 “[…] the essence is the unity of both sides, and this unity is consciousness 
[Bewußt/sein], which, as such, presents itself as universal on both of its universality. 
Each of these two sides in their opposition is the unity of both, [i.e.,] the unity of that 




when it, as the middle, continues the activity of universalizing, whereas the 
natural being ceaselessly repeats generation and extinction without any 
durable existence. 
In the 1803-04 lessons, the problem of the difference of nature and 
consciousness is not exhausted with such an articulation of their distinct 
modes of existence. On the other hand, Hegel also presents the idea that 
consciousness is the conjunction of nature and spirit—the two distinct 
realities forming the two parts of the philosophical system. What is argued 
here is that consciousness marks the liberation from animal existence and so 
the beginning of the spirit. In this sense, it can be said that Hegel does not 
develop his theory of consciousness only for the sake of giving an 
explanation about what we call consciousness. Rather for Hegel, the theme 
of consciousness has to do with the problem of the system, or the systemic 
science, which is one of the most important issues throughout Hegel’s 
philosophy as a whole. As a matter of fact, viewed from the perspective of 
the Hegelian philosophical project, the problem of the system covers many 
issues in various contexts in their complex relation to each other. To 
summarize, the system is first concerned with metaphysical issues as far as 
Hegel aims to present the knowledge of the absolute through the system. 
Secondly, the methodological issues are important in that it is explicit in his 
argument of the necessity of the Phenomenology of Spirit, wherein the 
methodological issue is extended to the phenomenological issue in the sense 
that human experience takes an important role in the method. The 
phenomenological issue seems to be enlarged to an anthropological issue at 
various levels, embracing diverse themes such as history, art, religion, and 
philosophy as well. On the other hand, the Science of Logic is concerned 
with the dialectic method, whereby the absolute, or the truth, is described as 
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the internal movement of the Concept, without any reference to a certain 
transcendental, external entity to it. It further embraces the problem of the 
relationship between the disciplines; logic, philosophy of nature, and 
philosophy of spirit, of which the systemic totality is supposed to be 
presented in the Encyclopedia. The system then problematizes an economic-
political issue, as far as it claims the completion of the idealistic system at 
the level of human community and institutions in particular, which is the key 
problem of the Philosophy of Right based on the idea that the actual is the 
ideal, the ideal is the actual. From this perspective, we can estimate that 
Hegel’s theory of consciousness in his philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 holds 
a thread concerning the system problem. In particular, it seems to be 
important in regards to the relation of nature and of spirit, and so that of 
philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit—the problem of the systematic 
conjunction of nature and spirit. The relevant question, then, can be 
formulated as such: how does consciousness conjoin nature and spirit 
continuously into one system, weaving the two parts of the system altogether? 
This is the question around which we will conduct further reading on Hegel’s 
theory of consciousness in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. In this 
context, fragment 15 of this manuscript seems necessary to read because it 
concerns the liberation of consciousness from animal existence, thereby 
ending the philosophy of nature. In the following, we will examine Hegel’s 






2. The Organic Whole and the Transition to Consciousness in 
Fragment 15 
 
The concept of consciousness that Hegel develops through his 1803-04 
lessons shows an anthropological approach to consciousness—for the main 
problem on which Hegel’s theory of consciousness turns is the particularity 
of a conscious being in comparison with a natural being. Thus, we can regard 
the concept of consciousness presented through these lessons as referring to 
a human being—of which the conceptual determination we have previously 
drawn from the ontological argumentation of Hegel: the universal aspect of 
nature or the natural being universalizing nature. From this perspective, the 
Hegelian concept of consciousness seems to inherit the traditional 
understanding of human being as an intellectual animal; as a corporeal 
animal being and an intellectual being at the same time. In this regard, 
fragment 15 is important in making sense of Hegel’s concept of 
consciousness since in this fragment, Hegel argues for the transition from 
sensation (die Empfindung) to consciousness. The main question leading 
from our reading of fragment 15 is as follows: how does Hegel explain the 
particularity of consciousness from the perspective of an organism or of 
organic life—organic life including both human organisms and plants and 
animals? 
In fragment 15, Hegel proposes to consider an organism in terms of a 
triple system: the inner organism, the system of blood and lymph; the outer 
organism, the system of bone and muscle; and finally, the system of senses. 
When it comes to the distinction between inner and outer organism, they are 
not attached by equal weight in this fragment. Hegel is mainly interested in 
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giving an account of organic life in terms of the inner organism, viewing this 
biologically circulating system as concerned with individualization of an 
organism whereas the outer organism has to do with anatomic, functional 
formation of bone and muscle system. To briefly reconstruct the argument, 
Hegel first considers the lymph system in its functional aspect, stating that 
“the lymph becomes the fluidity of each particular organ” (JS I 170).
6
 That 
is, the lymph system is not an organ among others but a certain functional 
one that connects other organs with each other. In this sense, Hegel 
determines it as ‘the real universal in the particular [das real Allgemeine in 
Besondern]’ (JS I 170). Additionally, this function of the inner organism is 
culminated through the superior nerve system, that is, the cerebral nerve 
system: “in the superior nerve system, the fluidity liberates itself from this 
real being in the particular and becomes the absolute universal” (JS I 170). 
And finally, the system of senses is presented as being established on the 
basis of the systems of lymph and nerve. In the very system of senses, the 
universalization of an individual occurs as such. In line with this idea, Hegel 
also asserts that sensation should be understood as the process of generating 
‘the universal oneness’—the organic life as process: 
 
The theoretical process as a system of senses is the individual’s, as 
itself, becoming universal; it is sentient; the sensation is irrelevant 
[gleichgültig] to the proper animality, the formation-process and the 
relationship of the mediate system to it, and as if [the sensation is] 
only an accompanying, indifferent function, a universal oneness 
                                           
6
 We do not have a reliable translation in English for the part of the philosophy of 
nature of the 1803-04 lessons yet. So when the passage of fragment 15 is cited in this 
paper, my translation will be accompanied by the page number of the German original. 
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which is life of the process. (JS I 170)    
 
Therefore, what Hegel wants to articulate through his consideration of the 
triple system of an organism is the process of an organism making itself a 
universal oneness. To put it another way, the sensation does not simply refer 
to the corporeal reaction of external stimulation, which would then be 
nothing but an animal function to Hegel. Rather, what the sensation concerns 
here is the individuality or the unifiable self of an organism. Sensation 
should thus be understood in terms of individualization of an organism, 
which signifies generating its unifiable self. Thus Hegel’s consideration on 
sensation certainly touches a metaphysical issue inherent in the biological 
theme of the life of an organism; how to explain the fact that an individual 
has a number of senses and that a number of senses form an individual. In 
this regard Hegel seems to show a theoretical possibility to problematize the 
oneness of a living organism at the biological level in terms of 
individualization of an organism, instead of dealing with it at a purely 
conscious level as we observe in the Kantian explanation of apperception or 
in the Cartesian concept of the Cogito, for example. On this basis, Hegel 
further gives an account for organic life in terms of fluidity. In brief, Hegle 
considers individuality of an organism the universalizing process through 
sensation. Then, fluidity, in terms of the afore mentioned process, can be 
properly considered as the life of an organism.  
 Hegel characterizes the process occurring in the system of senses as 
a theoretical one, meaning that it is neither practical nor actual because the 
individuation occurs only inside one organism. So Hegel secondly takes into 
consideration sex-relation as the practical process of individualization. In 
 
23 
other words, for Hegel, sex-relation makes possible the individualization of 
an organism that occurs through the practical, actual relation between two 
sexually different individuals. But in Hegel’s understanding, the sex relation 
does not concern only the individualization of an organism, but also the 
generation of the universal, the genus (Gattung). Genus thus means the 
universal maintained through the relation between sexually different 
individuals. Especially, Hegel thinks of this universal as the most supreme 
essence of animal beings: “it [the sex-relation] is only the relation of the 
individual to the other; the genus is the not-emerging middle (die nicht 
hervortretende Mitte), which, as such, would not relate itself to the 
individual. But the absolute essence of the animal individual consists in 
being genus, Idea, the universal” (JS I 170). However, the most important 
idea that Hegel wants to articulate in terms of the sex-relation is that those 
two factors, universality and individuality, oppose each other in the life of an 
organism, and that the essence of the life of an organism consists in the very 
opposition between universality and individuality: “this side, wherein it [the 
animal individual] is the universal, mediating nerve, is opposed to its 
individuality itself” (JS I 170-1). Thus eventually, Hegel would assert that 
the individuality of an organism should be eliminated for the subsistence of 
the universal called genus, which would render the death of individuals 
necessary. In this way, the opposition between universality and individuality 
characterizes the life of organic beings at its practical level, whereas their 
accordance marks its internal process of individualization.  
From this comes Hegel’s thesis that the discordance of individuality 
and universality forms an organic whole
7
. In this regard fragment 15 in the 
                                           
7 This idea of the strained relation of the two terms resonates throughout Hegel’s 
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1803-04 lessons is worth noting especially in that Hegel here considers the 
organic whole in terms of the life of an organism. Furthermore, Hegel asserts 
that disease is a necessary moment of the organic whole, and thus, to make 
sense of the organic whole, it is necessary to elucidate the particular 
significance of disease in its inseparable relationship to the life of an 
organism. In line with this, Hegel criticizes two theories: the humoral 
pathology and the stimulation-reaction theory. The error of the humoral 
pathology, in Hegel’s view, lies in that they attempt to only separately make 
sense of the individual parts of an organism, as if they could be completely 
separated from each other. They thus do not concern themselves with the life 
of an organism. On the other hand, the stimulation-reaction theory, Hegel 
criticizes, does not consider the actual real organs beyond a quantitative 
apprehension of the stimulation-reaction relation. However Hegel believes 
that they are right in that they grasp life and disease as absolutely related to 
each other, which makes a great contribution to the understanding of the life 
of an organism. In other words, if an organic being is no different from dead 
material, the latter makes intelligible the bodily activity of an organic being. 
Despite of this, this activity, understood in the stimulation-reaction relation, 
is nothing but a mechanic activity, not the vivid activity that is peculiar to an 
organism for Hegel. Thus Hegel himself suggests to think of the integrated 
relation between inner and outer organism. They form a whole body in their 
                                                                                                            
mature works, forming the core of his logical framework and ontological insight. Hegel 
will give an explanation, for example, on the organization of a social space and of its 
mechanism as well as with the idea of inter-constitutive relationship between singular 
subjects and universal order. The historical development of the European community 
from ancient Greek to his own time which signifies the history of the development of 
freedom for Hegel, is also interpreted as the successive process wherein the individual 





 But it does not seem that Hegel matches each of these 
systems to a certain organ. What they represent is conceptual principles of 
the life of an organism. That is, ‘the indifference of the fluidity’ and ‘the 
difference of the moments’. In short, the life of an organism consists in their 
immediate connection, while disease in their separation: 
 
The organism essentially has its life in being the movement that 
potentiates itself from the indifference of the fluidity into the 
difference of its moments and holds its different movement in the 
fluidity. This immediacy of the passage that this middle is not 
opposed to its aspects is the essence of the animal organism. As the 
indifference of the fluidity is separated from the absolute 
differentiated-becoming and is opposed to it, disease is set in this 
way in the organism. (JS I 171) 
 
So affirming that each organ has its own fixed form, Hegel also argues that 
the articulation and formation are not fixed but always face fluidization, 
which means they are always involved in a probable change. If fluidization 
takes place, then differentiation and articulation will follow it, which is not 
absolutely fixed but will be fluidified again. Differentiation and fluidization 
take place altogether and therein lies the essence of the life of an animal 
organism. This is the organism’s way of constituting its life. Hence, they 
                                           
8
 “As the difference of the external and internal organisms, as we have cognized the 
former as itself in bones and muscle, the latter as itself in nerve and blood, this must not 
be understood therewith as if bones and muscle would be separated from nerve and 
blood, but rather each organic part is the whole of the organism itself, and the bone is in 
itself also muscle, nerve, and blood, the muscle is blood and nerve, and the nerve is the 
same” (JS I 170) 
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correspond to the inner and outer organism respectively, as Hegel states that 
“each part itself is likewise immediately inner and outer organism, the fluid 
that differentiates itself in itself and the falling back into the same” (JS I 171). 
Therefore, the distinction between inner and outer organism is concerned 
with those operations forming the life of an organism, beyond the biological 
or functional distinction between physical organs. Additionally, it also 
reveals the basic framework of Hegel’s philosophy of nature during his Jena 
period, according to which natural beings exist as the opposing unity of two 
forces or tendencies—that is, to stay in the non-differentiated state and to 
potentiate itself into the differentiated state. However, those two terms, 
fluidization and differentiation semantically do not have the same value, 
since Hegel regards them as two aspects of the third term, fluidity: the 
fluidization and the differentiation are “the two aspects of the fluidity as the 
middle” (JS I 171). It follows then that fluidity is not merely attributed to one 
of the properties such as the physical system of blood and nerve, nor to one 
of the constitutive principles or tendencies of the life of an organism. More 
significantly, it refers to a certain operation that connects two opposing 
tendencies, enabling the life of an organism: the operation that, however, has 
little to do with any empirical, physical activity, but cannot be but purely 
conceptualized.  
 We thus observe that the concept of fluidity becomes more abstract 
with Hegel’s argumentation proceeding as follows; what comes first is the 
inner organism identified with the system of blood/lymph and nerve, which 
is then followed by the tendency to send back the living organism to the non-
differentiated state; fluidity then means the conceptual operation enabling the 
organic life. Thus fluidity, not differentiation, is the principle of the organic 
life for Hegel. In this regard, reduplication of this concept is significant. That 
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is, it accomplishes its role of connecting other organs by becoming the inner 
organism, but it is also the power to remain as the non-differentiated state, 
resisting to become itself a fixed organ. In the first place it is passive but in 
the second it is active, even destructive. Hegel’s idea would then be that one 
could not give any plausible explanation on the life of an organism by 
holding the concept of fluidity only as the one term of the opposing relation. 
Fluidity would then come into being with itself fixed—as the qualitatively 
same as the other potency—and the connection between the two terms would 
then be left inexplicable. Therefore, Hegel thinks of the fluidity as the 
universal medium wherein fluidity itself and differentiation are intertwined. 
Furthermore, this reduplicated concept of fluidity, Hegel would assert, is 
capable of explaining life and disease at once. If the life of an organism 
consists in the very mediation of two terms, fluidity and differentiation, the 
disease appears when fluidity is isolated from the differentiating operation 
and so does not play the role of mediating two terms. Therefore, fluidity is 
the principle of a life and that of its dissolution as well.  
 Finally, we will concentrate on Hegel’s stance with sensation, with 
which the transition from organic life to consciousness is asserted. As we 
have previously seen, Hegel regards sensation as the individualizing process 
of an organism. Namely, it is as the system of senses constituted by the 
combination of the inner and outer organism that an organism can be an 
individual with its unifiable self. To put it another way, it is through 
sensation that an organism exists as an individual, as such a whole. However, 
Hegel does not consider sensation only in terms of a relation to an external 
object. Sensation is essentially self-relational, as Hegel states that “it [the 
animal] has its being-other than itself in its singularity, in its simplicity, and 
senses itself” (JS I 179), “then, it [the animal] senses itself as the organic, the 
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living being for the first time (JS I 181)”. So the sensation Hegel brings into 
the center of his argument is self-sensation of an organism—sensing itself as 
an organism, as a living being, and precisely as an individual or singular 
being. Thus it is when it senses itself as a singular being that an organism is a 
whole oneness, and thus as a singular being for Hegel. On the other hand, the 
self-sensation also concerns the universality of an organism, in the sense that 
it is relevant to ‘the being-other of its singularity (das Anderssein seiner 
Einzelheit)’ (JS I 181). This point can be explicated by the genus-process. To 
begin with, the self-sensation Hegel thinks of implies the capacity of 
intuiting the other organism as a singular organism. To be more specific, a 
singular organism senses itself as a singular one when it cognizes another 
singular organism as a singular one. Which means that the self-sensation is a 
kind of reflective cognition coming into being through the relation to the 
other. We can then probably say that Hegel bears the concept of intuitional, 
sensational recognition besides the intellectual recognition between rational 
beings—that is, the recognition relation between sexually different organisms. 
It thus enables organisms to enter a sex-relation and to reproduce a new 
individual, which makes a certain species, the particularized genus, exist. 
Therefore the individuality of an organism consists in that a singular 
organism also exists as a generic being, one that is involved in the genus-
process.  
Therefore the concept of the self-sensation allows the twofold level of 
the organic whole: individuality understood as the oneness of a singular 
being and universality an organism has as a generic being; “the for-itself-
being of the individual, its producing itself and formatting itself becomes 
empty illusion; it is, as it believes to produce itself, a product of the whole 
and produces the whole” (JS I 182). Obviously Hegel’s intention here is not 
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to affirm a substantial, independent being of the universal, or a certain 
transcendental or metaphysical order beyond our empirical world. Rather, 
what here concerns the universality is the organic whole, the whole that is 
constituted by the dynamic mutual relation between two orders of the 
organic life.  
However, Hegel asserts that the genus-process does not result in genuine 
universality. The genus-process is, in fact, no more than a ceaselessly 
repeated process of reproducing a new individual and of their dying, rather 
than the universal in-and-for-itself. This is because the desire, which overall 
determines the sex-relation, only aims to eliminate the singularity of the 
other; and that a child, the reproduced individual, is only a singular one again. 
The genus-process thus in effect circulates in the chain of singularities. At 
this point, disease and death forms a crucial issue again. They are the 
moment where fluidity is separated from singularity, thereby marking the 
beginning of the genuine universal, the spirit. In this context the disease and 
death is also the watershed for the thematic transition from organism to 
consciousness, from sentient being to spiritual being for Hegel. Indeed this 
transition forms a highly convoluted issue, that of the coming into being of 
the spirit by the sublation of death,
9
 which we will deal with later. Instead 
we will examine the first potency by centering on the relation between 
sensation and consciousness. Through this examination we can probably gain 
                                           
9
 “The fixed universality of disease abolishes only the infinity of the opposition and 
passes into the death; the universality of the spirit makes it subsist, as it has sublated the 
opposition in itself, the opposition, the absolute concept that emerges as sensation and is 
universal in itself in the opposition; the absolute essence of the animal lifts itself out of 
its immersed being in the subsistence and becomes the genus, which is universal in 
itself” (JS I 181). 
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a concrete insight regarding the thematic transition to consciousness, and 
therewith, Hegel’s thought of the continuity as well as discontinuity between 
nature and spirit, without giving primacy to the metaphysical implication of 


















3. Consciousness as the Totality of Three Potencies  
 
According to what we have seen so far, defining consciousness as the middle, 
Hegel considers it in terms of unity of opposition and activity generating 
opposing relation between the active and the passive. The definition also 
regards consciousness as the phenomenal, bringing its existence into being 
through the opposing relation to its object. As such, the middle defines the 
peculiar mode of existence of consciousness, distinct from that of natural 
beings. If natural beings primarily exists as an immediately singular being, 
consciousness exists in its opposing relation to nature by idealizing the latter, 
and by relating itself to such idealized elements of nature; that is, to nature as 
the universal, not as the singular. Hegel continues further from this to an 
argument that whereas the natural being ceaselessly repeats generation and 
extinction without any durable existence, consciousness, on the contrary, 
attains its absolute existence as far as it, as the middle, continues the activity 
of universalizing. 
 In accordance with this definition of consciousness, in the 
philosophy of spirit of 1803-04, Hegel develops his theory of consciousness 
with the idea of the totality of three potencies (die Potenz). The term potency 
plays a methodologically important role in developing this consciousness 
theory, although both its terminological use and the methodological idea 
itself remain obscure, even inconsistent. In this regard, Hegel’s criticism of 
epistemological attitude in general attempting to grasp consciousness on the 
basis of the dualistic presupposition of the subject-object opposition is worth 
of noting. For Hegel, to ask whether the color determination of a perceived 
object exists as such without any relationship to the consciousness would be 
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absurd because the color determination in this question does not refer to the 
color itself, but is already interpreted as a concept. So the idealism based on 
such an opposing presupposition could not but fail to realize its project of 
explaining in a proper way the unity of the passive moment and of the active 
moment in consciousness. On the other hand, Hegel argues that color should 
be considered in the totality of three potencies: “Color is in its three 
potencies: in sensation as the determinacy of blue (for example), and then in 
formal ideality [of imagination] as concept, and as name [in memory] as 
related to others, which it is opposed to and which it is at the same time like 
in this respect that they are colors; and at this level [memory] it is simply, 
universally, as color” (JS I 204/225).
10
 So Hegel presents on his own part the 
consciousness model with its three potencies, i.e. memory and language, 
                                           
10
 English translator H.S. Harris interprets on the other hand that Hegel presents his 
own understanding of color-perception and, as such, sensation in general with 
synthesizing the antithesis between idealism and realism with this concept: the sensation, 
as long as it is surely an event occurring in the thing (the determinacy of blue) justifies 
the realism, and also justifies the idealism, because color is an imagined concept. 
Further, it is by the name, signifying such an activity that discriminative perception of 
color is completed in Hegel’s view. See: System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of 
Spirit: An English Translation of G.W.F.Hegel’s System der Sittlichkeit and of 
Philosophy des Geistes, (ed. & tr.) H.S.Harris & T.M. Knox, New York: State 
University of New York Press Albany, 1979, p.192. On the other hand, Hegel also 
explains the absolute essence of an organism in terms of the color perception, according 
to which the essence consists in that “the blue that is felt immediately ceases to be the 
blue” and “immediately becomes color” (JS I 181). From this, Hegel goes on to argue 
the passage from sensation to consciousness and the becoming intellectual of animal 
organism: “it [the sensation] has passed into the consciousness, and the animal becomes 
rational” (JS I 181). As a matter of fact, Hegel often uses the color perception problem 
in some analogous way in his text, which will need further research exceeding the scope 
of this paper—further research on Hegel’s concept of potency (die Potenz) employed to 
give his own account on consciousness in general and on the color perception problem 
as well, on the one hand, and a separate research on the dispute concerning the color 
perception problem made by Goethe against Newton in particular, on the other. 
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labor and instrument, and family and wealth. Nevertheless, it is still unclear 
how methodologically the potency concept functions in Hegel’s 
consciousness theory as a whole. Furthermore, in the example above, the 
most concrete reference concerning the terminology potency probably does 
not cover the whole of consciousness, but is only concerned with the first 
potency of the consciousness. More precisely, it is by no means clear 
whether what Hegel lists as the potencies above, that is, determinacy, 
concept, and name correspond to the three potencies of consciousness, 
memory and language, labor and instrument, and family and possession, 
respectively. Thus, it is undeniable that there remains some conceptual 
confusion in regards to the terminology of potency. Nevertheless, Hegel’s 
exposition of the first potency of consciousness, including that of the term 
potency, carries an important significance because it especially centers on the 
question of how to deal with consciousness, which ultimately matters for the 
spirit and its relation to consciousness as well:  
 
But properly speaking we ought not to talk about either a subject, or 
an object, of this kind, but about the spirit; and in that perspective, 
we have seen how qua totality it comes to be nature, and how it 
comes to be spirit. Subject as such, it only is as sensation, that is, as 
singularity whose immediate other-being is outside it; and the 
articulation of consciousness is how it comes itself to consciousness, 
[or] how the inner concept of consciousness posits itself as 
consciousness proper. Sensation becomes concept of consciousness 
when it elevates itself to memory and language; but it reaches only 




Hegel’s main argumentation would then be that consciousness should be 
dealt with in terms of the movement of the spirit, of externalizing as nature 
and of returning into itself as the spirit, instead of the epistemological 
framework of subject-object relationship. In particular, consciousness 
appertains the returning of the spirit into itself from nature. It has been 
previously shown that, for Hegel, consciousness is relevant to the threshold 
in the passage from nature to spirit, whereby the main issue was to make 
sense of how universalization occurs in the life of organisms, determined as 
the system of senses. From this, Hegel goes on to argue the existence of the 
spirit: the spirit, Hegel emphasizes, does not belong to a natural being, since 
the spirit is relevant to the existence of the universal whereas natural beings 
is characterized by its singularity. In this context, Hegel conceptualizes that 
consciousness refers to the existence of the spirit. However, it does not mean 
that Hegel would give conceptual precedence to the concept of the spirit in 
order to establish his consciousness theory, by presupposing its justification 
in some metaphysical way.  
On the contrary, through the 1803-04 lessons, Hegel holds sensation as 
the starting point of his consciousness theory, putting emphasis on the 
determination that the subject of sensation remains singular and has its other-
being outside itself. Thus after defending his own definition of consciousness, 
Hegel starts his consciousness theory by dealing with the problem of 
intuition in terms of space-time determinations and empirical imagination; 
and extends it to that of memory and language. At the end of this explanation, 
Hegel concludes that the concept of consciousness is attained therewith. To 
reformulate Hegel’s idea, sensation should be sequentially comprehended 
with memory and language, instead of being limited, in a narrow sense, in 
the epistemological framework. It is through such an extended consideration 
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on sensation that the essence of consciousness is properly presented for 
Hegel. To put it another way, consciousness theory should certainly include a 
sensation theory in Hegel’s view, but precisely in such an extended sensation 
theory; the proper concept of consciousness can be attained for the first time 
through the extended sensation theory, in which the main issue of the first 
potency consists.  
In spite of all of this, Hegel determines the first potency as only being 
theoretical, meaning that the consciousness cannot effectively exist as the 
first potency. We could say, then, that the first potency gives only a proper 
understanding of the singular being of consciousness: the absolute 
singularity that brings its singular existence into being through the negative, 
practical relation to its other or object, the natural thing. So for Hegel, 
consciousness can only effectively exist as a singular being only in a 
practical manner. In other words, the first potency should be realized as the 
second potency, labor and instrument—the practical consciousness. However, 
Hegel determines that both of the two potencies and the practical realization 
of the theoretical consciousness therewith as ideal. Consciousness can be real, 
then, through familial processes, including love and marriage, education of a 
child, a parent’s death, and struggle for possession. The singularity of 
consciousness is then understood as the becoming of the third singular 
consciousness. That is, the child who is educated by parents, inherits the 
knowledge of his/her parents, and so keeps the death of his/her parents in its 
ideal form. With this, Hegel includes the struggle for possession in the third 
potency, with which he argues for the passage to the universal 
consciousness—the people’s spirit in this case— or the elevation of singular 
consciousness to the universal one. In this way, these three potencies as a 
whole constitute Hegel’s theory of consciousness. Thus, it is also within such 
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a wholeness of the three potencies that the formulation that consciousness is 
the existence of spirit could be properly understood. In the following section, 
we will follow Hegel’s description of three potencies of consciousness one 
by one. 
 
1) First potency: language and memory 
 
Consciousness in its ideal potency, as concept, has elevated itself 
immediately out of sensation; sensation, posited as ideal or as 
sublated is a singularity for which other-being is something else 
outside it, not immediately itself. The ideality of sensation, or its 
coming to be consciousness, has as its immediate goal that [active] 
sensation shall become in consciousness something inwardly 
opposed that has its other-being, and hence precisely the object 
sensed, in itself, and the sensing [subject] shall become in himself a 
universal. Sensation as singular is to become infinitely singular. (JS I 
197/218) 
 
For Hegel, consciousness is distinct from sensation. As it is explicit in 
the citation above, their difference lies in that consciousness concerns 
universality whereas sensation is characterized by its singularity. However, 
this does not mean that Hegel thinks of them as if they would be absolutely 
different from each other—as if we could deal with them thus in their 
complete separation. Rather, to appropriately formulate Hegel’s idea, 
consciousness has sensation as its moment and sensation is the moment of 
consciousness. The issue becomes clearer when we pay attention to the 
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expression ‘elevate out of’: consciousness has elevated itself out of sensation, 
meaning that consciousness, which was actually sensation, has freed itself 
from its previous state, namely, from sensation. So, for Hegel, sensation is 
one moment constituting consciousness, which cannot however be identified 
with consciousness itself. Then, we can rightly draw a conclusion that when 
it comes to theory of consciousness, we should dwell on sensation first, but 
we should then extend the consideration of sensation to explain what 
consciousness is like in its proper meaning. Additionally, these two parts of 
consciousness should be neither entirely separated from nor just paralleled to 
each other; the former should retain continuity with the latter. So, Hegel 
begins his explanation of first potency of consciousness by dwelling on 
sensation in terms of empirical imagination, and proceeds to explain the 
conscious process in terms of symbolization, externalization, and 
conceptualization through memory and language. This covers the issues dealt 
with in the first potency.  
Hegel’s point should be clarified once again that sensation is 
characterized by its singularity—which means ‘for which other-being is 
something else outside of it, not immediately itself’ (JS I 197/218) or ‘having 
an external contextual dependence on other to their [causal] necessity (ein 
äußerer Zusammenhang mit andern nach ihrer Notwendigkeit)’ (JS I, 
198/219). Following from this the elevation of consciousness out of 
sensation refers to the process of universalization or of becoming infinite for 
singularity in sensation, meaning that sensation immediately has its opposite 
in itself so that its being-other is immediately itself. In this context, Hegel 
first deals with sensation in terms of the empirical intuition. Empirical 
intuition, Hegel articulates, has the following two moments: space and time 
and particularization of these forms of intuition. In particular, Hegel puts 
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emphasis on the point that space and time are in fact nothing but empty 
forms of intuition; they are thus concepts and relevant to universality 
accordingly. By extension, Hegel terms space and time as positive 
universality, meaning that they are: they are as universal, which designates, 
as such, the being of consciousness. But also Hegel sees that empirical 
imagination has the practical and negative aspect, of particularizing these 
forms of intuition. And this particularization is the way sensuous 
representation occurs according to him. So Hegel thinks that empirical 
imagination includes the universal aspect of consciousness on the one hand 
in so far as space and time, as the forms of intuition, is characterized by its 
universality—wherein consists the being of consciousness. Empirical 
imagination, however, is involved in the singularity of sensation in so far as 
it concerns the generation of particularized sensuous representation, the 
referential ‘this’ in Hegelian terms.  
 On this basis it could be said that, if sensation falls short of 
consciousness for Hegel, the deficiency consists in its internality and 
subjectivity. Hegel namely thinks that space and time, though they designate 
the being of consciousness, are only internal and thus only subjective; the 
case is the same with empirical imagination insofar as it only remains an 
internal state of the subject who senses. This dumb consciousness, Hegel 
states, is actually nothing but animal sensation: “and consciousness as this 
empirical imagination is a waking or sleeping dream, empty and without 
truth, [occurring in human experience] either as permanent derangement, or 
as a transient state of sickness, as consciousness falls back into the animal 
organism, and only is as its concept” (JS I 199/220). In other words, for 
Hegel, sensation that we consider in terms of empirical imagination is in fact 
no different from the animal sensation. Therefore, when it comes to human 
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consciousness that is not reduced to animal sensation, it is necessary to 
consider it in terms of its external existence. So, Hegel proposes to consider 
consciousness in terms of the middle in earnest—more precisely in terms of 
the existing middle. While the point is still clear that consciousness should 
be considered in simultaneity of the opposition and the unity between two 
opposing terms—what is conscious and that of which it is conscious, Hegel 
makes clear the point that consciousness, as the middle, should be an 
‘externally existing one’. In short, consciousness exists, having its own 
externally materialized form according to Hegel. To put it another way, 
consciousness, so understood as an externally existing one, does not only 
cover some purely internal experience or mental state, of which the 
internality and subjectivity Hegel terms as ‘dumb’. Consciousness includes 
naming of what is intuited and enunciating through articulated sound, 
according to Hegel; and also linguistic reality such as sign, name, and 
language are the being of such consciousness.  
 In this way, Hegel develops his idea of the consciousness as the 
existing middle with a series of linguistic factors such as sign, name, and 
language/speech (die Sprache); maintaining the idea that memory is the 
activity of transforming what is intuited into a thought. Above all, sign for 
Hegel means a thing in which unity of consciousness is externalized: 
“consciousness as this existing middle of its concept is thus just a sign in 
general, in which something intuited, wrenched out of its connection, is 
posited as related to another, but [only] ideally, because it still subsists in 
truth in its connection” (JS I 200/220). This citation seems to be too 
compressed and subtle, but if we can take the term ‘connection’ as a 
referential relationship to the object of intuition, one important point can be 
plausibly drawn; that the sign, which certainly is also a conscious factor, 
 
40 
guarantees at any rate its referential relation to the object as it is. So, by 
introducing the signing problem into his consideration on sensation, Hegel 
probably thinks of intuition in the framework of a tri-relationship between 
the object in itself of intuition, the referential relation of consciousness to it, 
and the conscious operation of mediating them—instead of the dual relation 
between the object in itself that is intuited and the intuiting subject. In other 
words, if the conscious factor of intuition was exclusively understood as 
belonging to the intuiting subject in its opposition to its object, it is duplexed 
with Hegel’s understanding of it as a sign: an external thing outside of 
consciousness on the one hand, and mediating it to its referential on the other. 
If so, not only the referential relation, but also the semantic relation seems to 
be involved herein, since the mediating operation here would mean in fact 
signification. Regarding this, it is worth noting that Hegel strongly supports 
arbitrariness of signification, stating that “the meaning of the sign is only in 
relation to the subject; what the subject thinks by means of the sign depends 
on this caprice, and is only comprehensible through the subject” (JS I 
200/221). The arbitrariness, however, represents in Hegel’s view, the infinity 
of signification, meaning that through the signification, a sign proves itself to 
have its own independent existential value, independent from the signifying 
subject. What is signified, once it is signified, takes a totally different form 
from what was originally intended, so that the sign and what is originally 
intended to signify are incommensurable, untranslatable to each other. But 
Hegel finally argues that the sign, though infinite, is not absolute because the 
sign cannot help but depend on the signifying subject. In this context, Hegel 




This sign was previously, qua [natural] sign, a name which is still 
something else that a name on its own account; it was a thing, and 
what is signified has its sign outside it, it was not posited as 
something superseded, so that the sign does not have its meaning in 
itself, but only in the subject, one must still know specifically what 
the subject means by it; but the name is in itself, it persists, without 
either the thing or the subject. In the name the self-subsisting reality 
of the sign is nullified. (JS I 201/222) 
 
So if the sign, as a thing, needs a signifying subject for its meaning, instead 
of having its own signification it itself, the name holds its meaning by itself, 
which is more objective, more durable in comparison with signification, so 
that it does not need to depend on a signified object, nor on a signifying 
subject for its meaning. To put it in another way, if a sign holds the 
referentially objective relationship to its referential but semantically depends 
on the relation to a signifying subject, name is supposed to be objective, not 
only referentially, but also semantically. But this distinction between sign 
and name has a close relation to the distinction between cognitive faculties. 
If sign concerns intuition as we have seen above, name has to do with 
thought.
11
 In this context, Hegel introduces memory into the center of the 
                                           
11
 The intuition-significance combination is dealt with in a more detailed, organized 
way in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel opens the first chapter of the 
Phenomenology by introducing a common understanding of immediate, sensual 
knowledge, termed as sense-certainty, in which the immediate knowledge is supposed to 
be the richest, truest knowledge. It proves, however, the poorest, most abstract 
knowledge according to Hegel. Hegel’s main argumentation consists in revealing that 
the sense-certainty, as an immediate, singular relationship to a singular object, can 
enunciate only the simplest universal, such as, ‘this’, ‘now’, ‘here’, and ‘I’. So it is the 
discordance between what is originally intended and the enunciation of it that 
characterizes the sense certainty—rather than the plentitude or poverty of its knowledge. 
 
42 
problem, defining it as a process of turning sensual intuition into a thought as 
the wordplay that a memory-thing (die Gedächtnissache) is a thought thing 
(das Gedachte) (JS I 201/221) explicitly expressed. In other words, memory 
has little to do with recalling a certain past event stored in consciousness to 
Hegel, but rather it is relevant to changing the form of what is intuited from 
the intuited to the thought—namely, from the singular form to the universal 
form. To put it another way, for Hegel, it is the alternation of ontological 
forms of what is intuited which memory is involved in. In this context, Hegel 
maintains that memory refers to giving a name to what is intuited, 
determining name as the idealized being of something intuited: “in the name 
its empirical being as a concrete internally manifold living entity is cancelled, 
it is made into a strictly ideal, internally simple, [factor]” (JS I 201/221). 
Hegel thus interprets Adam’s anecdote in the bible that his activity of naming 
of natural beings is relevant to “nullifying them as beings on their own 
account, and making them into ideal [entities]” (JS I 201/221). Then, in 
addition to the introduction of the concept of sign and the problem of 
signification into sensation theory, Hegel’s second strategy is clear: to break 
out of the semantically subjective relation, which is the case of the sign, by 
                                                                                                            
Hegel makes clear this point when he analyzes the cases of pointing-out [aufzeigen] of 
something, which would be understood as signification [bezeichen] here: the sentence 
written on a paper, “now is night” would not always hold the truth of that sentence; a 
now is no longer the now as soon as one enunciates “now”, because with the 
enunciation it already becomes what was so and no more what is so. Thus, Hegel 
finishes his whole consideration on sense-certainty by giving prominence to such a 
paradox of signification: “But if I want to help out language—which has the divine 
nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said, of making it into something 
else, and thus not letting what is meant get into words at all—by pointing out this bit of 
paper, experience teaches me what the truth of sense-certainty in fact is: I point it out as 
a ‘Here’, which is a Here of other Heres, or is in its own self a ‘simple togetherness of 
many Heres’; i.e. it is a universal” (PhG, 66/85). 
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giving ontological prominence to the name, which is considered holding its 
own meaning in a more objective, more durable way in comparison with sign. 
Name is so understood as holding its own meaning independently from the 
signifying subject, but this does not connote that it would fall under abstract 
concept or common noun. Rather, if the name designates a persisting being 
of the conscious ideality, such a being of consciousness, according to Hegel’s 
further argumentation, concretely exists as language, the system of 
articulated sounds: 
 
Language as articulated sounding is the voice of consciousness, 
because every tone within it has meaning, i.e., because there exists 
in it a name, the ideality of an existing thing; [in other words] the 
immediate non-existence of the thing. (JS I 202/222)  
 
The citation above partially exposes Hegel’s understanding of language, 
according to which human language is different from animal sound in that it 
has the interrelation between articulated sounds as the source of signification. 
If an animal sound has, as such, its meaning and so does not need any 
relatedness to another sound for signification, the meaning of one sound, in 
the case of human language, comes from the phonetically differential 
interrelation between back and forth connected phonemes. Therefore, if 
name is effectively real or even exists as such only when it is enunciated as 
an articulate sound, this implies that we do not need to appeal to a referential 
object, nor to a signifying subject. Meaning will rather come from such a 
linguistic difference, and this is the way that language proves its semantic 
objectivity according to Hegel. To briefly sum up Hegel’s argumentation on 
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the first potency of consciousness so far; the first point was that 
consciousness is fundamentally ideal, meaning that it should be ultimately 
considered the universalization of the intuited singular, and that it should be 
considered having its being in an externally existing form. The main issue 
then consists in giving an account on this being or existence of consciousness 
while simultaneously developing a theory of sensation of intuition here based 
on that account. For this, Hegel introduces the problem of language into the 
framework of intuition, provides consciousness with its external being—
specifically, sign, name, and language—and thereby enlarges the problem of 
the objectivity of consciousness from referential objectivity to semantic 
objectivity. In this way this whole process is relevant to the very elevation of 
consciousness out of sensation, which is characterized by its ideality: 
“consciousness in tis ideal potency, as concept, has elevated itself 
immediately out of sensation” (JS I 197/218).  
At this point, Hegel’s concept of consciousness should be formulated 
more explicitly henceforth, as Hegel draws his own definition of 
consciousness following the consideration on language and memory. Hegel’s 
argumentation on the first potency of consciousness can thus be regarded as 
a theoretical process of deriving his own concept of consciousness; more 
precisely, the process of purifying the concept of consciousness from the 
dimension of sensation and intuition. The last step of such purification is to 
distinguish consciousness from language, which was previously presented as 
the existential being of consciousness. Strictly speaking, being a 
semantically differentiating system, language exemplifies the being of 
consciousness, but it is not, as such, consciousness itself. Or it can be said 
that consciousness itself stands on a totally different dimension than such a 
determining relationship, and that consciousness itself has in fact, in Hegel’s 
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view, little to do with determination. Rather, what ultimately defines 
consciousness is, for Hegel, the absolute indeterminacy, or “the abolished 
determinacy of relation, pure relation, the absolute emptiness of the infinite, 
the formal aspect of rationality, the simple, absolute abstraction of unity” (JS 
I 206/227). That means, consciousness nullifies all determinations of relation 
and holds its own absolute unity only through such nullification. 
Consciousness is thus ‘the absolutely empty unit’ which faces against all 
determinations or ‘the totality of being’. The question arises then if this 
concept of consciousness does not actually repeat the epistemological, 
dualistic understanding of consciousness according to which it would be 
nothing but a formal, logical, functional unity as, mutatis mutandis, the 
Kantian definition of apperception. As to this point, one thing should be 
made clear above all which is that Hegel first characterizes consciousness as 
an opposing relation to the other. This opposition, however, has little to do 
with epistemological subject-object opposition, as it concerns the self-
organization of consciousness itself as consciousness. The idea can be more 
precisely formulated that consciousness inevitably stands in an opposing, 
negative relationship to its object, world or totality of beings, whatsoever it is, 
in order for it to exist as a singular individual. So consciousness is not simply 
a term of a fixed opposing relationship, but what produces its own existence 
through its opposing relationship to the totality of beings. Thus its singularity 
should be understood as what is intermediately posited through the negative 
relation, far from the singularity of the immediate given. Its being can also 
only be produced by its own activity of making itself an existing thing. 
Therefore, the opposition of consciousness, as Hegel presents, is concerned 
with the practical opposition and practical definition of consciousness as well 
in this sense. 
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2) Second potency: instrument and labor 
 
Consciousness, as absolute reflection, has only changed the form of 
the opposition and relation; it is related to an absolute opposite, a 
dead thing, and it is the contradiction of a relation to something 
absolutely unrelated; the relation must be realized, and the 
absolutely singular consciousness is directed against itself as if it 
were its own nullification as this absolute singularity; and 
consciousness is as practical relation. (JS I 209/229) 
 
To begin with, Hegel derives the concept of consciousness as absolute 
singularity through previous consideration on the first potency: 
consciousness is absolute singularity which stands in opposition to the 
totality of beings and so brings itself into existence by negating all such 
objective determinations. In this sense, consciousness is termed as ‘the 
absolute unit of reflection’. Additionally, opposition is brought into the 
center of the consciousness problem as its core factor, since the absolute 
singularity or absolute reflexivity of consciousness connotes its opposition to 
all others for Hegel. But Hegel clearly makes point that this opposition is not 
real, but only a theoretical one: two opposing terms previously presented as 
forming consciousness, the absolute singularity and the totality of beings, are 
just suggested to be as such, while no account is yet given as to which 
relation they are making, how they negatively relate to each other, or what 
the opposition can be. So, the first issue to inquire is on their relation. Then 
the ‘absolute reflexivity of consciousness’ above can be properly formulated 
as the self-relation through the relation to others; or in this case, relation of 
consciousness is directly equivalent to reflexivity as so defined. However,  
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this reflective relation is not possible for the first potency of consciousness 
because this theoretical potency is in fact a relation to dead things. Here is an 
interesting point concerning relation: strictly speaking, for Hegel, a relation 
cannot be made to a dead thing because a dead thing is not capable of 
making a relation. To put it another way, in order for a relation to be made, 
each involved term should be capable of making a relation—they should be 
alive. In this strict sense, relation is only possible as interrelation. Thus 
Hegel’s characterization of consciousness, or conscious relation as practical 
implies the effective production of a relation, namely an interrelation 
between conscious beings. So, a condition for a relation being able to be real 
is derived from this: each term of relation should be capable of making a 
relation—of making a reflective interrelation, more precisely. What deserves 
a special mention here is that Hegel draws a further condition from this: each 
term should be capable of opposing itself, not the other. In other words, if the 
reflexivity of consciousness consists in its opposing relation, the opposite of 
consciousness is not the other, but its own self, its own singularity more 
precisely. This is why only the form of opposition and relation has changed. 
In short, consciousness can be practically realized only as interrelation 
between those who equally have the capacity of making relation, and they 
should be capable of making a negative relation to its own self. Following 
from this, Hegel elucidates this practical relation of consciousness through 
the structure of desire. First, defined as ‘an ought-to-be nullified [ein 
sollendes Vernichtwerden]’ (JS I 201/229), desire means a certain necessity: 
the necessity of the object of consciousness, whether it is its other or its own 
self, to be nullified. In this sense, desire is synonymous to the practical 
relation, practical consciousness. In other words, if consciousness is practical, 
this means that it desires. Then, the question arises as to whether the desire, 
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so defined, implies the elimination of the whole existence of the object, by 
eating it away. Hegel however argues that the object of desire should not be 
absolutely nullified. The reason is that with the other absolutely eliminated, 
consciousness would then lose its opposite, namely, what it is going to 
nullify. Therefore, for Hegel, nullification should be inhibited in order for the 
practical relation of consciousness to be possible. Hegel thus formulates the 
structure of desire, which conditions practical consciousness, with the 
following two moments: the actual sublation of object and the inhibition of 
the nullification—the desire and its ideality.
12
 By extension, Hegel sees the 
difference of animal and human desire through the relation between these 
two factors. More specifically, these two factors are simultaneous in human 
desire, whereas they cannot synchronize in animal desire. Or it is appropriate 
to say that the inhibition of nullification cannot occur in animal desire; 
animal beings satisfy their desire by immediately sublating its object without 
ideally preserving its existence. In contrast, the object, though sublated, does 
not absolutely disappear but remains in human desire, and this enables 
consciousness to exist as the middle of this whole opposing relation. In this 
case, consciousness is not merely an opposing term of the relation, but rather 
it is the operation of holding the opposition relation itself—of bringing itself 
into existence by doing a double operation: to nullify its object and to let it 
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 “Die Begierde ist ein sollendes Vernichtwerden, das Begehrte ebenso, das wirkliche 
Aufgehobenwerden selbst und seine Idealität, eine Hemmung desselben, sind in der 
Zeit auseinander gerückt” (JS I 210/229-30). English translator, H.S. Harris selected the 
English term “cancel” or “suspend” in some cases for the German term “aufheben” and 
“restricted” for “hemmen sich”. In this paper, “sublate” is preferred for “aufheben” 
given the custom that this technical term, which is highly controversial, is normally 




abide in an ideal manner: “human desire must be [only] ideally sublated 
[even] in the sublating itself, and the object must abide even when it has 
been sublated, and the middle as the abiding sublated-being of both, must 
exist as opposed to both; the practical relation is a relation of consciousness, 
i.e., the simplicity of nullification must even in its simplicity go apart from 
itself, it must be inwardly inhibited and opposed [to itself]” (JS I 210/230). 
Giving an account of the practical relation of consciousness in this way with 
the structure of desire, Hegel maintains that it is through labor that this 
practical relation structured by desire is effectively realized. Thus, to be 
practical is directly equivalent to labor. Or, as long as there is desire, 
consciousness is necessarily practical. Specifically, being involved in a 
relation; this practical relation of consciousness being labor. So, for Hegel, 
consciousness precisely involved in the opposing and reflective relation to 
the other, to desire, to be practical, to labor, all carry the same indication: 
 
Labor is this practical consciousness as [the] relation, [the] universal 
union of both [terms]; it must likewise be as middle, in which they 
are connected as opposed, and wherein they abide as separately 
subsisting; hence labor as such has its abiding existence; [it is] itself 
a thing. The instrument is the existing rational middle, the existing 
universality, of the practical process. […] It is that wherein laboring 
has its permanence, that which alone remains over from the laboring 
and the product of work, that wherein their contingency is 
eternalized [immortalized]; it is propagated in tradition, whereas 
both the subject and the object of desire subsist only as individuals, 
and pass away. (JS I 211/230-31) 
 
Labor means making a relation above all. Namely, the active term of relation 
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works on the passive term, taking place effectively, and then this is called 
labor. Hegel thus imparts a particular meaning to labor, according to which 
through it, its object is posited as related to desire, breaking out of the natural 
connection it had as a natural thing. This is the way desiring consciousness 
nullifies its object while letting it abide. The object is negated, but remains 
subsisting at the same time instead of being totally nullified. But this does 
not mean in any case that the labor would be a one-sided relation where the 
active term changes the passive term without itself being changed. The 
sublating by labor does not concern only the object, but equally the laboring 
consciousness, so that it is also in this sublating, Hegel argues, that 
consciousness exists as laboring. Thus, so understood, the labor cannot be 
identified with the activity itself of consciousness such as working on its 
object, changing the form of this object for example. Rather, what it means is 
that a certain relation is effectively realized whereby two opposing terms are 
involved in their interrelation and bring themselves into an abiding existence, 
as subsisting through this relation. In this sense, the labor is termed as the 
middle. Therefore, labor refers to to the effectively practical form of the 
consciousness as the middle. By extension, Hegel goes on to assert that this 
practical consciousness as the middle has its own external, material existence, 
namely, instrument. But the instrument here does not merely refer to such 
and such a tool we use for laboring. It rather refers to a certain material 
holder wherein labor has its permanent existence with its necessity. And this 






3) Third Potency: possession and family  
 
To begin with, the definition of consciousness as the middle is still of 
important to note. According to this definition, briefly, consciousness exists 
as the relation between two opposing terms, that is, what is conscious and 
that of which it is conscious, or in other words, what is active and what is 
passive. Evidently it is opposition that primarily defines consciousness for 
Hegel. But this point does not seem to be significant per se, as long as Hegel 
puts more emphasis on giving an account of how the opposition can be a 
relation, how the opposing terms really make a relation. In this context, 
Hegel first demonstrates that this opposition, which consciousness as the 
middle is involved in, cannot be a one-sided relation of the active side to the 
passive side and it is thus totally different from the presumed opposition 
between a given world and a cognizant subject, for example. For Hegel, the 
opposition of consciousness, in fact, comes into being between an individual 
having the form of absolute singularity and the totality of beings. In this 
context, consciousness is understood as a point of reflection—the absolute 
singular coming into being by negating all external beings and 
determinations. In this way, consciousness is first considered a relation, the 
negative relation to others more precisely, through the first potency. And then 
the second potency is concerned with how these opposing terms effectively 
make a relation. According to Hegel, in order for this opposing relation to be 
possible in a practical manner, the condition should be satisfied that the 
object which is opposed to and thus negated should not only be nullified but 
also reserved. In other words, nullification should be inhibited. By extension, 
Hegel also argued that nullification is not unilaterally conducted in this 
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practical relation, by the active consciousness against the passive object one 
could say, but consciousness itself, more precisely the singularity of 
consciousness, is also nullified. Specifically, what is sublated in such a 
relation is not only the totality of beings but also consciousness itself as a 
singular one. And so consciousness, Hegel might argue, can be seen as 
absolute reflexivity, that is, as the relation to itself in the relation to the other. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that Hegel equally regards both of the two 
potencies as ideal, meaning that all of them stand in abstraction of only one 
form of the opposites: “the theoretical level posits it in the abstraction of 
indifferent simple universality, the practical level that we are now discussing 
in that of the absolutely differentiated, absolutely opposed relation” (JS I 
209/229). To put it another way, if the first potency concerns only the 
absolute singularity of consciousness without itself being effectively 
connected to diversity of beings, the absolute reflexivity of consciousness 
remains unexplained in the second potency while the necessity of practical 
relation is demonstrated and its conditions are presented therewith. In short, 
the former is only concerned with the simple unity of consciousness while 
the latter only the relation, so that the reflective relation of consciousness to 
itself in the relation to the other remains only conceptual so far. Furthermore, 
if the asymmetry that consists in the opposition of consciousness is only 
conceptual without being an effective relation in the first case, the second 
case has asymmetry in the fact that the practical relation of consciousness is 
established at the natural level, namely as the relation to natural things. So if 
absolute reflectivity of consciousness is not possible through the practical 
relation of labor, it is because labor is a relation to external things of nature, 





 And so Hegel considers certain relations in which two 
terms equally exists as conscious beings; sex-relations. From this, Hegel also 
argues for the passage to the third potency: possession and family.  
 As we just saw, the passage from the first to the second potency 
comes from the necessity of demonstrating the possibility and conditions of 
the real practical relation, whose opposing terms and their opposing relation 
were conceptually grasped in the first potency. The passage from the second 
potency to the third, though more complex but less clear, is explained by the 
sex-relation and love:  
 
The freedom of consciousness supersedes this need, and inhibits the 
nullification in enjoyment through consciousness itself; it makes the 
two sexes into consciousness for one another, into being on their 
own account, being that subsist; and [they subsist] in such a way that 
in the being-for-self on the other, each is him/herself; so that each is 
conscious of their own singularity for self in the consciousness of 
the other, that is, in his/her singularity, or being for self; and the 
relation of the sexes comes to be one, in which in the being of the 
                                           
13
 It seems to be clear that Hegel considers the second potency as the relation to natural 
things, to external objects, whereas the third as a spiritual relation, in his specific terms: 
“whereas in the first potency [i.e. memory and language] it proved its ideal lordship 
over nature, here it proves its real lordship and thereby constitutes itself as spirit for 
itself withdrawn from nature and independently self-shaped; it has superseded the 
antithesis on the external side, so that it falls apart within itself and realizes itself in 
mutually differentiating moments, each of which is itself a consciousness, in the 
difference of the sexes” (JS I 195/211). This is the reason for putting the term “labor and 
instrument” in place of the omitted subject of the first sentence in fragment 21, instead 
of “sexual desire” as suggested in the English version. Then, the complete sentence 
would be: “[Labor and instrument] is an inhibited nullification through need, or 
something absolutely external” (JS I 212/231). 
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consciousness either party, each is him/herself one with the other, or 
[there is]… Desire thus frees itself from its relation to enjoyment, it 
comes to be an immediate union of both in the absolute being for 
self of both, i.e., it becomes love; and the enjoyment is in this 
intuiting of oneself in the being of the other consciousness. The 
relation itself becomes in the same [way] the being of both, and 
something that abides as much as they do [separately], that is, it 
becomes marriage. (JS I 212/231-32)  
 
The main issue concerning the passage from the second potency to the third 
would be, above all, the inhibition of nullification, meaning that the negation 
of an object should be conducted in a way that the existence of the object is 
simultaneously preserved. Labor satisfies this condition, being the 
transformation of the existential form of related objects; that is, from its 
natural form to a cultivated one. Nevertheless, Hegel does not think that the 
reflectivity of consciousness, the reflectivity being consciousness as such, 
would consist in labor, because labor, in fact, is a relation to natural things. 
Hegel instead maintains that reflectivity of consciousness is made possible 
by the negative relation to itself, which would be included in its relation to 
others. In the citation above, which is the first paragraph on the third potency, 
Hegel presents the relations between two different singular consciousnesses. 
In this relation, tow singular consciousnesses are supposed to be conscious of 
one another, to be conscious of its own singularity precisely in this 
consciousness of the other, and to constitute its own singular being for itself 
through such self-consciousness in the consciousness of the other. 
Furthermore, Hegel maintains that they form oneness in the relation as far as 
the consciousness of one’s own singularity comes into being in the 
consciousness of the other. In other words, the two singular consciousnesses 
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are as one in this relation. For Hegel, such is sex-relation and love. Thus, it 
would be proper to say that Hegel sees in this way the recognition relation in 
the sex-relation by directly reading the constitution of a singular being for 
itself in it.
14
 Love then, ontologically interpreted as the immediate union of 
                                           
14
 Above all, a widely admitted point is that recognition, regarded as the interaction 
between individuals, is the proper principle of spirit, precisely the objective spirit which 
concerns the inter-subjective world of normativity. It also gives an ontological account 
of how an individual, as a human being, constitutes its own independent existence in 
his/her communal life. In this context, a majority of studies on Hegel’s recognition 
concept have focused on its social connotation, while regarding it, consciously or 
unconsciously, as a purely human process without any reference to nature. For the 
development of the theory of recognition, see: Ludwig Siep, “Recongnition in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit and contemporary practical philosophy”, in: (ed.) Hans-
Christoph Schmidt am Baush and Christopher F. Zurn, The Philosophy of Recognition: 
Historical and Contemporary Perspective, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2010; 
Emmanuel Renaut, “Reconnaissance, Lutte, Domination: le Modèle hégélien”, Politique 
et Société, vol. 28 (3) (2009). But what we find in Hegel’s Jena writings is pre-spiritual 
recognition involved in sexual polarity and sexual desire, which is thus an issue of the 
philosophy of nature for Hegel. This gives the ground for some scholars to affirm that 
the recognition concept in the Jena writings does not only cover the problem of spirit, 
but rather it addresses the problem of the nature-spirit relation. See for example: Italo 
Testa, “How Does Recognition Emerge from Nature? The Genesis of Consciousness in 
Hegel’s Jena writings”, Critical Horizon 13(2), (2012). According to Testa, in Hegel 
recognition emerges from nature, from sexual differentiation and interaction. From this 
perspective, sexual intercourse, which Hegel deals with in order to explain the 
individualization of living organisms, represents the proto-sociality, meaning that 
“mates recognize themselves as belonging to the same genus or species, and 
simultaneously that they recognize their sexual difference and the other’s individuality”. 
For a more detailed study on the development of recognition concept in the Jena 
writings, see: Henry S. Harris, “The Concept of Recognition in Hegel’s Jena 
Manuscripts”, Hegel Studien 20, (1977). Paying attention to the Differenzschrift, Harris 
emphasizes the fact that Hegel sees the recognition structure in sexual polarity. The 
author goes on to argue that Hegel’s recognition concept, the formulation of self-
cognition in the other, is originated in his understanding of sexual polarity, and that the 
dialectic of life and death in the Phenomenology of Spirit should be decoded centering 
on the problem of sexual desire. 
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both in the absolute being for self of both, takes over the place of desire, 
regarded as the practical relation of consciousness to natural things. In this 
way, love refers to a denaturalized sex-relation to Hegel: it is certainly a 
male-female relation, not based on the natural desire. Obviously, the 
hermeneutic problem as to how to interpret this love, so understood, is not 
the issue here. The main question is still the existence of consciousness as 
the middle, and more precisely the existence of the relation here. To sum up 
briefly, centering on the problem of relation, Hegel first considers 
consciousness as having an opposing structure while putting emphasis that 
opposition must be a relation. Then, the opposing relation must be a practical 
one, the real relation with a living thing capable of making a relation. 
Following from this, opposition of consciousness, namely, its practical 
relation, is conceptualized as the relation between two individuals wherein 
each of them attains a reflective self-relation in her/his relation to the other. 
Hegel observes this relation in a male-female relation, whose essence does 
not consist in natural desire, but in the oneness constituted by it. If love 
characterizes consciousness as opposing relation in this way, or as the middle 
on the one hand, Hegel develops this consideration to that of the existence of 
that relation on the other. Such is marriage. The idea would be reformulated 
in the following way that the relation of consciousness, as the opposing one 
exists and abides as marriage. In this context, Hegel strongly opposes the 
point of view of the social contract, clearly making the point that marriage 
has nothing to do with such and such particular interests or purposes: “just as 
in marriage each [partner] is mutually in the consciousness of the other, so 
each is mutually consciousness in the other, as his/her whole singularity; and 
the spouses give themselves a wholly communal existence, in which they are 
one not in the linkage with any one singularity (a particular purpose), but as 
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individuals, according to the totality in which they belong to nature. This 
bond, as involving the totality of someone’s consciousness, is just for this 
reason sacred, and is wholly removed from the concept of a contract, which 
some have wanted to view marriage as” (JS I 213/232). 
 However for Hegel, marriage does not merely entail a dyad relation 
between husband and wife, but the triad relation including a child as well. 
Through this triad relation, the theme of the existence of consciousness as 
the middle in marriage is addressed for the first time; the theme of the 
oneness of consciousness as the sublation of opposition, beyond the 
framework of the existence of relation itself, which we have seen above. 
First of all, Hegel determines a child as “that in which they [husband and 
wife] recognize themselves as one, as being in one consciousness, and 
precisely therein as sublated, and they intuit in the child their own coming 
sublation” (JS I 213/233). In this sense, the child is also termed ‘the unity 
which is became (die gewordene Einheit)’ which is also a consciousness. To 
put it another way, the unity of consciousness is, for the first time, realized as 
the child which thus signifies the becoming of consciousness. But this 
becoming of conscious unity in the child does not merely connote the 
biological reproduction of a new individual belonging to the same genus, as 
Hegel conceptualizes that this becoming of consciousness as the child 
consists in its cultural formation by education. The idea is that consciousness, 
distinctively from natural beings, has its own peculiar existence mode 
precisely through its formation by education. So here the becoming of 
consciousness is considered at the level of its content, as education signifies 
to pass down the content of parent’s consciousness to their child, so that the 
learned content constitutes as such the content of the child’s own 
consciousness. Or, in Hegel’s own terms, “consciousness that is posited for 
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him [the child] as other than that which he is himself, shall become his own” 
(JS I 214/233). By extension, identifying in this way the effective becoming 
of consciousness to its cultural formation, that is, education of the child, 
Hegel makes another point as to the parent’s death, stating that “as they 
[parents] educate it [child], they posit their achieved consciousness in it, and 
they generate their death”(JS I 214/233). Another way to put it, 
“consciousness is here the coming-to-be of another consciousness in him, 
and the parents intuit in his evolution their own passing into sublation” (JS I 
215/234). The idea is that the parent’s consciousness becomes the child’s 
consciousness through education, and so becomes the material for the child’s 
formation and the cost that should be paid for as well. Certainly, Hegel’s own 
account is too brief to decipher how much, metaphorically, the term death is 
used here, whether it also connotes the biological death or not. Additionally, 
the conceptually controversial relation between the terms death and sublation 
remains unclear here. But the most clear point regard to the death and 
sublation of parents is that Hegel formulates the issue that is the ideality of 
the world therewith. In other words, the opposing term to which the 
consciousness relates itself, in this third potency, is the ideal world, or 
inorganic nature constituted with the consciousness and knowledge from 
parents. Thus, the opposing relation in the third potency is distinct from 
conceptual, abstract opposition in the first potency between the absolute 
singularity and the totality of beings; and from the opposition to natural 
things, the objects of desire and labor in the second potency, in that it 
opposes itself to the consciousness, namely, the ideal world from the 
consciousness of parents. Hegel briefly formulates this opposition as that 
between the singular and the ideal, comparing it to the previous opposition 
between the singular and the external (JS I 215/234). Thus the becoming of 
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consciousness means the realization of this ideal world by the child. This 
realization is not one-sided, as if an already complete ideal world preexists, 
so that realization would be no more but transformation of its form without 
any change in content, from which any new content would not be generated. 
It should rather be understood as much more dynamic, as Hegel argues that it 
includes the contradiction between the real world of the child on the one 
hand and the ideal world of the parents on the other. The realization, namely, 
can be said to be the dynamic resolution of this contradiction.  
 When it comes to an account of consciousness and of its singularity, 
we can then say that Hegel identifies the educational relation in family and 
the cultural formation made through it as the minimum conditions for 
consciousness existing as singular. Namely, if consciousness is considered a 
certain singular being having its own totality, the consciousness as such 
exists, only as the cultural individual formed by education. And then, the 
becoming of consciousness, the term through which Hegel gives an account 
of the unity of consciousness, catches the particular mechanism through 
which singular consciousness is culturally formed as individual. So Hegel 
characterizes the becoming of consciousness as for itself as such:  
 
In this way the totality of consciousness is in the family the totality 
as an evolution into being for itself [ein für sich selbst Werdendes]; 
the individual intuits himself in the other; the other is the same 
whole of consciousness, and it has its consciousness in the other, 
[…]. (JS I 215-16/234-35) 
 
If this is the case, the totality of consciousness here does not only concern 
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the singularity of an individual. Rather, the totality, as far as it is involved in 
the becoming of consciousness or the cultural formation of consciousness, 
also signifies the totality of this whole process of formation itself. 
 
4) Consciousness, recognition, and sprit.  
 
The whole theory of three potencies of consciousness, as we have seen 
above, resolves itself into the concept of consciousness as totality. In short, 
consciousness is totality and this addresses the issues of the ideality of the 
world and singularity of consciousness. The first thing to be made clear here 
is that consciousness is no longer understood in terms of the opposing 
relation to natural things as it was the case for labor. Instead, the external 
world to which consciousness is related is now considered ideal; it is relevant 
to the cultural world formed through the educational relation in family, and 
this ideal world is where the becoming of consciousness occurs for itself. In 
line with this, the so-called natural thing as it stands is meaningless here and 
there is nothing that would have its own being for itself and value 
independently from consciousness. All beings and determinations 
constituting the external world, to which consciousness relates itself, have 
their being and value only if they are related to consciousness. In this sense, 
Hegel’s formulation, which is dispersed in a somewhat discursive way, can 
be reformulated as the world is the extension of the being and possession of 
consciousness. In Hegel’s own terms: “the thing, the determinate [property], 
does not come into consideration as to its value, or as a thing at all; it is, 
rather, wholly nullified, wholly ideal; the point is just this, it is connected 
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with me, that I am one consciousness [and it] has lost its antithesis status 
against me” (JS I 217-218/236-237).  
The thesis that consciousness is totality, however, does not merely 
concern such ideality of social or cultural space: this space, distinctively 
from natural space, is constituted by conscious elements, conscious beings 
and determinations. More significantly, what this thesis is rather concerned 
with is the singularity of consciousness. Obviously, there seems to be an 
underlying idea that consciousness should be regarded as what exists as the 
singular. Consequently, Hegel’s idea is that if the world is such an extension 
of the being of consciousness, it is only when it makes such ideal elements in 
the world its own that consciousness actually exists as a singular being. In 
this regard, Hegel’s idea on the singularity of consciousness is highly worth 
noting. First, Hegel argues that the singularity, when it comes to 
consciousness, is attained only when consciousness ties its possessions and 
being with its own essence as a whole. In this sense, that consciousness is the 
singular also means that it is the whole (das Ganze). But this process through 
which consciousness attains its singularity, according to Hegel’s further 
argument, must be in line with depriving other consciousness from its 
singular aspect. The opposing consciousnesses to each other must cognize 
the other as the one who will deprive itself from its singularity, and it is 
through such exclusion of the other consciousness from its singularity that 
consciousness, as a singular being, can be a true totality: “that each appears 
in the consciousness of the other as someone who excludes him from the 
whole extension of his singular aspects; that he is an actual totality in this 
exclusive agency of his” (JS I 218/227). Thus for Hegel, it is necessary to 
damage the other consciousness in order for a consciousness to be able to be 
a singular being, and thus there is supposed to be a struggle for singularity 
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and this struggle is termed recognition. In Hegel’s own formulation: “each 
posits himself in the consciousness of the other, cancels the singularity of the 
other, or each [posits] the other in his consciousness as an absolute 
singularity of consciousness” (JS I 217/236). The third point regarding the 
singularity of consciousness lies in the previous determination that 
consciousness, as far as it is a singular being, is the whole. Thus for Hegel, it 
is hardly ever the case that the damage is partially possible. If one injures 
some singular aspect of the other, what is injured is in fact the consciousness 
as the whole itself, as the united integrity. In this sense, Hegel determines 
such injuring as infinite: “the injuring of any one of his single aspects is 
therefore infinite, it is an absolute offense, and offense against integrity, an 
offense to his honor; and the collision about any single point is a struggle for 
the whole” (JS I 217/236).  
 For Hegel, consciousness exists as a singular totality only when it is 
recognized as such by the other consciousness and thereby cognizes itself as 
such: “it is absolutely necessary that the totality which consciousness has 
reached in the family recognizes itself as the totality it is in another such 
totality of consciousness; in this cognition each [family head] is for the other 
immediately an absolute singular” (JS I 217/236). In this regard Hegel 
certainly affirms the difference of the conscious singularity from the 
singularity of natural beings as a given thing, as such static facticity. So, after 
arguing the ideality of the world with the thesis that consciousness is totality, 
Hegel goes on to describe the recognition struggle for the singularity. First, 
Hegel stresses that the recognition should be effective (wirklich). Namely, 
recognition cannot occur as some type of verbal activities such as assurance, 
threat, or promise, but rather must be the actual activity of practically doing 
harm to the other. More precisely, Hegel maintains that recognition occurs 
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through injuring the being and possessing the other. So evidently Hegel 
considers recognition as some violent injuring which will actually be done to 
the other rather than a certain verbal, cognitive activity, a certain peaceful 
agreement: “Hence they must injure one another. The fact that each posits 
himself as exclusive totality in the singularity of his existence must become 
actual; the offense is necessary, [since] the other can only make his exclusion 
of another actual because I disturb him in his apparent phenomenal being” 
(JS I 219/238).  
The actual struggle surrounding private possession per se, nevertheless, 
is not the main issue here. What Hegel wants to articulate rather is the 
relation between the singular consciousnesses because it is through the 
mutual relation between consciousnesses that each should prove itself a 
singular totality, and it is through injuring the other that they enter into this 
relation. More precisely formulated in Hegelian terms, in this relation, each 
should negate the other and at the same time affirm what is so negated in the 
other to be his/her own. Furthermore, the idea that recognition actually 
occurs when it accompanies the violent process of injuring the being and 
possession of the other is based on the unique view of the singularity and 
totality that Hegel develops here; the idea that consciousness, as the singular 
totality, is the whole, so it is hardly ever the case that injuring is partially 
possible as we have seen above. From here, Hegel makes his second point: 
that recognition occurs through the death of the other, while holding the 
determination of the life of consciousness as “the whole apparent totality” 
(JS I, 219/239). In other words, the life of consciousness, as far as it consists 
in constituting his/her singular totality, necessarily requires the death of the 
other, since consciousness attains the singular totality by negating the totality 
of the other and by affirming what is negated as such in the other as its own. 
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Regarding this, the point should be clarified once again that partial injuring 
or partial negation is hardly ever the case when it comes to the singular 
totality of consciousness. That the death of the other is required means that 
the whole of the other should be negated. Hegel thus argues that some partial 
negation would make the other a slave, who proves him/herself to be a non-
totality. This consciousness, only partially negated, would then be 
disqualified from being in the opponent’s party of the recognition. From this 
comes the particular contradiction of recognition: “the internal absolute 
contradiction” that “the recognition is just the being of consciousness as a 
totality in another consciousness, and thereby the recognition is suspended 
too; it is not realized, but rather ceases to be, just when it is” (JS I 221/240).  
Indeed the paradox comes from the fact that the other, being the 
partner of recognition, should not be negated because then the recognition 
itself would be impossible. Thus Hegel asserts that the consciousness should 
risk his/her own life while going for the death of the other, since the death of 
the other signifies the loss of the totality of extension of the being and 
possession of the consciousness. To be strict, then, it would be impossible for 
recognition to be realized because of this contradiction, and if possible, only 
with some added conditions, with some change, or on a different framework 
than from which recognition is understood so far. 
 
[…] in that I posit myself as totality of singularity, I suspend myself 
as totality of singularity; I want to be recognized in the [outward] 
extension of my existence, in my being and possessions, but I 
transform this will in affirming it, because I cancel this existence and 
get recognition only as rational, as totality in truth, since when I go 
for the death of the other, I myself wager my own life, too, and 
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cancel this extension of my existence, the very totality of my 
singularity. (JS I 220-21/239-40) 
 
To reconstruct the idea, recognition is impossible as far as what is at stake in 
recognition is the singularity of being and possession, which has the form of 
external extension. This impossibility is, however, not absolute, as far as the 
content of recognition, what will be recognized, is just changed at the very 
moment when consciousness tries to be recognized of his/her singularity in 
terms of being and possession; the totality as singularity is sublated, and 
therewith, the true totality as rational will come into being. Nevertheless this 
supposed idea never lessen the peculiar tension of recognition, the absolute 
contradiction in Hegelian terms in that it cannot be realized because its 
realization directly means its suppression. Thus what Hegel intends to is not 
proposing an explicit solution regarding the contradiction. The central issue 
concerning the maintained tension and contradiction rather consist in a 
certain additional event, occurring at the very moment the contradiction 
arises. This event is namely sublation, through which the true totality, which 
is rational, comes into being. 
 Sublation [Aufhebung]
15
 is the very one which enables recognition, 
                                           
15
 Being one of the most notorious terms of Hegel’s philosophy, the term ‘aufheben’ is 
generally understood as having three meanings at once: (1) abolish, (2) preserve, and (3) 
raise up. See: Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. But 
Hegel does not explicitly mention the third meaning ‘raise up’ but only points put the 
twofold meaning of this German word: “Sublation (Aufhebung) has the two-fold sense 
in [the German] language so that it equally means preserving, conserving as well as 
ceasing to be, putting an end to it[. . .] . The two cited determinations of sublation can 
be lexically listed as two meanings of this word. However, it must be striking that a 
language has reached the point where one and the same word is used for two opposed 
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or in other words it is the same with the recognition: to be recognized is 
namely to be sublated [aufgehoben]. First it should be clarified that 
recognition is presented from the outset as the only way that consciousness 
can actually exist as a singular totality. But we have seen above that 
recognition implies a particular paradox: that consciousness risks its 
possibility of being a singular totality or the foundation on which it can 
constitute itself as a singular totality once it tries to attain its singular totality 
through the recognition relation, since it is necessary for him/her to negate 
the totality of the other and to make this its own, which should not however 
be absolutely negated in order for the recognition relation to hold. In short, 
consciousness exposes itself to death once it tries to constitute its own life. 
Being involved in such a paradox or contradiction is the first meaning of the 
sublation. Sublation, thus, means the occurrence of the diametrical opposite 
to what is originally due to happen, and so to become the diametrical 
opposite to what is originally supposed to become. So if recognition is the 
only way consciousness can exist as a singular totality, then, for Hegel, the 
contradiction above is the only way. In this context, the “sublated-being 
[Aufgehobensein]” means that consciousness renounces itself and exists as 
the other of itself in the consciousness of the other. Thus the sublated-being 
is relevant to the peculiar way consciousness exists: in Hegelian terms, “it 
[singular totality (of consciousness)] can only be itself as a sublated state (als 
eine aufgehobene); it cannot maintain itself as a being, but only as one that is 
posited as sublated (als aufgehobene); and posits itself herewith as a sublated 
                                                                                                            
determinations. It is gratifying for speculative thought to find words which have a 
speculative meaning in themselves” (WL I 114/107).  In this paper, the English term 
‘sublate’ is used for this German term given the general terminology of contemporary 
Hegel scholarship, whereas the English translator prefers ‘supersession’.  
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state (als eine aufgehobene) and can only gain recognition in the status[…]” 
(JS I 222/240). And then, the structure of recognition, being the only way 
consciousness exists as a singular totality, is more explicitly explained: “I am 
absolute totality in that the consciousness of the other as a totality of 
singularity is in me only as sublated; but likewise my own totality of 
singularity is one that is sublated in others” (JS I 222-23/241). Thus, 
recognition refers to the state in which each consciousness is sublated into 
the other, ceasing to be itself and existing as the other of itself in the other. 
Obviously, both of sublation and recognition occurring between 
consciousnesses  cannot be understood in terms of an immediate 
transformation of one side into the other as if one side literally becomes the 
other, and the other becomes it. If consciousness ceases to be itself and is 
sublated into the other, this other into which it is sublated does not refer to 
the other consciousness, the partner of recognition, but what is no longer the 
singular totality. Thus, sublation here rather means here raising up, and so 
appears as the distinct order from singular consciousness, which Hegel terms 
‘universal consciousness’ or ‘spirit’:    
 
It [singular totality (of consciousness)] is a self-sublating 
[consciousness] and it is a recognized consciousness, one which is in 
the other consciousness as it is in itself, thus it is absolutely 
universal consciousness. This being of the sublated-being of the 
singular totality is the totality as absolutely universal, or as absolute 
spirit; it is the spirit, as absolutely real consciousness. (JS I 222/240) 
 
Recognition, therefore, has little to do with epistemic or cognitive 
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activity, for example, as if a consciousness is recognized as a singular totality 
by recognizing in its turn the other as a singular totality. Or, even if 
recognition implies some cognitive activity as it is the case of sex-relation 
where it is necessary for the involved organic beings to cognize the other, 
and so itself as well, as belonging to same genus in order to begin their 
sexual relation, the eventual signification of recognition, for Hegel, always 
lies in the appearance of universal order. Furthermore what more fully 
elucidates the concepts of the recognition as well as generation of universal 
order is ontological context, since they are primarily concerned with the 
being or the existence mode of consciousness. To be briefly, consciousness is 
not as what is in-itself, but it is for-itself, meaning that the being of 
consciousness is dynamically constituted through contradiction and sublation, 
different from the immediate given or such facticity of natural being; the 
being-for-itself of consciousness is no other than the universal order or space 
or simply the spirit. And Hegel himself formulates such ontologically 
peculiar framework of consciousness as the oneness between being, sublate, 
and being as sublated-being: “these three forms of being, sublating, and 
being as sublated being (Sein, Aufheben, und Sein als Aufgehobensein) are 
posited absolutely as one” (JS I 223/241). In effect, the citation compresses 
the idea of the being for itself of consciousness by recognition that we have 
previously examined: that consciousness is as what is posited through 
sublating the other, and it is for itself since it is also sublated therewith, 
meaning that it exists thus as sublated-being. Such is recognition, and 
therefore consciousness is only as what is recognized. Following, as much as 
the concept of recognition is concerned with the existence mode of 
consciousness, the being for itself, universal order or the spirit which is 





This absolute consciousness is thus a sublated-being of the 
consciousness as singular; a sublated being which is at the same time 
the eternal movement of the one coming to itself in another 
(Bewegung des Zu-sich-selbst-Werden eines in einem andern), and 
coming to be other within itself (des Sich-anders-Werden in sich 
selbst); it is universal, subsisting consciousness; it is not [the] mere 
form of the singulars without substance, but the singulars are no 
more; it is absolute substance, it is the spirit of a people, for which 
consciousness qua singular is itself only [the] form that of itself 
immediately become another, the side of spirit’s motion, the absolute 
ethical life. (JS I 223/241) 
 
To recapitulate, sublating and recognition consist in negating the singular 
totality of the other to affirm it as its own, and in becoming other of itself 
through sublating itself thereby. This corresponds to what Hegel describes as 
the double movement in the citation above: becoming itself in the other and 
becoming the other in itself. Recognition thus goes through not only the 
destruction of the other, but ultimately self-destruction. But Hegel’s main 
argumentation here is that a new type of consicousness emerges therewith: 
the universal, subsisting consciousness. If so, recognition can be properly 
understood as self-destruction through the destruction of the other as we just 
formulated, and above all as self-raising-up through the destruction of both. 
It would then signify a raising up of both since it should symmetrically occur 
between two singular consciousnesses. Likewise, sublating should be 
eventually understood in its meaning of raising up rather than destroying, or 
more precisely raising up through destroying. The issue here is precisely 
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which aspect of the consciousness is destroyed, and while being destroyed 
what the other—the other to which the consciousness becomes—is like. In 
short, Hegel’s idea would be that consciousness as a singular being is 
destroyed and so the universal consciousness emerges. This new type of 
consciousness, Hegel highlights, has its own substance: in other words, the 
universal consciousness is the substance of consciousness or of what is 
called the singular consciousness so far. And this universal consciousness as 
substance, for Hegel, is identified as the spirit; more precisely the spirit of a 
people, namely, what he calls the ethical life [Sittlichkeit].
16
  
The conclusion can now be properly drawn that it is at the 
communal level, termed as the Sittlichkeit, that consciousness exists with its 
substance. It also then means that consciousness, as far as it is a singular one, 
does not have any substance in fact, although the whole theory of three 
potencies is oriented to an account of the existence mode of consciousness as 
a singular totality. Therefore, if the thesis that consciousness has its 
substance in the spirit of a people can be read as presenting an ontological 
understanding concerning consciousness, the ontological connotation does 
not consist only in the simple fact that consciousness is explained thereby 
with the term substance, the traditional category of ontology. The more 
significant point is rather that consciousness, as far as it is singular one, 
would be nothing but a certain potential form, namely an ineffective form it 
                                           
16
 The term Sittlichkeit is generally translated as ‘the ethical life’ in English. In this 
paper, the German term is used without being translated in light of its particularity. 
Specifically, the English translation might cause some confusion of subtle nuance for 
readers by decomposing two elements of the term and by employing the term ‘life’—
which has certainly more than a grammatical function of nominalization, in contrast to 
the German suffix ‘-keit’.  
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could be said, because it does not have any substance, it is not yet realized as 
such. That is, what is really effective [wirklich] is in fact the universal. This 
does not imply however that Hegel would totally disregard singularity here, 
especially when it comes to especially human existence, by giving 
prominence to universality or even totality, which forms one of the dominant 
preconceptions of Hegel’s philosophy in general. For the singularity would 
be, in accordance with this life of Hegel’s idea, the ontologically potential 
form whose realization will give rise to universal consciousness. To put it 
another way, there is no hierarchy between singularity and universality in 
this framework because these concepts consist of a certain ontological 
movement altogether, the actualization of the virtual form. So, it might be 
appropriate to say that Hegel’s strategy of counting the communal level in 
the theory of consciousness contributes in fact to give an ontological account 
regarding consciousness on the basis of the idea of the actualization of 
virtual form. The conclusion seems to be clearly drawn from this: that for 
Hegel, it does not make sense that there would be pure singularity—the 
purely singular consciousness. Which theoretically meaningful tool this idea 
offers could probably be examined only issue by issue, text by text. Though, 
it seems to be agreed upon that the theory of consciousness presented 
through this 1803-04 lessons are mainly based on the idea that consciousness 
should be considered through its singular totality, but that this singular 
totality is only real as a universal one, the Sittlichkeit: and the ontological 
transformation from singularity to universality would be the eventual 
significance of sublating. Even though we need to allow for the fact that the 
1803-04 manuscript of this lessons is a lecture note and the edition also has 
to be dealt with carefully, the structure of the theory of consciousness 
presented through these lessons can now be analyzed in the following way: 
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(1) Hegel first develops the definition of consciousness as the middle and the 
whole; (2) in accordance with this, the three potencies theory follows it to 
conceptualize the singular totality of consciousness; (3) and then, the third 
part, separately written in fragment 22, gives an account of the conditions for 
the real existence of this consciousness as a singular totality. In this way, 
putting emphasis on the necessity of taking into consideration the 
consciousness as subsisting, as having its substance, the concept of 
consciousness in this theory also means an agent who is living their 















II. Derrida’s Reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit of 1803-
04 in Glas 
 
4. Circularity and Derrida’s approach to Hegel’s System Problem in 
Glas 
 
Obviously, system is of main interest to Hegel. He believes science 
is only possible and meaningful as system and thus establishing a scientific 
system under the name of philosophy was the important goal throughout his 
academic career. The idea is apparent in the preface of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit: “the true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system 
of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the 
goal where it can lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual 
knowing—that is what I have set myself to do” (PhG 6/5). Also, we observe 
that the idea of completing science as system resonates from earlier writings 
such as the 1801/02 manuscript for logic and metaphysics lecture, Difference 
between Fichte’s system and Schelling’s system, to mature works such as 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Science of Logic, and Encyclopedia. But this does 
not mean that Hegel would have consistently held a clear concept of what the 
system should be like or how he would have fulfilled the aim. It seems rather 
that his conception of the system remains somewhat obscure while the idea 
that science is only meaningful as system is constantly maintained. 
Ambiguity of the concept of system is apparent, for example, in the 
confusing role the Phenomenology of Spirit plays; whether Phenomenology 
is just an introduction to or constitutes a part of the system. It is widely 
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admitted, Hegel himself left this confusion unresolved by restricting its role 
to the introduction of the system in the preface of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit on the one hand and by including it in the system as a part of the 
subject spirit in the Encyclopedia.
17
  
In spite of all of this, it is clear that Hegel retains the idea that the 
system should be presented only as the system of spirit. Certainly the spirit 
should first be understood in its metaphysical connotation given that it is the 
Hegelian concept of the absolute. Nevertheless the spirit cannot be simply 
regarded as inheriting the traditional metaphysical understanding of the 
absolute, since what Hegel intends to with this concept is the substitution of 
the very traditional understanding of the absolute by fitting it with 
subjectivity. Thus this Hegelian absolute is no longer related to a 
transcendental entity inaccessible by our experience, nor to a fundamental 
principle governing the world beyond our intelligence. Rather, the spirit, as a 
self-constituting, dynamic reality, does not have any other place than nature 
and social, cultural, or historical space constituted by human conscious 
activity for its reality. And this is as far as it manifests itself as a phenomenon 
according to Hegel. By extension, the particularity of this concept consists 
especially in that the self-constitution of this subjective reality is presented as 
a kind of an ideological movement of knowing therewith—the self-knowing 
of the absolute. From this perspective, it would not be proper to interpret the 
                                           
17
 The problem of the floating status of the Phenomenology of Spirit was dealt with in 
detail through comparatively recent philological studies on the initial plan for the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and the actual writing and editing process of it. For a summary 
of the disputes, see: Robert Pippin, “You Can’t Get There from Here”, in: (ed.) 




Hegelian project of the system—to complete the scientific system by 
constructing it as the movement of the spirit— only as intending to give a 
probable conceptual explanation of the world; as if the spirit can be regarded 
as one of such and such concepts to make sense of the reality we live in; and 
as if the reality, or whatever it is called is already completely established so 
that we only need to develop a proper conceptual framework to give an 
explanation of it. Rather, for Hegel, the system is actually involved in the 
movement of the spirit, so that it constitutes itself as a part of the movement 
of the spirit. More precisely, it is the final part of the whole movement of the 
spirit in so far as philosophy occupies the last spot where the spirit 
recognizes itself as the spirit. In short, the system or philosophy, for Hegel, 
cannot be but the movement of the spirit, where the spirit constitutes itself as 
the spirit.  
As to such identification of the philosophical system in regards to 
the movement of the spirit, we can first of all consider it to revolve around 
the epistemological problem of the justification of true knowledge. Indeed 
the idea that true knowledge is possible through system was a great issue 
among German idealist. What comes to the first is the Kantian idea of the 
critique: the insistence and request of the preliminary studies on the 
possibilities and conditions of true knowledge and of our faculties as well. 
So, the epoch-making idea would have been that a philosophical theory, in 
order for it to be considered a science of true knowledge, should set the 
epistemological critique at the head, which then would simultaneously need 
to clarify what methodology is used for it. The question is then followed by 
how this scientific knowledge, which is not only knowledge about true 
knowledge but also true knowledge itself, should be presented. As this topic 
actually stirred heated controversy among post-Kantian idealists, we also see 
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that the meta-epistemological question about true science was being 
explicitly thematized by Fichte’s theory of science. In fact, Fichte made great 
contributions to the development of the problem of true science by clarifying 
the point that the initial principle, in order to be capable of establishing true 
science, must not be placed out of science itself. Otherwise, it is possible for 
an infinite regression between the principle and what should be founded by 
the principle to arise. It means then that science itself should be prepared 
with its own foundation, its own justification, so that true science should be 
capable of conducting critique rather than critique and true science being 
separated as preliminary work and genuine work respectively. In this respect, 
Fichte’s work is invaluable in theorizing the reflexivity of the I: the effort 
ultimately demonstrating what the self-founding science could be through 
bringing the concept of reflectivity of the I to its extreme. But Schelling and 
Hegel’s rejection was evident in their theoretical dissatisfaction of Fichte’s 
conceptualization of the I as, in fact, remaining nothing but a subjective 
principle.  
 For Hegel, the system should be capable of justifying and thereby 
grounding itself. This idea is apparent in Science of Logic, of which the aim 
is to describe the movement of pure thought producing its content from its 
own self and thereby grounding itself: the life of the logical Idea or of the 
Concept. This logical Idea, however, has nothing to do with finite self or 
formal reflexivity that we might understand under the term self-
consciousness. Instead, it should be taken as the absolute reflexivity of the 
spirit and it is this very absolute reflexivity of the spirit that the system is 
capable of justifying, grounding itself. Thus for Hegel, the system does not 
merely define a certain ordered college of knowledge in accordance with the 
principle, as Kant would: the system should rather be the concrete whole 
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possessing an internal source of development while it provides a bond and 
principle of unity (EL §14). The system, which is comprised of three parts; 
logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit, should not be then 
simply regarded as a college of diverse knowledge but as the movement of 
the spirit that reflects into itself. In this respect, it would be helpful to 
recapitulate the construction of the Encyclopedia in making sense of the 
reflective movement of the spirit. The first part of the Encyclopedia is the 
Logic, which is the abridged edition of Science of Logic. This is then 
followed by the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit, each of 
which has three sub-parts: mechanic, physics, and organism for the 
philosophy of nature, and subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute 
spirit for the philosophy of spirit. These three parts, for Hegel, represent the 
dynamic and reflective movement of the spirit: the spirit first as the logical 
idea as it is in-itself, externalizes itself into nature and the human conscious 
life at various levels as well, and cognizes itself as the spirit by returning into 
itself. In short, implying the monist ontology of the spirit in this way, Hegel’s 
system theorizes this monism through the logic of dynamic movement, 
distinct from a certain static substantialism or essentialism.  
 On the other hand, it seems that there have not been many 
systematic studies done on Hegel’s system problem.
18
 The difficulty first 
arises regarding the logical complexity and high-degreed abstractness of the 
presented dialectic on the one hand, and in the encyclopedic wideness of the 
treated themes on the other. But the worst problem is the circular structure of 
                                           
18
 For the study on Hegel’s conception of the system, see: (ed.) Otto Pöggeler, Hegel, 
Einführung in seine Philosophie, München: Verlag Karl Alber GmbrH Freiburg, 1977; 
Vittorio Hösle, Hegels system: der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der 
Intersubjektivität, Hambourg: Felix Meiner, 1988. 
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Hegel’s argumentation as a whole. The circularity is first apparent at the 
level of logic, since Hegel establishes his Science of Logic on the basis of the 
idea that the result to be founded is not different from the initial starting 
point
19
: “absolute truth must be a result, and conversely, a result presupposes 
a priori truth” (WL 69/70), “the advance [in the logic itself] is a retreat into 
the ground, to what is primary and true, on which depends and, in fact, from 
which originates, that which the beginning is made” (WL 70/71). The 
circularity brings forth a more complicated problem especially concerning 
the self-becoming of the spirit. The question here is what the absolute spirit, 
the spirit proving itself to be the spirit, would be like. Certainly this concept 
of the absolute spirit seems to be strongly associated with the theological 
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 Actually the circularity model, when it comes to epistemological justification and of 
systematization of knowledge, is not monopolized by Hegel. See: Tom 
Rockmore, “Dialectic and Circularity: Is Hegelian Circularity a New Copernian 
Revolution?”, in: (ed.) Nectarios G. Limnatis, The Dimension of Hegel’s Dialectic, New 
York: Continuum, 2010. Rockmore first attempts to examine the issue of the 
epistemological circularity in the context of its historical development. The circularity 
of Hegel’s system then, according to him, can be considered in particular from the 
perspective of the endeavor to reconstruct the Kantian critical philosophy. More 
precisely speaking, Hegel’s argumentation can be counted as third one, alongside Fichte 
and Reinhold. Rockmore first clarifies that it was by Fichte that the circularity was 
rehabitated: Fichte holds, according to the citation (p.57) that “philosophical 
explanation is intrinsically circular”. This position of Fichte, according to him, arises 
from Schulze’s objection to Reinhold. But while accepting Reinhold’s idea of the basic 
rationalist model of system in terms of as an initial principle, Fichte makes the 
circularity that was set aside by Reinhold, as constitutive of the process of knowledge. 
And then, Hegel, who was actually aware of this debate, sides with Fichte against 
Reinhold, in contending that knowledge is an essentially circular process, according to 
Rockmore. But Hegel’s position is distinct from that of Fichte in that he denies 
traditional understanding, according to which the outcome of the process is less than the 
full form of knowledge, at any rate. So Hegel’s argument can be reconstructed as “an 




concept of the absolute as a lot of readers of Hegel have taken notice, mostly 
in a critical manner. But it also implies more important issues that cannot be 
set aside simply for the reason of its theological nuance, and which actually 
exceeds the previous theological framework. In this respect, it is highly 
worth noting that the concept of the self-becoming of the spirit, in Hegel’s 
system, has an intimate relation with establishing, a philosophical 
anthropology; for the main idea is that the reflectivity of the spirit, whether it 
means self-becoming in an ontological sense or self-recognition with some 
epistemological nuance, first needs to exteriorize itself to become the other 
of itself.  That is, externalizing itself to nature and then to human 
consciousness and to the social, historical, and cultural space constituted by 
it. Concerning the human consciousness and the world constituted by it, 
Hegel develops the concepts of consciousness or of self-consciousness with 
the great effort, of which the main issues dealt with are: the proper mode of 
existence of human beings, self-relation and the inter-subjective relation 
between self-conscious agents, the construction of human communities and 
institutions at various levels, the historical development of human society 
and so on.  
 In these circumstances, Derrida’s Glas presents a suggestive 
interpretation of Hegel’s system. What we observe in this monumental work 
in the history of the reading of Hegel so far is the highly skillful weaving of 
the intricate issues which we just formulated, which are never easy to think 
of in a synthetic manner: the paradoxical logic on which the system is based 
and the circular structure of the whole system on the one hand, and the 
various, concrete themes of nature and of human spirit, on the other. But the 
most remarkable thing in Derrida’s reading of Hegel in Glas is that Derrida 
holds on tight to the logical problem of Hegel’s system without resolving it 
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at all in his reading. And it is with this issue of the paradoxical structure of 
Hegel’s system at the center that various involved themes are intertwinded 
along with his reading. And the problem on which the whole reading pivots, 
is the problem of the introduction to philosophy, which Hegel develops 
methodologically to support his Phenomenology of Spirit, but of which the 
metaphysical implication can be made more clearly, as we will see later, 
when it is seen with the problem at the starting point of philosophy 
developed in Science of Logic altogether. Through these problems, Derrida 
sees through the fundamental paradox: 
 
Einführung, as German philosophers say, introduction into Hegel. 
Einführung demands the accusative and so indicates the active 
movement of penetration. Not to stay here at or be content here with 
the skirt of the Hegelian thicket. Not to stop immediately in all the 
difficulties, intrinsic or extrinsic, intrinsically extrinsic—and 
supplementary—that the decision of such a stroke [coup] instigates. 
There have been many introductions to Hegel for sale and generally 
available. And the problem of the introduction in/to Hegel’s 
philosophy is all of Hegel’s philosophy: (the) already posed 
throughout, especially in his prefaces and forewords, introductions 
and preliminary concepts. So, already, one would be found entrained 
in the circle of the Hegelian beginning, sliding or endlessly atrip 
there. (GL 10/4)   
 
In short, in Derrida’s view, we can formulate the paradox of Hegel’s system 
as following: that the introduction to the system is already the system. Indeed, 
this paradox has been occasionally taken as revealing the teleological or even 
theological character of Hegel’s system as Heidegger characterizes it to be 
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the delegate of onto-theology. But the problem here, in Derrida’s reading, 
does not cover only the questions as to which position Hegel’s system 
occupies in the context of the history of occidental metaphysics or as to 
which particularity Hegel’s ontology has. What Derrida sees through the 
paradox above is also a hermeneutical problem: amongst the concepts Hegel 
presents as an entrance or threshold to the system, which is the best suitable 
to properly deal with the so-called Hegelian system? However, in so far as 
Hegel’s system establishes a circular relation between the starting point and 
the whole system, once any such starting point of the reading is chosen, it is 
also true that one would find in the circularity that the starting point is 
already the whole system in some way. If this is the case, one might say that 
it does not matter much of a difference for making sense of Hegel’s system 
which concept to begin the reading with. Derrida will also make clear the 
point that for reading Hegel, for dealing with Hegel’s system, we must make 
a decision in choosing the most appropriate entrance to the system to start 
the reading. But for Derrida, this decision cannot be made arbitrarily. On the 
contrary, Derrida affirms that there is a particular concept, which should 
properly take as the starting point of Hegel’s system, which can be so 
identified with the system itself, and thus from which the reading should 
proceed and converge onto: the family.  
 Prior to considering Derrida’s questioning, we will examine which 
idea Hegel himself developed concerning the problems of the introduction to 
philosophy in the preface of the Phenomenology of the Spirit. Hegel starts 
the preface by posing the question as to which contents would be proper for 
the preface of a philosophical work. Listing the author’s intention or purpose, 
establishing the relation of his presented work to the previous works by 
others that deal with similar themes, and asserting the particular significance 
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the author’s own work has are first dismissed. For philosophical writing, 
according to Hegel, cannot be a set of arguments justifying a particular 
position of the author, which would then also contain some 
counterarguments against the opposing position. Hegel supports this idea on 
the basis of his viewpoint about truth that it is impossible and even 
meaningless to absolutely distinguish true and false. Instead, for Hegel, truth 
is like the organic whole in which what is regarded as false knowledge or 
even what turns out to be an error constitutes the truth at that moment, and in 
this sense, it can be regarded as relatively true. As far as truth means the 
organic whole constituted by every part having its own necessity, 
philosophical knowledge can be considered fundamentally different from 
anatomy for example, as nothing but “an aggregate of information” (PhG 
3/1). Actually, this Hegelian view of truth initially justifies the 
phenomenological method, in Hegelian sense of the Phenomenology of Spirit: 
describing of the repetitive discordance between consciousness and its 
object—or between object and its concept—at various levels, on various 
spheres, under the title of “experience of consciousness”. That is, the 
Phenomenology does not address truth itself but it is concerned with only 
what is not yet true: this being the reason why the Phenomenology is “the 
pathway of doubt, or more precisely as the way of despair” (PhG 61/78). 
More significantly, the presented view also supports Hegel’s historical 
perspective that every philosophical system so far constitutes the whole truth 
altogether. But the most important connotation of this view is that there is no 
need for preliminary work in completing the system of truth. Or, if there is 
some need for a preliminary work, in whatever sense, such preliminary work 
should not be conducted completely separately from the construction of the 
system as such; there cannot be a totally external introductory part to the 
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completed system, but rather the introductory part should constitute a part of 
the system. In the same context, Hegel asserts that the essence of philosophy 
lies in directly rushing into the state of affairs itself to deal with its internal 
necessity—rather than in developing the preliminary method to then 
successively grasp the truth. 
 The formulation that the introduction to the system is the system 
itself can be then made sense of on the basis of argument on the starting 
point of philosophy that Hegel presents in the short, but intensive article at 
the head of Science of Logic: “With What Must the Science Begin?”. In this 
article, Hegel highly values the methodological thought presented in his own 
time—alluding to Reinhold’s idea in particular: that philosophical knowledge 
starts with positing a hypothetical, probable truth and then to proceed then to 
demonstrate its truth as the result. Hegel appreciates this position in that it 
reveals the speculative nature of a philosophical beginning, as far as it 
clarifies the point that what is absolutely true cannot be but a result, but what 
is initially posited as true also cannot be but true, in any case, as far as it 
proving it to be true. So, the point that Hegel wants to bring in relief is that 
the starting point of philosophy, even though it is posited as a hypothetical 
one, is in fact already true. To put it another way, what we normally regards 
as the proceeding process from the hypothetical starting point to a proven 
truth, which is the result, is in fact the regressing process into the starting 
point; the process of founding the initial ground as ground:  
 
The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that 
the beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the 
science be within itself a circle in which the first also the last and the 
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last is also the first. We see therefore that, on the other hand, it is 
equally necessary to consider as result that into which the movement 
returns as into its ground. In this respect the first is equally the 
ground, and the last a derivative; since the movement starts from the 
first and by correct inferences arrives at the last as the ground, this 
latter is a result. Further, the progress from that which forms the 
beginning is to be regarded as only a further determination of it, 
hence that which forms the starting point of the development 
remains at the base of all that follows and does not vanish from it. 
(WL 70-71/71) 
 
Hegel therefore admits the idea that the first step in constructing the system 
is to justify the initially posited hypothesis and to ground it as ground. But 
for Hegel, the process of this grounding cannot be done anything other than 
by proceeding to the result in a straight line. Rather, the process of grounding 
cannot be but return back to the starting point, which thus remains true 
throughout the whole process.  
 On this basis then, we can say that it is the identity of the content 
and the difference of the form that characterizes both relations: between the 
introduction to the system and the system itself on the one hand, and between 
the beginning and the result on the other. This point is concerned with the 
metaphysically controversial affirmation of the absolute differentiating 
itself—the absolute in which the difference is implied only as its moment—
and this affirmation explicitly assures the self-completedness of Hegel’s 
system. Namely, according to Hegelian logic, the system does not need any 
exterior factors than itself for its justification and foundation, since the 
process of grounding it is nothing else than returning back to itself. However, 
this self-completedness sprung forth many critical interpretations that 
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Hegel’s system would represent a teleological project presupposing the result 
from the outset, and that it was no more than a theological system taking the 
very beginning as the absolute. In short then, Hegel’s system would be no 
more than a repetition of traditional metaphysics. In this regard, Derrida 
seems to take over Heidegger’s critical interpretation of Hegel’s system, 
which saw it as onto-theology.
20
 What seems more important than the usage 
of the term onto-theology itself, however, is the point that Derrida draws a 
methodological proposition for reading Hegel from the circularity between 
starting the point and ending point—and the absolute self-completedness that 
it implies as we have seen above. In this regard, the point should be pointed 
out that Hegelian theology is not a one-sided movement going in a straight 
line to the destination. Instead, what characterizes the Hegelian teleology is 
the circular movement through which, and at the end of which the initial 
ground that was posited is proved to be ground and so founded as ground. 
But Derrida implicitly makes this distinction between two different sorts of 
teleology paralleled with two different ways of reading Hegel. According to 
him, we can identify Hegel’s system, as his mature works such as the Science 
of Logic, the Philosophy of Right, or the Encyclopedia while regarding the 
earlier writings before the Phenomenology of Spirit as the materials showing 
the developmental process of Hegel’s thought—with the mature works as the 
goal. In this case, the earlier writings would merely show Hegel’s immature 
thought and unstable conception as to what the system should be like. 
Derrida determines this way of reading as the teleological approach, which is 
however unnecessary in reading Hegel.  
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To speak of several states of Hegelian thought, of a youthful Hegel 
or an accomplished Hegel, is at once both Hegelian and anti-
Hegelian. Thus Bourgeois’s book on Hegel at Frankfurt applies 
Hegel’s most preformationist categories to its subject. It opposes, to 
be sure, the “arrival of the mature Hegelianism” to the “incipient 
Hegelianism”, but precisely states that the latter “is engaged on the 
path of Hegelianism properly so called, on which we will formulate 
at Jena the ingenious intuition in writing that the absolute must be 
conceived as the ‘identity of identity and nonidentity’”. In this one 
sees Hegel “anticipating … future themes”, […]. Nothing more 
Hegelian. But nothing less than Hegelian: in distinguishing the old 
from the young, one sometimes dissembles the systematic chains of 
the “first” texts; and above all one applies a dissociating and formal 
analysis, the viewpoint of the understanding in a narration that risks 
missing the living unity of the discourse; how does one distinguish 
philosophically a before from an after, if the circularity of the 
movement makes the beginning the end of the end? And reciprocally? 
(GL 96-97/83-84) 
 
As apparent in the passage above, Derrida believes there is support in the 
differing readings of Hegel directly corresponding to young Hegel’s 
distinction between Judaism and Christianity —that is, the distinction 
between religion of command and that of love, and likewise, the distinction 
between the intellect [Verstand] of morality and the spirit of the ethical life 
[Sittlichkeit] as well. Derrida says, “the risk, then, is the Jewish reading” (GL 
97/84). Derrida, thus, does not think that there is a linear progression 
between the young Hegel and the old Hegel. According to him, the relation 
between these two Hegels is analogous with that between the starting and 
ending point that Hegel establishes at the level of the system. And this is why 
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Derrida holds the following methodological idea: the earlier texts written in 
Frankfurt and Jena already contain all of the main ideas, conceptions, and 
features of the system as they are developed in the mature works. From this 
perspective, it is highly fitting to refer to the earlier texts in order to clarify 
what the system of Hegel is like. In actuality it can be seen in Glas that 
Derrida uses the earlier text in Frankfurt, The Life of Jesus, as the starting 
point of his reading of Hegel, and devotes the first third of his book to the 
reading of earlier writings such as The Positivity and Destination of 
Christianity and Reason in History, in order to determine the fundamental 
character of Hegel’s system.  
 Obviously, the idea of equating the character of the system and the 
method for reading the system seems to be strange. So the question still 
lingers as to if it could be possible, or meaningful to pass over the 
chronological gap among the texts and the probable gap in the development 
of Hegel’s thoughts as well. If so, we need to return to the question of what 
Hegel’s system is. Or, we can ask whether Hegel did actually complete the 
system and publish it in textual form? Previously, we have mentioned the 
Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia as sources that seem to show Hegel 
established the system himself—while identifying the system as the absolute 
reflective movement of the spirit which goes from its immediate form, 
externalizes itself into nature and human spirit, and finally returns into itself. 
But it becomes problematic to identify those texts as the system itself when 
we take into consideration the fact that the Logic alone cannot be taken to be 
the system itself without its enlargement to the spheres of nature and of 
human spirit. Furthermore Encyclopedia was originally written as lecture 
notes and published later with an editor’s addition of the lecture note from 
the students. In addition to this, the Philosophy of Right, which is often 
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equated to the system, was also written for the sake of lectures. By extension, 
we can also raise the question about the absolute spirit, which is presented as 
the summit of the system at the end of the Encyclopedia. Indeed, it is well 
known that Hegel presented his main idea of the absolute spirit in the last 
part of the Encyclopedia while giving a brief explanation of its three sub-
parts; art, religion, and philosophy. However, for accurate ideas and 
explanations of the absolute spirit, we should depend on his historical 
lectures which are also published later: the lectures on the history of art, 
religion, and philosophy, respectively. On these bases, we can hardly say that 
Hegel actually presented what would be the absolute spirit in a systematic 
manner in relations to the Logic and the philosophies of nature and of human 
spirit in an organic and consistent way. Of course, the hermeneutic burden 
commentators take is another question: to chase, to make clear, and to make 
sense of Hegel’s true idea of the system on the basis of the transmitted 
manuscripts. The question here at stake is if Hegel himself actually presented 
the system in a systematic way. We can even add in these doubts: what we 
normally have in mind in regards to the term the ‘Hegelian System’ is that it 
is nothing but a myth.
21
 Furthermore, was the idea that Hegel completed the 
system an exaggeration? To be more gently, if they actually overlook the 
complexity of Hegel’s conception of the system, which seems nonetheless to 
be properly dealt with properly once a comprehensive understanding of the 
concept of the spirit is first secured.  
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5. Family: Conjunction of the Onto-theology of the Saint-Family and of 
the Speculative Theory of Sittlichkeit  
 
 Up to this point, we can agree that the legitimacy of the teleological 
and linear reading, or what Derrida calls ‘the Jewish reading’, is 
questionable—reading centered around the assumed complete system of the 
Encyclopedia, or the Philosophy of Right, and to understand the progressive 
development of Hegel’s thought through his earlier texts. However, this does 
not mean that Hegel would have maintained the same idea or conception of 
the system throughout his academic career, as if we could thus recognize 
what the system would be in his earlier works in the same manner as it is 
presented in the mature texts. Nor does it imply that the concept of the so-
called Hegelian system would be absurd, since it is certain that Hegel 
himself presented the system of the spirit with the Encyclopedia. Thus, as 
Derrida affirms, if the earlier texts anticipate the mature system, it first 
means that we have sufficient reasons for ignoring the chronological order, 
but it also signifies that there is some chronological gap. To put it another 
way, the earlier texts hold all of the main features of the mature system, but it 
is not analogous to mature system. From this perspective, Derrida formulates 
the particular difficulty in reading Hegel as following: “we can neither avoid 
nor accept as role or principle teleological anticipation, neither accept nor 
avoid as rule or principle the empirico-chronological delay of the narrative, 
the récit” (GL, 12/6). Then Derrida’s strategy consists in what he calls ‘the 
bastard course’. Which, briefly summarized, is a strategy consisting in taking 
a certain concept which is capable of playing the role of introduction or 
entrance into the whole system, and reconstructing the concept of the system 
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and its related problems. Furthermore, we can analyze the involved texts 
with these concepts and problems at the center instead of focusing on the 
chronological order of the texts. In line with this, what we observe 
throughout the whole reading given by Derrida in Glas is the extension of 
the chain of the main problems and the change of their constellation as well 
while all of the extensions and changes are repeatedly referred to the most 
essential issue: the entrance to the system. By extension, Derrida certainly 
organizes his reading of Hegel on the basis of an explicit concept of Hegel’s 
system: the movement of the spirit. In this regard, it is worth noting that 
Derrida maintains a particular question around which he organizes his whole 
reading: how the spirit having externalized itself returns back to itself, in 
what manner the most natural spirit sublates its natural aspect to become the 
spirit in its proper meaning. This is the question on sublation [Aufhebung].  
 
The family is a party to the system of the spirit: the family is both a 
part to and the whole of the system. The whole system repeats itself 
in the family. Geist is always, in the very production of its essence, a 
kind of repetition. Coming to, after losing itself in nature and in its 
other, spirit constitutes itself as absolute spirit though the negative 
process of a syllogism whose three moments are subjective spirit 
(anthropology, phenomenology of spirit, psychology), objective 
spirit (right, morality, Sittlichkeit), and absolute spirit (art, religion, 
philosophy). Each of the three moments itself includes three 
syllogistic moments. So the family is the first moment of the third 
moment of objective spirit, Sittlichkeit’s first moment. Family forms 
its still most natural instance and accomplishes itself by destroying 




 Derrida explicitly points out ‘the family’ as the paradoxical core of 
Hegel’s system—the paradoxical logic and structure on which Hegel’s 
system is based, which we have previously examined with the thesis that 
introduction to the system is already the system, and that progression is in 
fact regression. First of all, what supports Derrida’s idea is the location that 
the family occupies within the whole system of the spirit: the first moment of 
the Sittlichkeit, wherein the externalized spirit as nature returns back to itself 
as the spirit. So, Derrida regards the family as a part of the system, more 
precisely, as the entrance to the system in the sense that it marks the point 
where the spirit ceases to be as the other of itself and becomes itself. But the 
more fundamental moment in supporting the idea, is the particular 
perspective of Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit Derrida defends. Certainly, the 
issue here does not lie in discussing which moment among others one should 
attach the weight on to properly treat the concept of Sittlichkeit. For Derrida, 
it is indisputable that the family is the core of Sittlichkeit and finally of the 
system itself; the necessity of the relation of the family and Sittlichkeit comes 
from the theoretical demand that Sittlichkeit should be considered in the very 
context of the movement of the spirit, instead of being restricted to its social 
or political horizon as it is normally done by many commentators. So, the 
family is a concept concerning the system problem, and thus it is an 
ontological, or onto-theological theme, according to Derrida: “the concept 
family very rigorously inscribes itself in the system: within the Encyclopedia 
and the Philosophy of Right, those final forms that are subsequent to the 
great Logic” (GL 11/5). In line with this, Derrida asserts that sociological or 
politico-economical interpretations, which dwell on the spheres of the 
bourgeois society and the state than on the family, do not have any 
‘philosophical foundation’ (GL, 23/16), even though it could be worthwhile. 
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So, defining Sittlichkeit as ‘a spirit-nature’, Derrida takes the whole 
development of Sittlichkeit to be the process of removing such naturalness 
from the spirit. Explicit here is the second feature of Derrida’s perspective: it 
is not only within the framework of the movement of the subjective-
objective-absolute spirit, but rather, more fundamentally, within the higher 
order framework of the nature-spirit that the concept of Sittlichkeit is 
problematized.  
 As this point, it seems we can make overall sense of how Derrida 
problematizes the paradoxical structure of Hegel’s system in his Glas. And 
for this, we should ask the question left above in what sense Derrida thinks 
that the family can also be regarded as the whole of the system. As we just 
saw, Derrida deals with the circular structure of Hegel’s system in terms of 
the movement of the spirit instead of devoting himself to its logical paradox. 
From this perspective, it is self-repetition of the spirit in terms of which the 
issue of the circularity of the system can be adquately thematized—in so far 
as the movement of the spirit consists in returning into itself following its 
externalization. To recapitulate the thematization, Derrida first pays attention 
to the determination of the spirit that Hegel gives in the Reason in History 
and the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, that is, ‘self-knowing 
through the knowing the object’. Here Hegel’s idea is explicit that the spirit 
knows only itself, so that the content of its knowledge is never imposed from 
the outside. According to Derrida’s recapitulation, “to know is to appropriate 
oneself, to produce or reproduce the known” (GL 21/29). To put it another 
way, it is only the spirit that can know the spirit, and in this sense, Derrida 
formulates, “Geist repeats itself” (GL 29/22). Nevertheless, self-repetition of 
the spirit has little to do with some logical or formal tautology, nor with 
reflective structure of our subjective knowledge, although the terminology 
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employed for determining the spirit might remind us of some self-conscious 
structure. Rather, what concerns circularity, or self-repetition of the spirit in 
Derrida’s terminology, as Derrida emphatically characterizes, is the liberty 
for itself of the spirit. Derrida goes on to clarify the point that for Hegel the 
liberty of the spirit is clearly distinct from the being in itself of a natural 
thing, meaning that the liberty consists in the active self-constitution of the 
spirit by negating all that limits itself. And therein Derrida further sees the 
necessity of the phenomenal experience of that liberty, since otherwise the 
spirit would remain only a concept without becoming actual. What is needed 
is therefore “becoming-alive, the matter’s becoming life” (GL 32/25) under 
the form of self-sensation in animality. So it is not difficult to recognize that 
the nature-spirit framework in which Derrida reads the problems of Hegel’s 
system, when it comes to nature here in particular, has little to do with nature 
of a natural being in a general sense, nor with various issues dealt with in the 
philosophy of nature. Rather, nature that Derrida brings into question refers 
to the naturalness of the spirit. That is, the spirit is nature in the sense that 
nature is where the spirit finds itself externalized as the other of itself. This 
nature should be said to be the nature of the spirit as far as it is also where 
the spirit begins to become itself. By extension, it is worth noting that 
Derrida identifies the very domain of the nature-spirit to the anthropological 
sphere, putting emphasis on the particularity of Hegel’s concept of human 
desire, wherein also constitutes the thematic association between liberty for 
itself of the spirit and the family: “man passes from feeling [sensation] to 
conceiving only by suppressing the pressure, what the animal, according to 
Hegel, could not do. Ideality, as thought of the universal, is born and then 
bears the mark of a suppression of the pressure: the violent interruption 
between pressure and satisfaction, between the animal moment and the 
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spiritual moment of the life, death in the natural life, natural death as the 
spirit’s life. The family is announced” (GL 33/25). 
 Derrida’s idea would be that once the main problem of Hegel’s 
system of paradoxical circularity is formulated in terms of the repetition of 
the spirit, we are led to the theme of the family. In other words, the spirit 
repeating itself means that this repetition occurs in the family. If so, the 
question arises as to what the family means here, in which manner and in 
what sense, more precisely, Derrida associates the question of the Hegelian 
spirit to the problem of the family. In this regard, it should first made clear 
that the family at issue here does not concern only the economic community 
unit constituted by marriage and raising children that we just determined as 
concerning the anthropological sphere, and of which Hegel provides a theory 
in the economic-political context in the Philosophy of Right. The family as 
well as the relation of the spirit-family as well that Derrida wants to cipher 
out through his reading of Hegel’s early texts is concerned with the problem 
of the ontological copula, or copulation in Derridian terms. And, we will see 
that ontologically problematizing the issue of Hegel’s system in this way, 
Derrida finally characterizes Hegel’s system as speculative onto-theology. 
Meaning that first, what we can read from the Hegelian spirit is an ontology 
deeply rooted in Christianity, and secondly, Hegel ultimately sees the truth of 
this onto-theology consisting in its sublation into philosophy—speculative 
philosophy. So, we will first follow in more detail, Derrida’s 
problematization that we just sketched, and then return to reflect on the 
asserted relation between the spirit and the family.  
To begin with, we will dwell on Derrida’s remarks on the metaphor of 
the seed given in Reason in History. While Hegel originally used the 
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metaphor to complement his account on the particularity of the human spirit, 
that is, the mediating of thought, Derrida takes this metaphor to articulate 
three different leaps constituting Hegel’s system: the quantitative leap of 
plants and animals, the qualitative leap of human spirit, and the dialectical 
leap of infinite spirit. First, the qualitative leap concerns the life of a plant, in 
which a seed is the starting point and the end result at the same time. In this 
identity, Hegel also sees their discordance that a seed, being the starting point 
of a plant, is the ending result of the other plant. For Hegel, this discordance 
however shows the impotency of the life of a plant (die Ohnmacht des 
Lebens), and so, the growth of plants and animals cannot be regarded as 
anything but quantitative. What is meant thereby is that the latent form in a 
seed is separated from its development and result. In contrast, the formation 
of a human individual, Hegel argues, consists in the following ontological 
ought: “man must make himself what he should be; he must first acquire 
everything for himself” (GL 36/28). So Derrida, next, goes on to deal with 
Hegel’s explanation of the formation of a human individual. What gets 
highlighted is that for Hegel, the formation of a human individual is 
fundamentally the cultural process termed as Bildung. For Derrida, the 
formation can then be regarded as the auto-production, in a sense that a 
human individual constitutes itself through such symbolic formation. To put 
it another way, “the human individual is its own proper product, its own son, 
the son of its works” (GL 37/29). In comparison to the first case, the division 
(Entzweiung) is also essential to the human individual, as far as the human 
individual is determined by its self-knowing; but the starting point and the 
end result form the life of one individual, and together they are completely 
involved in the life of one individual. Additionally, an important point 
Derrida underlines is that auto-production of a human individual is made 
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through the negative relation to nature, so that this second case creates the 
negative relation to the first above. It means that cultural formation of a 
human individual is made by “the inhibiting negation of natural self-mobility” 
(GL 37/29). From this Derrida articulates the qualitative leap, indicating the 
very inhibiting negation of the nature in the auto-production of a human 
individual. As a third point, the dialectical leap concerns the passage, or 
sublation of the finite, human spirit into the infinite spirit, the absolute. The 
related issue here is then to clear up the relationship between the finite spirit 
and the infinite spirit, what the passage or sublation would mean: 
 
But of this self-production, as the inhibiting negation of natural self-
mobility, the human individual, the particular, finite individual, as 
such, is only an example. And the (human) father/son relation is only 
a (finite) example of the infinite father/son relation, of the relation of 
infinite spirit freely relation to itself as to its own rebound [ressaut], 
its own resource. Just as there was a leap [saut] into negativity, 
between the negativity of the natural [plant, animal] Entzweiung and 
that of the spiritual or human Entzweiung, between the relief in 
nature and the relief of nature in the finite spirit, so there is a 
dialectical leap that is the absolute rebound of the result, between the 
Aufhebung of the finite spirit and that of the infinite spirit. Just as—
so: the analogy or the proportion depends on what the finite is at the 
passage to the infinite. (GL 37/29)  
 
The first noticeable point in the citation above is that Derrida explicitly 
brings the problem of the absolute into the center of his reconstruction of the 
problem of Hegel’s system. But what is more suggestive in this regard is that 
Derrida deals with the Hegelian concept of the cultural formation (Bildung) 
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in terms of a father-son filial relation. We will later see in more detail that 
Derrida converges the problem of Hegel’s system as a whole into the 
framework of a filial relation; including not only the cultural formation of 
finite human beings but fundamentally the relations between the finite 
human spirit and the infinite spirit. First we need to examine how Derrida 
drags the whole problem to an idea of filial relation, and for this, particular 
attention should be paid to his interpretation of Hegel’s terminology of the 
‘example’. As it is explicit in the citation above, Hegel gives an account of 
the relation between the finite spirit and the absolute by establishing the 
former as the example of the latter. Asserting that the terminology is not 
merely rhetoric, then, Derrida goes on to examine the other paragraph where 
Hegel uses the term the example in a more implicative way. To look at only a 
part of the cited paragraph here:  
 
The most sublime [raised, elevated, relieved, eminent: das 
erhabenste Beispiel] is to be found in the nature of God himself; 
strictly speaking (eigentlich), this is not a genuine example in the 
sense of one casual instance among others (ein Beispiel (bei-her-
spiel)), but rather the universal, truth itself, of which everything else 




By definition, the term the example implies the relation between the higher 
order universal and its instances. But what Hegel wants to affirm is that the 
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most sublime form of the universal-instances relation is found in God, on the 
basis that God is the universal of which everything else is an instance. In this 
respect, Derrida maintains that the term obviously concerns the ontological 
issue: the positing of the finite being elevated to the infinite. So, Derrida 
implicates his own interpretation of this term into his comments on Hegel’s 
texts, according to which the term implies the ontological hierarchy between 
the finite being and the infinite being: if the finite beings, as example, 
relevant to the particular cases substitutable for each other under the general 
rule, the infinite being is unclassifiable, non-substitutable. Hegel’s 
ontological argument using the term the example would then be that the 
positing of the finite beings is only possible by being elevated to the infinite 
being. Then, following this interpretation, Derrida poses a further question of 
whether it would not be possible for the infinite to become an example of its 
own self. The question actually touches on the core of Hegel’s thesis on 
infinity—which will also express his fundamental intuition in regards to the 
relation between the absolute or the infinite spirit and the finite human 
spirit—according to which the infinite should involve the finite as its 
moment. Otherwise, Hegel argues, it cannot be infinite but only limited, as 
opposed to finite. So, if the infinite’s possibility of becoming the finite 
should be preserved in this way, the question arises then as to in what sense 
more precisely it is preserved. In this respect, we observe that Derrida 
comments on the cited passage above in which Hegel determines God as the 
most sublime case of the ‘example’ and identifies this God precisely as the 
Christian God, opposing it to the Jewish God.
23
 Derrida pays special 
                                           
23
 The rest of the citation is as following: “It is true that the older religions also referred 
to God as Spirit; but this was no more than a name which could not as yet contribute 
[grasp: gefasst] anything towards explaining the nature of spirit. In the Jewish religion 
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attention to the point that Hegel sees the true nature of the spirit expressed in 
the Christian God: “in Christianity, however, God is revealed (offenbart) as 
Spirit. In the first place, he is the Father, power (Macht), abstract universal 
(abstrakt Allgemeines), which is still veiled, enveloped (eingehüllt) within 
itself. Secondly, he is an object for himself, an other than himself, a dividing 
himself in two (ein sich Entzwiendes), the Son (der Sohn)” (GL 38-39/30-31). 
This provides Derrida with the interpretative ground for making sense of 
Hegel’s concept of the spirit from the presented idea of the Christian God. 
And from Derrida’s perspective, what Hegel sees in the Christian God is the 
God knowing itself by dividing itself into his own son, by becoming itself its 
own other and so the object for itself. In a word, “God knows and recognizes 
himself in his son” (GL 39/31). So Derrida argues   that Hegel’s concept of 
the spirit refers to the Holy family constituting with God and his son, the 
Christ. In line with this, Derrida interprets the Holy Spirit as the familiarity, 
meaning the medium through which “the (infinite) exemplar gives itself and 
makes the (finite) exemplar return to it” (GL 31/39). What determines the 
Holy Spirit would be then no other than the filiation itself, the making of the 
filial relation. So, Derrida finally draws the definition of the spirit as the 
filiation itself as following: “the spirit is neither the father nor the son, but 
filiation, the relation of father to son, of son to father, of father to father 
through the mediation of the son, of son to son through the mediation of the 
father” (GL 39/31).  
 In this way, the point that Derrida wants to demonstrate through his 
comments on Hegel’s theological earlier writings is that Hegel develops the 
ontological question therein, which covers all of the essential elements of the 
                                                                                                            
too, the spirit was at first represented (vorgestellt) only in general terms.” (GL 38/30) 
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mature system. Inversely, it means then that it is the ontological question 
through which we can appropriately intertwind the early and later texts of 
Hegel. Derrida formulates the question as following: “it is the question of the 
Wesen(essence) and of the copula is as a question, the relation or name of 
father-to-son” (GL, 66/56). In other words, for Derrida, what Hegel showed 
through his treatment of the Christian Holy Family is a thought on the copula, 
namely the ontological link:  
 
The Father is the Son, the Son is the Father; and the Wesen, the 
essential energy of this copulation, its unity, the Wesenheit of the 
first and the second, is the essence of the Christian Last Supper 
Scene. The spirit of Christianity is rather the revelation of the 
essentiality of the essence that permits in general copulation in the is, 
saying is. Unification, conciliation (Vereinigung), and being (Sein) 
have the same sense, are equivalent in their signification 
(gleichbedeutend). And in every proposition (Satz), the binding, 
agglutinating, ligamentary position of the copula (Bindewort) is 
conciliates the subject and the predicate, laces one around the other, 
entwines one around the other, to form one single being (Sein). The 
Sein is constituted, reconstituted starting from its primordial division 
(Urteil) by letting itself be thought in a Bindwort. (GL 67/56) 
 
As we have previously seen, Derrida comments on the nature of the spirit—
that Hegel draws from his reflection of Christianity—as consisting in the 
filiation itself. And then, as we see in the citation above, Derrida articulates 
more precisely this problem of the Christian filiation as the identity of the 
father and of the son in the trinity. With this, Derrida clarifies the point that 
the problem of the Christian trinity, when it comes to the Hegelian spirit at 
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least, is the ontological problem of the copula is. In this regard, for Derrida, 
it is important to understand the point that the copula, as far as it is involved 
in the trinity and thereby in the Hegelian ontology of the spirit, cannot be 
regarded merely as a grammatical, functional constituent. Instead, Derrida 
maintains that the is should be considered ‘the essential energy of the 
copulation’, namely, of generating a link itself: and so, making the divided 
parts one, unifying them. Accordingly for Hegel, it is improbable that a being 
would be restricted to the sole sphere of conceptual determination, but it 
fundamentally signifies the energy of unification. And this is the way that it 
is as being, wherein Derrida sees the essentiality of essence. By extension, as 
Derrida points out, Hegel does not think that judgment could be dealt with 
only at the level of formal logic; what judgment is rather concerned with 
would be the reconstruction of the being as oneness from the primordial 
division, as Derrida formulates it. In short, for Hegel, being refers to the 
energy of the construction of being as being from the primordial division, 
through generating a link, that is, unifying the divided parts—the subjectivity 
of the Hegelian being. Concerning this ontological problematization, 
particular attention should be paid to the point that Derrida does not get out 
of the Christian framework, but rather the Hegelian being, the energy of the 
copulation, refers to the very Christian filiation in Derrida’s view. So this 
interpretation recognizes the Hegelian ontology as referring to Christianity, 
instead of extending consideration of the ontology that is deeply rooted in 
Christianity to a comprehensive reflection of Hegel’s ontology in general. So 
it can be said that this interpretation obviously concerns the Christian origin 
of Hegelian spirit. Nevertheless, it should not simply be said that it has 
critical intention against such a theological origin, but it seems to better to 
take it more neutrally: as an ontological interpretation. Certainly, it seems 
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unlikely fair to treat Hegel’s ontology without taking into account Science of 
Logic, where Hegel actually develops his thesis on the being. But this would 
not depreciate Derrida’s ontological interpretation above, as far as it 
explicitly catches the particularity of the Hegelian spirit or of the Hegelian 
being: the subjectivity of self-constituting such a power.  
 Then, the onto-theological reading of the Hegelian spirit does not 
seem to go against what we normally admit of the Hegelian system in some 
critical way: its Christian origin and subjectivity. But the most distinct 
feature of Derrida’s reading lies in his identification of the ontological 
linkage and the familial filiation. Thus, the issue is neither revealing the 
theological origin of the concept of the spirit, nor to give an analogical 
interpretation of it on the basis of the metaphor employed by Hegel himself. 
More precisely, what Derrida wants to argue is the overlapping of 
ontological, or onto-theological linkage and of the unification in actual 
human family—of the Holy family and the human family. Wherein precisely 
he sees the key to the Hegelian system. And the key issue that Derrida wants 
to bring into the center of all of the set of problems therewith can be 
appropriately illuminated from the perspective of the speculative sublation of 
onto-theology, which thematically has to do with sublation of the absolute 
religion into philosophy in Hegel’s system. So we will examine in more 
detail how Derrida, using his conceptualization of the overlapping of two 
families above, leads onto-theological problematization of Hegel’s system to 
a new step in his reading, concerning the final sublation in Hegel’s system. 
To begin with, what Derrida gains from Hegel’s earlier theological writings, 
as we have seen above, is the ontology that has its root in Christian filiation: 
or, in his own term, “thus is opened and determined the space in which the 
ontological (the possibility of Wesen, Sein, Urteilen) no longer lets itself be 
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unglued or decapitated from the family” (GL 67/56). But, in order to make 
clarify what the family means here, we will need to examine Hegel’s concept 
of the love and Derrida’s interpretation of it as well. First, Hegel determines 
Christianity as the religion of love in his early theological writings in 
comparison with Judaism, which is in its turn determined as the religion of 
command and duty. In other words, for Hegel, the ontological identity 
between the infinite and the finite—between God and human—becomes 
possible with Christianity whereas in the case of Judaism, God and humans 
creates a the lord-slave relation. In this sense, love means no more than the 
ontological filiation that we have seen so far. On the other hand, love is 
presented as the unifying factor of the family in the Philosophy of Right. In 
particular, Hegel takes love to be a kind of feeling and on this basis argues 
that the family is the most natural form of the ethical life or of the spirit 
(PhR § 158). In the same passage (PhR § 158 Addition), the love is also 
determined as ‘the consciousness of my unity with another’ and from this 
Hegel goes on to argue ‘the most immense contradiction’ of love. To put it 
another way, if love means that “I know myself as the unity of myself with 
another and of another with myself”, the contradiction consists in that I 
should renounce my independent existence to gain my self-consciousness. 
Regarding Hegelian love, Derrida takes two approaches: the first is 
substitution of Christianity for Judaism, which is the thesis of young Hegel 
in his earlier theological writings; and then, the passage from morality to the 
ethical life in the Philosophy of Right. First, paying special attention to 
infidelity prohibition, Derrida explains that if Jewish commandment 
prohibits only the infidel act without touching the desire of infidelity, 
Christianity prohibits both (GL 43/35). But it should be said more precisely 
that the prohibition in the latter has nothing to do with a commandment 
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imposed from outside but it is only the internal prohibition; since what Christ 
teaches is that the duty of chastity is accompanied by love of the partner. 
Thus, substitution of Christianity for Judaism means ‘the interiorization of 
the interdict, the interiorization of the objective law’ (GL 44/35) in Derrida’s 
terminology. The interiorization of the interdict should be mediated, however, 
by the love of God and so Derrida goes on to argue the infinity of Christian 
love. In short, the interdict or the limit would become infinite when it is 
interiorized, so that “no longer is one limited to loving a finite being, but one 
loves a finite being as infinite” (GL 44/35). From Derrida’s perspective, the 
infinity of love or what Hegel takes being love is the unification without 
alterity; or, if one claims on Hegel’s behalf that there is certainly the alterity, 
Derrida will firmly maintain that the other of love cannot be but the infinite. 
In short, for Hegel, love means linkage between the finite and the infinite 
and in this sense the reconciliation of their opposition. Such is, in Derrida’s 
view, the Hegelian concept of love presented in his theological writings. 
Additionally, it is the archetype of Hegelian love, the human love Hegel 
thinks of more precisely, of which the fundamental meaning and structure 
should be preserved in the family’s love of the Philosophy of the Right: it 
would thus be meaningless, in Derrida’s view, to dwell on the family’s love 
in the Philosophy of the Right without taking into consideration love as the 
filiation between the finite and the infinite. But the most important point that 
Hegel argues, as Derrida rightly underlines, is that such a relation between 
the finite and the infinite could be thought of for the first time with coming 
of Christianity, whereas it has never been possible with Judaism. To be more 
precise, what Judaism could not think of is the relation between the finite and 
infinite as “the commensurablity or the passage between two [of them], the 
presence of the immeasurable in the determinate” (GL 99/85). 
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On the other hand, Derrida pays attention to the duplicity in Hegel’s 
understanding of Christianity, in that Hegel sees in the death of Jesus Christ, 
the destiny of Christianity to repeat the split; that Christianity surpasses and 
also repeats the split in Judaism. Nevertheless, Derrida does not interpret the 
duplicity as meaning that Hegel actually had an inconsistent understanding 
of Christianity. Rather, from his perspective, the duplicity pretypifies the 
conceptual core of what Hegel later calls the absolute religion: the split or 
the opposition in the very divine—“the representative nature of the presence 
of the divine that holds itself before consciousness” (GL 107/92) in Derrida’s 
terminology. For Derrida, the Hegelian conceptualization of the historical 
religion called Christianity as the absolute religion should not be simply 
regarded as a philosophical interpretation. For Hegel considers the absolute 
religion the representative form of philosophical truth, meaning that the truth 
of the absolute religion is philosophy, that sublation of the absolute religion 
is philosophical truth. In this way, the question as to what could be the proper 
philosophical truth is brought into the center of the problem in Hegel’s 
system with the problem of the relation between the absolute religion and 
philosophy. But it does not seem to be easy to make sense of the relation—
the formal transformation of the truth that is presented already in the absolute 
religion; since it would be hardly possible, or even absurd, to extract the 
purely philosophical elements from the whole system Hegel develops, which 
is however supposed to develop through its becoming other, nature or spirit, 
naturally including religion. But the difficulty, from Derrida’s perspective, 
fundamentally lies in what we have previously dealt with in terms of the 
paradox of the philosophical beginning. In this occasion, Derrida refers to 
what Hegel discusses concerning the need of philosophy in his 
Differenzschrift. The paradox can be then formulated as following: we do not 
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have philosophy in its proper meaning yet, but philosophy makes its start in 
its own self without depending on some external elements. As it is well 
known, based on his own historical perspective on philosophy, Hegel asserts 
that the nature of philosophical knowledge lies in the synthesis. And the 
proper duty of philosophy consists in presenting the synthesis of all sorts of 
modern dualistic divisions. What Derrida understands from this Hegelian 
demand for philosophy is, however, a particular philosophical situation, 
which is unstable, floating: 
  
Philosophy’s need is not yet philosophy. There is not yet of 
philosophy (il y a un pas encore de la philosophie). Philosophy—
already—is announced in it. (GL 110/95) 
 
Obviously, the Hegel’s idea that we need philosophy implies that we do not 
have philosophy in its proper meaning yet. But, from Derrida’s perspective, 
it connotes that philosophy, nevertheless, is announced in its non-proper 
form. And this non-proper form is nothing but the absolute religion for 
Derrida. It means then that Hegel would have seen the resolution of the 
system problem—the paradox of philosophical starting point—in the 
absolute religion. On this basis, a key feature of Derrida’s interpretation is 
that he sees these problems, which would stand at the zenith of the system 
problem, are deeply involved in the family problem. In other words, both 
sublation of the absolute religion to philosophy and the constitution of the 
system of philosophical truth are developed in the framework of the family 
problem. But the most significant argument is that one should consider the 
problem of the human family once sublation of the absolute religion to 
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philosophy becomes an issue, instead of limiting the family problem to the 
onto-theological filiation in the Holy Family. In this regard, paying particular 
attention to a short passage in Hegel’s article on the Natural law, Derrida 
asserts that the whole project of Hegel’s system lies in constituting the 
speculative science of the Sittlichkeit; the science of Sittlichkeit, which has 
the family as its first moment, and gives an account of it from the ontological 
perspective in terms of love. Then, the speculative science of Sittlichkeit, 
Derrida points out, is far from empiricism and formalism, which take the 
family only as an example for their account of the communal life of human 
beings and count only raising children and sharing of wealth for roles of 
conjugal relation without being capable of thinking of unification by love. 
Thus, from Derrida’s perspective, love, which we have previously 
determined as the infinite relation to the infinite other according to Derrida’s 
reading, is the first theoretical core on which the speculative science of 
Sittlichkeit could be founded. By extension, Derrida sees the second core of 
this science in the very theme of death, representing the negative aspects 
such as division, separation, and dissolution, of which we will not deal with 
in detail here. From this comes Derrida’s interpritive strategy that the theme 
of the passage from religion to philosophy or of sublation of the absolute 
religion to the absolute knowing should be considered with the theme of 
sublation of the family within Sittlichkeit (GL 108/93-94). Then, we can 
reconstruct the process of Derrida’s problematization of Hegel’s system 
problem in Glas in terms of the speculative sublation of onto-theology as 
following. The first issue was to reconstruct from Hegel’s earlier theological 
writings what would be Hegelian onto-theology. The second issue is then to 
make clear what sublation means by examining how Hegel explains 
sublation of the family within his theory of Sittlichkeit. And finally, what 
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speculative sublation of onto-theology would be, will be presented by 




















6. Derrida’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Theory of Three Potencies of 
Consciousness 
 
 On these bases, we will examine how Derrida deals with the 1803/04 
manuscript of Hegel—specifically, what which role does his reading of this 
manuscript have for his treatment of Hegel’s system problem? Prior to 
directly accessing the question, it will be helpful to sketch Derrida’s reading 
process of Hegel in Glas. First, Derrida explores Hegel’s earlier theological 
writing with great effort to articulate Hegelian onto-theology. The main 
analyzed texts are: the Destiny and Spirit of the Christianity, the Reason in 
History, the Life of Jesus, and also including later text such as the Lecture of 
the World History. At this point, Derrida moves on to deal with the 1803/04 
manuscript in detail, weaving it together with the part on the genus-process 
(Gattungsprozeß) in the Encyclopedia. On this basis, Derrida develops his 
interpretation of chapter six of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in which Hegel 
launches his doctrine of the spirit by making an interpretation of the role and 
significance that Antigone has for the Greek Sittlichkeit. Following this, 
Derrida deals with the section about absolute religion in the Phenomenology, 
of which the particularity lies in its location: just before the absolute 
knowing. And then, the last pages of Glas are devoted to natural religion in 
the Phenomenology and related various considerations in the Lecture of the 
Philosophy of Religion. Thus, we can say that the 1803/04 manuscript takes 
the mediating role between earlier theological writings and the 
Phenomenology in Derrida’s reading of Hegel in Glas. And then, by 
examining how Derrida reads the 1803/04 manuscript, we can see how 
Derrida thematically connects what he articulates as the Hegelian onto-
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theology on the one hand and what he determines as the project of the 
speculative theory of Sittlichkeit on the other—the connection between the 
Saint-Family and the human family. With the previously mentioned problems 
kept in mind, we will follow Derrida’s reading of this manuscript step by 
step. That the following points will explicitly show the direction to which we 
will lead this study. First, Derrida deals with the last part of the philosophy of 
nature in the Encyclopedia on the genus-process in detail. This reading of the 
genus-process is significant because it is on the basis of the very problems he 
articulates from this reading that Derrida deals with the philosophy of spirit 
of 1803/04. Besides, Derrida pays great attention to the passage from the 
second potency to the third in this manuscript, upon which we will reflect on 
our own reading of the genus-process and on the problems articulated 
through Derrida’s reading of it as well.  
 To begin with, as Derrida indicates, Hegel considers the disease and 
death keys to passage from nature to spirit: “the disease of animal is the 
becoming of the spirit” (JS I 179). In this regard, pointing out the fact that 
the same is asserted in the Encyclopedia, Derrida interprets the assertion as 
completing the teleology based on internal purposiveness, which originated 
from Aristotle’s philosophy of nature and metaphysics and was reestablished 
in the modern period with Kantian internal teleology (GL 125/109). We can 
support this interpretation based on the evidence that the spirit—which is 
supposed to be generated by the death of individuals, at least in the last part 
of the philosophy of nature—refers to the biological universal called the 
genus and is thus concerned with the life of an organism. Additionally, the 
genus-process can be properly regarded as a teleological explanation, since it 
implicitly inherits the concept of the internal purposiveness of an organism—
the concept of an organism having itself as the purpose and so constitutes 
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and maintains its organic life. The internal purpose, however, has nothing to 
do with conscious intention, as Derrida explicitly points out, but rather refers 
to an effective biological reality which cannot be grasped other than as a 
whole, as the universal.
24
 By extension, Derrida refers to the genus-process 
in Encyclopedia to stress the point that Hegel’s genus-process contains the 
evolutionary idea of the struggle between species; not only natural death due 
to disease, but also the violent death caused by struggle between species is 
considered necessary for the whole genus-process according to Hegel. In this 
way, Derrida first deals with the genus-process in Encyclopedia before 
making sense of the main theme of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04, 
namely, the passage from nature to spirit—the consciousness as the place 
where the externalized spirit as nature returns back into itself. As we have 
seen, Hegel’s mention in this philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 that the passage 
from nature to spirit consists in disease and death of organisms provides 
                                           
24
 We can make sense of the Hegelian teleological concept of organism from the 
Kantian concept of internal purposiveness. For Kant, the existence and life of an organic 
being cannot be explained by the mechanical causal relation but by the teleological idea 
that organic beings exist only as a purpose, meaning that an organism is simultaneously 
the cause and the result of itself (KU B280-281, B284-285). In the last part of Science 
of Logic, Hegel highly appreciates the Kantian teleology (WL 438-444/737-739). 
According to Hegel, Kant’s greatest service to philosophy consists in the distinction 
between external purposiveness and internal purposiveness, since the very notion of 
internal purposiveness opens up the concept of life and idea, which makes it possible to 
grasp effective reality as a whole in the most proper way. In spite of all of this, Hegel 
criticizes Kant for restricting the internal purposiveness only to a subjective maxim, for 
depriving of objectivity and reality. So, Hegel agrees with the Kantian idea that the life 
of an organic being should be grasped together with the concept of internal 
purposiveness, but he will argue that internal purposiveness constitutes objective 
existence, effective being or reality of organisms—but, precisely, as process: the whole 
process through which the universal called the genus is generated and maintained and 
organisms also individuated.  
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Derrida with sufficient reason to go to the genus-process in the Encyclopedia. 
However, as we will see, the most elaborate interpretation in the genus-
process given by Derrida is sex-relation (das Geschlechtverhältnis) rather 
than disease and death. Then we need to first revisit how Hegel himself 
presents the genus process in Encyclopedia. We will also examine in detail 
how Hegel understands sex-relation from the perspective of the genus-
process.  
 In general, genus is a biological unit for categorizing animals and 
plants. It is thus relevant to universal, abstract concepts which embrace 
various individuals. In this regard, paying special attention to the 
development of zoology and comparative anatomy during his time, Hegel 
appreciates that these empirical sciences are concerned with fundamental 
classifications and essential determinations of animals (EN §368). However, 
the genus, for Hegel, should be concretely considered as what exists, as a 
certain effective reality, instead of being merely understood as an abstract 
category for classification. In this context, Hegel presents the idea that the 
genus is the universal which particularizes itself (EN §386): it exists namely 
as species. To be more precise, for Hegel, the genus can only be understood 
as the process of its own particularization into species. So, the main issue of 
the genus-process is to give an account of the existence of species in terms of 
the process of its generation and its durable subsistence—termed as the 
genus process. The genus-process can in this way be regarded as the 
Hegelian account for the particular existence of the biological universal—
genus or species. But the more significant point is that Hegel describes it 
from the perspective of the life of an individual organism. Thus, the genus-
process includes the following themes: struggles between individuals from 
different species, mating, breeding, disease and death. More precisely, Hegel 
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explains the genus-process with the following sub-processes: (1) the struggle 
between species in the evolutionary context: the process in which individuals 
recognize themselves as the member of a certain species and make a hostile 
relation to the individuals from other species; (2) sex-relation: the process in 
which an individual engages in intercourse with another individual, which 
has a different sex from the former and produces another individual 
belonging to the same species; (3) disease and death: the natural death of 
individuals, without which the genus cannot maintain its subsistence. And 
then, Hegel argues throughout the whole description of the genus-process for 
the emergence of the spirit: “in this genus-process, the merely natural being 
only perishes, for, as such, it does not transcend the natural” (EN §367). 
 Hegel defines the sex-relation as a symmetrical relationship between 
two sexually different individuals through which they interchange self-
sensation and so exist in the other. Through the sex-relationship, a singular 
individual “continues itself in its other and in this other feels its own self”, 
and thus the sex-relationship is ‘the self-sensation which exists’ and ‘the life 
in the self-sensation’ (EN §369). Hegel further defines sex-relation as ‘the 
substantial connection of genus’, stating that “the Idea of nature is actual in 
the male and the female couple” (EN §369 Addition). In this case, sex-
relation is directly identified with the genus-process itself, namely, with the 
process of bringing the genus into existence.
25
 By extension, for Hegel, the 
                                           
25
 What draws our attention is the wordplay given by Hegel, that is, the identification of 
the copulation (Begattung) with the genus-process (Gattunsprozeß): the sex-relationship 
understood as sexual intercourse (Begattung) with the process of realization or 
actualization of genus. Here the German prefix ‘-be’ performs the function of 
verbalization of noun, Gattung. Thus, the Begattung means the operation which aims at 
Gattung or has Gattung as its result. 
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initiator of sex-relation is a need or the feeling of defect—the defect of the 
universal. According to Hegel, the singular individual exists only as a 
singular being before having a sex-relation, even though as the substantial 
foundation of genus, it has immanently in themselves the universal, the 
genus. In this sense, the starter is the formal discordance of ontological 
categories constituting organic beings—between the universal and the 
singular. So the Hegelian concept of sex-relation can be made sense of in 
terms of the biological concept of species: species is the sets of organisms 
that are capable of producing other individuals which are the same to them 
and maintain the existence of species through reproduction. 
 On the other hand, from the perspective of genus or species, Hegel 
considers sex-relation in terms of asexual unity of species: “on the contrary, 
both are organisms and belongs to the genus, so that they exist only as one 
species (ein Geschlecht). Their union is the disappearance of the sexes into 
which the simple genus has developed” (EN §369 Addition) (My emphasis). 
Actually, the German noun Geschlecht bears two different meanings: sex on 
the one hand and species on the other. The ein Geschlecht then, 
simultaneously means ‘a sex’—the disappearance of the biological sexual 
difference—and ‘one species’.
26
 On this basis, we can interpret the term ein 
                                           
26
 For that reason, the expression ‘one species/one sex’ seems to be the second-best 
translation for the German term ein Geshclecht. The English translator A.V.Miller 
translate it in English as ‘one species’ while J.Derrida as ‘un seul Geschlecht (sexe ou 
genre)’. Miller’s translation seems to well convey the meaning of ‘one species’ but the 
meaning of annulation of sexual difference is excluded therewith. On the other hand, 
Derrida’s translation reveals the double connotation of the term in question as it is, by 
remaining the German term Geschlecht. His French translation in parenthesis makes 
clear the point that this word has to do with the sexual issue but his selection of the 
French term ‘genre’ does not seem to perfectly fit to the term Geschlecht because the 
latter is related here rather to ‘species’, the particularized existence of genus/genre.       
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Geschlecht as the asexual unity coming into being through sex-relation, 
called species. We also observe that Hegel defines genus as an ‘asexual and 
fecund universal’ (EN §370 Addition). However, what the asexuality or the 
disappearance of sexual difference means still remains ambiguous, and 
actually this seems to be problematic. In this regard, the following point is 
clear that the asexuality is not only a predicate describing an attribute of the 
universal—genus or species. More significantly, for Hegel, the asexuality 
also means the annulment of the sexes, the disappearance of the individuals 
involved in the sex-relationship: the death of singular individuals. In fact, 
genus-process, understood in terms of successive repetition of birth and 
death of individuals, includes the death of individuals as its necessary 
moment. This point is applicable to Hegel’s conception of the genus-process. 
But the important point is this: that when Hegel speaks about the death of 
individuals, the individuals dying through the genus-process are considered 
as sexually differentiated individuals, either as male or female. Thus we can 
say that all individuals involved in the genus-process are those that exist only 
as male or female. And thus for Hegel, the singularity of the individual 
involved in the genus-process, has the biological sexual difference as its 
fundamental determination.  
 With regards to the sexual difference presented in the Hegelian 
explanation of the genus-process, we should say that it has little to do with 
the distinct determinacy of masculinity and femininity—neither anatomically 
nor culturally. On the contrary, the sexual difference in the genus-process is 
concerned with the natural fact that every organism, as far as it is involved in 
the genus-process, only exists either as male or female. In so far as Hegel 
considers the existence mode of natural organisms in terms of the singularity, 
we can say that the biological sexuality is the core moment of the singularity 
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of an organism. To put it another way, there cannot be singularity without 
sexuality for Hegel; what biological sexuality—that a singular organism 
exists either as male or female— implies is no more than the ontological 
discordance between the singularity and the universality. By extension, we 
can regard this discordance as the most fundamental determination of the life 
of an organism, namely, of the mortal being in general.  
  
The word for copulation or coupling, for this general play of the 
copula, is Begattung, the operation of the genus (Gattung), the 
generic and generative operation. Just as what is rightly translated by 
sexual relationship (Geschlechtverhältnis) also designates the 
relationship of genus, species, or race (family, lineage) or the sex 
relationship as the feminine or masculine gender (Geschlecht) (le 
rapport du sexe comme genre (Geschlecht) féminin ou masculine). 
(GL 126/110) 
 
For Derrida, the whole genus-process of Hegel can be constructed with 
copulation (Begattung) at the center. In other words, the genus-process 
indicates no other than copulation. In this context, Derrida interprets that 
copulation is the operation of the genus: it is the operation made by the genus, 
which is immanent to organisms, and the operation generating genus as the 
result as well. In line with this, Derrida also interprets the sexual relation 
(Geschlechtverhältnis) as the relation of the genus, determining it as the 
relation of the sex, which is directly identified with genus itself (Geschlecht) 
once again. In this way, the genus-process, copulation, and sexual relation 
are sequentially regarded as equal by Derrida. Then, the question arises as to 
how Derrida understands the term Geschlecht; since it appears that the term 
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Geschlecht stands at the center of this interpretation, the determination of 
this term given by Derrida—‘le sexe comme genre féminin ou masculin’—
seems to be ambiguous. To begin with, through the following consideration 
of the Hegelian concept of sexual difference, Derrida gives an interpretation 
of Hegel’s claim that individuals “exist only as ein Geschlecht”. First, 
Derrida dwells on the idea of the difference of sex, which probably means 
that every organism exists as either male or female. For Derrida, the 
difference of sex should be regarded as the essential factor that introduces 
the contradiction into the whole genus process. And the contradiction, as we 
have previously seen, consists in that an organism, even though it has the 
universal in itself in the sense that it is relevant to the substantial foundation 
of genus, is a singular being that exists only as either male or female. On the 
other hand, Derrida argues that what characterizes the difference of sex—the 
sex of each organism involved in the genus-process—is its universality, 
meaning that, when each relates to the other, each represents one of the 
natural sex. According to Derrida’s view, the copulation Hegel describes is 
not the relation of a singular being to the other singular being, but it is 
considered at the universal level as copulation between two sexes. In line 
with this, Derrida implicitly gives his interpretation that universality of the 
genus actually means bisexuality. Copulation would then mean no more than 
the effective realization of the bisexuality each organism has in itself through 
the relation to the other organism. In short, for Derrida, ein Geschlecht 
means that an organism exists only as one sex, but it also means that an 
organism is already a universal or generic being in the sense that it contains 
sexual universality or unity, probably understood as bisexuality, for it to 
effectively realize itself as a genus. According to this interpretation, then, we 
can make sense of the Hegelian concept of sexual difference in terms of the 
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synthesis of these two aspects, namely, the difference of sex and generic 
universality of an organism. This is relevant to the discordance between 
singularity and universality we have previously examined. On this basis, 
Derrida argues that copulation is no more than the process of producing the 
sexual difference while eliminating it at the same time. The argumentation is 
very convincing, so that Derrida states, “Copulation relieves the difference: 
Aufhebung is very precisely the relation of copulation and the sexual 
difference. The relief in general cannot be understood without sexual 
copulation, nor sexual copulation in general without the relief” (GL 127/111). 
  
Following this interpretation, Derrida goes on the search for Hegel’s 
own explanation for the sexual difference, which is presented in the addition 
to paragraph 369 of the Encyclopedia. In the addition, Hegel introduces the 
account of the formation of different sexes given by the anatomist of the time 
and adds his philosophical interpretation, which is, according to Derrida, the 
most traditional and follows the Aristotelian idea. The anatomist theory 
explains that the male and female originally shares the same type of sex and 
the sexuality is determined by which part is dominant: if the active part is 
dominant, the organism becomes male and female if it is passive. Hegel 
appreciates this theory, stating that the complete understanding of the 
conversion between two sexes is attained by anatomy, and adds a further 
interpretation: 
 
Just as in the male, the uterus is reduced to a mere gland, so, on the 
other hand, the male testicle remains enclosed in the ovary in the 
female, does not emerge into opposition, does not develop on its 
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own account into active brain; and the clitoris is inactive feeling in 
general. In the male, on the other hand, we have instead active 
feeling, the swelling heart, the effusion of blood into the corpora 
cavernosa and the meshes of the sponges tissue of the urethra. […] 
In this way, the reception by the uterus, as a simple retention, is, in 
the male, split into the productive brain and the external heart. 
Through this difference, therefore, the male is the active principle, 
and the female is the receptive, because she remains in her 
undeveloped unity. (EN §369 Addition) 
 
So, Hegel estimates that sexual difference explained in terms of the 
formation of different sexes by anatomists does not concern the difference as 
opposition, and that we cannot develop an account of the active brain in this 
framework. What the theory explains is, thus, only the difference of feelings 
between male and female: the male has active feelings whereas the female 
has only inactive feelings. Hegel’s idea is, then, that if we can rightly explain 
the sexual difference with the difference activity and passivity as the 
anatomist theory suggests, the difference of activity and of passivity should 
be regarded precisely as the difference between the separation of active 
feelings and active brain and the indifference or the undeveloped unity. The 
former is of male and the latter is of female. Thus, according to Hegel’s 
interpretation, femininity consists in remaining in the original undeveloped, 
undivided unity, while masculinity consists in the active division. If so, the 
sexual difference no longer concerns the symmetrical difference that was 
supposed to arise depending on the dominant part by the anatomists. On the 
contrary, the sexual difference is asymmetrical; it is the difference between 
the undifferentiated state and of the divided state—the difference between 
indifference and division or opposition. This point gives Derrida the reason 
 
120 
for interpreting the Hegelian sexual difference as the difference between 
difference and non-difference: “Male and female are not opposed as two 
differents, two terms of the opposition, but as indifference and difference 
(opposition, division). The sexual difference is the difference between 
indifference and difference” (GL 128/112). By extension, Derrida maintains 
that the Hegelian sexual difference is based on hierarchical understanding 
stretching back to Aristotle: the female does not have what the male has, and 
the male activity is superior to the female passivity as far as the male is what 
is differentiated and developed, whereas the female remains as it is. So, what 
the Hegelian concept of the sexual difference represents is the hierarchical 
opposition between activity and passivity, between material and form, etc. 
More significantly, Derrida characterizes the Hegelian system as a whole 
with the hierarchical concept of the sexual difference: “The Aufhebung, the 
central concept of the sexual relation, articulates the most traditional 
phallocentrism with the Hegelian onto-theo-teleo-logy” (GL 130/113). That 
is, the Hegelian system fundamentally stands on the basis of the hierarchical 
dualism, giving primacy to all of the essential factors of the system such as 
productivity, differentiation, opposition, and logos by characterizing them as 
active. In some sense, however, the Hegelian system can be also regarded as 
standing on feminism, according to Derrida. For Hegel understands the 
female as the original undifferentiated unity, which means, in Derrida’s view, 
that the female is closer to the origin than the male and, thus, the male is 
secondary to the female: “The phallocentric hierarchy is a feminism; 
dialectically feminism, making man the subject of woman, submits itself to 
Feminism and Truth, both capitalized” (GL 130/113). 
At this point, we will follow Derrida’s reconstruction of Hegel’s 
theory of the three potencies of consciousness in the philosophy of spirit of 
 
121 
1803-04, especially in terms of the desire. First of all, Derrida clarifies the 
indispensable relation of the theoretical consciousness and of the practical 
consciousness—first potency, memory/language, and second potency, 
labor/instrument. According to him, theoretical consciousness cannot 
constitute its durable existence, nor posit itself, in so far as language, the first 
existing mode of consciousness, is invisible, sonorous, and evanescent. To 
put it another way, Derrida argues that the theoretical consciousness is in the 
inorganic state and it is, thus, no more than dead consciousness; it is just 
theoretical, its singularity is only internal, and its liberty is merely subjective. 
Thus, Derrida puts emphasis on the point that the theoretical consciousness 
can be posited only as the practical consciousness. So, the passage from 
theoretical to practical consciousness is then relevant to the passage from the 
only theoretical consciousness, which is not distinguishable from inorganic, 
or dead thing. In this context, Derrida importantly deals with the Hegelian 
concept of the desire in the second potency. Derrida highlights that this 
desire refers to the relation of the living being, namely, what is capable of 
making relations with the other. Furthermore, Derrida sees the particularity 
of the Hegelian concept of desire in that it includes the inhibition of desire as 
the essential moment of desire itself: desire should preserve its object to 
consume, to destroy, in order for that it can still desire. In Derrida’s view, 
this structure of desire is applicable both to human desire and animal desire. 
It is equally possible to animal beings to inhibit their desires. The difference 
between human desire and animal desire, then, consists in whether the desire 
and its inhibition take place at the same time or with a time lag. Thus, 
Derrida states, in the case of animal beings, “consum(mat)ion and inhibition 
are dissociated in the way that they consum(at)e, then do not consume, 
destroy, then do not destroy, etc., the inhibition ‘inhabits the consum(mat)ing’ 
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consumption’ and ‘forms part of the present of the consum(mat)ing’ (GL 
138/121). Finally, Derrida affirms that this peculiar structure of human desire, 
the inhibition in the desire should be thought of as the sublating itself. From 
this perspective, Hegelian sublation has little to do with some determined 
thing, or with a formal structure applicable to every moment. But it should 
be understood in its ‘self-relief in its presence’, whereby the human history is 
constituted: “so the Aufhebung relieves itself in present desire. Human desire: 
relief of the relief, relieving presence of the relief, […]. The Aufhebung is not 
some determinate thing, or a formal structure whose undifferentiated 
generality applies itself to every moment. The Aufhebung is history, the 
becoming of its own proper presentation, of its own proper differentiating 
determination [...]” (GL 138/121). So, Derrida’s idea is that the relation of 
the theoretical consciousness and of the practical consciousness can be made 
sense of in terms of human desire. To put it another way, that theoretical 
consciousness can be posited only as practical consciousness means no other 
than that the consciousness actually posits itself, brings itself into existence 
only as human desire. Then, the human desire of Hegel, for Derrida, exactly 
means the same as praxis, or to create a practical relation, to labor—of which 
animal beings are not capable. Thus, to labor is to inhibit desire, to oppose to 
itself with destroying objects; it is impossible for human desire to be satisfied. 
Then, Derrida points out that the instrument is relevant to tradition, meaning 
that the labor products of human desire cannot be something that would be 
merely consum(at)ed, simply destroyed, but it is the retained ideality 
resisting to such natural disappearance—the existing universality. 
 In Derrida’s view, the most difficult issue in the whole theory of 
consciousness of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 lies in the passage 
from the second potency to the third potency: in what sense does Hegel 
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affirm that marriage is the relief of the instrument? Derrida explains, first of 
all, the necessity and significance of this passage. According to him, the 
instrument is in fact the external constraint of the consciousness: its ideality 
is heterogeneous to laboring consciousness, so that the inhibition of desire is 
imposed from the outside instead of coming from the inside of consciousness. 
Thus, Derrida quotes a passage from the philosophy of nature of 1803-04 : 
 
The freedom of consciousness relieves this need, and inhibits the 
annihilating in enjoyment, through consciousness itself (durch sich 
selbst); that makes the two sexes into consciousness for one another, 
into beings and subsists for one another ... in such a way that in the 
being-for-self-of the other, each in itself. (GL 141/123) 
 
Derrida’s idea is that Hegel thinks of the internal and liberal inhibition of 
desire to be made through sexual relation; because sexual relation is 
characterized by inhibition or relief of pleasure within enjoyment—to relieve 
pleasure in order not to destroy the other and so destroy itself, to limit in 
order to keep, and deny in order to enjoy (GL 141/123). But Derrida also 
makes clear the point that Hegel himself thinks of internal and liberal 
inhibition of desire in terms of love and marriage. The point becomes clearer, 
as Derrida points out, when we refer to Hegel that marriage differs from 
concubinage in that the latter mainly concerns the satisfaction of natural 
drive (PhR §163 Addition). In this way, in Derrida’s reading, the whole 
problem of the consciousness theory of 1803/04 converges into the themes of 
love and marriage. And it is with this that Derrida begins his treatment of the 
human family problem in Hegel’s system.  
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 As we have previously seen elsewhere, Derrida characterizes the 
Hegelian theory of Sittlichkeit as a speculative one, meaning that Hegel 
establishes his theory on the basis of the positive principle of unity and of the 
negative principle of dissolution—which are relevant to love and death 
respectively— instead of depending on empirical or formalistic factors. This 
point would clarify the reason of why Derrida pays special attention to 
Hegel’s theory of consciousness of 1803-04. Derrida might think that this 
theory is more useful to clarify what the speculativeness of the Hegelian 
concept of Sittlichkeit and of the family is like. So, we will inquire into how 
Derrida explains the speculativeness in question from his reading of the 
family potency in Hegel’s theory of consciousness of 1803-04. First, Derrida 
sees that the family potency stands on the condition of the sublatedness of 
sexual difference: “love and marriage belong to the element of the freedom 
of consciousness and suppose the Aufhebung of the sexual difference” (GL, 
149/131). This claim refers to the Hegelian idea we just examined that love 
implies inhibition of the natural drive. But, the more significant point 
Derrida has in mind is that Hegel does not include any empirical account of 
sexual difference in his consideration of love and marriage. In order to 
clarify this point, Derrida examines the Kantian explanations of sexual 
difference and the superiority of monogamy given in his Anthropology 
which depend on some empirical and cultural factors. Kant addresses the 
question as to the particularity of the female—the female’s cultural 
superiority in spite of the male’s physical superiority in Kant’s 
terminology—in terms of a fight between husband and wife, for example. It 
is the harem that Kant takes into consideration in order to claim the cultural 
superiority of monogamy. In contrast, Hegel never deals with the difference 
of sexes in marriage, according to Derrida, “as if the spouses were the same 
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sex, were both bisexual or asexual” (GL 143/125). What comes into question 
in Derrida’s view, however, is not the fact that Hegel does not explain how 
the female and the male are different from each other in marriage. To more 
precisely articulate Derrida’s idea, Hegel establishes his theory of marriage 
and family in terms of sublation of the sexual difference: the death of parents 
in their child—what would be relevant to the death of individuals in the 
genus-process. This is the second point that Derrida draws from the family 
potency in order to clarify the speculativeness of Hegel’s theory of 
Sittlichkeit. So, Derrida states, “The specualtive dialectics of marriage must 
be thought: the being-one (Einssein) of the spouses, the consciousness of one 
in that of the other, such is the medium, the middle of exchange. The sexual 
opposition is relieved there. [...] That is the child. [...] That is education” (GL 
150/131-132). 
  
The relieving education interiorizes the father. Death being a relief, 
the parents, far from losing or disseminating themselves without 
return, “contemplate in the child’s becoming their own relief.” They 
guard in that becoming their own disappearance, reg(u)ard their 
child as their own death. And in reg(u)arding that disappearance, 
that death, they retard it, appropriate it; they maintain in the 
monumental presence of their seed—in the name—the living sign 
that they are dead, not that they are dead, but that dead they are, 
which is another thing, Ideality is death, to be sure, but to be dead—
this is the whole question of dissemination—is that to be dead or to 
be dead? (GL 151/133)  
  
 We have previously interpreted Hegel’s thesis of the education of a 
child—the becoming of consciousness in family through the death of 
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parents—as meaning that for Hegel, consciousness refers to a singular being 
coming into being through cultural formation. In other words, the Hegelian 
concept of consciousness is not merely limited to some mental state or 
cognitive functions such as perception, memory, or thought; nor does it 
simply concerns a laboring human being; it refers rather to a cultural subject 
who inherits, generates, and conveys the tradition. In this sense, we can say 
that older generation does not merely disappear with their death, but remain 
in newer generation, through their death. Such is the meaning of death of 
parents Hegel thinks of. But Derrida does not stop at this point. In his view, a 
death of parents cannot simply be interpreted as presenting the idea that a 
human being is a cultural being. For what this concept includes is in fact the 
combination of two issues: that they are dead and that dead they are. That is, 
the parents are dead but exist—exist as dead beings in their child. So, 
pointing out the difference of these issues is too subtle to grasp.  
If the two different ideas intertwinded in the concept of the death of 
parents can be discerned in this way—the death of beings and the being or 
presence of dead beings, what is more problematic for Derrida is likely the 
second. For beings or presence of dead beings is obviously paradoxical. So, 
Derrida concludes that death of parents signifies the negation of death: the 
being of that no longer is. To put it another way, the death that is present 
cannot be the death in its proper sense, but an idealized, weakened concept 
of death. For Derrida, it is the very idealized, weakened death that 
characterizes the Hegelian thesis in general: “Such is the Hegelian thesis: 
philosophy, death’s positing, its pose (Telle est la thèse hegelienne: la 
philosophie, la pose de la mort)” (GL 152/133). By extension, Derrida 
extends his reflection of the meaning of death in family to the speculation on 
the familiarity of Hegelian sublation. First, Derrida determines sublation as 
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‘the concept of economy in general in speculative dialectics’ (GL 152/133), 
meaning that sublation is fundamentally familial. The term economy can be 
understood in terms of the traditional metaphysical concept of oikeios. For 
Derrida, oikeios represents traditional familial logic: possession and 
reappropriation. This is the very ground on which Hegelian sublation works. 
From this, Derrida draws the fundamental formulation for characterizing 
Hegelian sublation: “the Aufheung, the economic law of absolute 
reappropriation of the absolute loss, is a family concept” (GL 152/133). On 
this base Derrida features this economic concept of sublation as ‘an onto-
economic concept’ (GL 152/134), meaning that the Hegelian concept of 
formation—which Derrida equalizes with the metaphysical concept of 
eidos—is equally penetrated by familial logic. Thus education and cultural 
formation is relevant to the metaphysical formation of material and the child 
is the relief of absolute loss to Hegel. Additionally, Derrida argues that his 
onto-economic concept of sublation also features the Hegelian concept of the 
spirit: “it is the guarding of the proper, of property, propriety, of one’s own 
[la garde du propre]; this guarding retains, keeps back, inhibits, consigns the 
absolute loss or consum(mat)es it only in order better to reg(u)ard it 
returning to (it)self, [...]. Spirit is the other name of this repetition” (GL 
152/134).  
 In this way, Derrida gives to the family potency a special meaning 
by reading the fundamental structure and feature of Hegelian dialectic from 
it: the reappropriation of absolute loss. On the other hand, Derrida also 
argues that this conclusion, covering the ontological, metaphysical issue, has 
great implication for the Hegelian concept of consciousness in general. So, in 
Derrida’s view, the Hegelian consciousness is the result of the familial 
process—the family considered from the onto-economic perspective, not in 
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the empirical-anthropological context. This then implies that we cannot 
properly understand the Hegelian concept of consciousness without referring 
to the family potency presented in this manuscript. For this reason, Derrida 
argues that overlooking or misunderstanding of this familial aspect would 
lead us to the wrong conception of Hegelian concept of consciousness; it has 
little to do with pure ego, nor with Husserlian transcendental consciousness 
for example. In like manner, the ‘experience of consciousness’ of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit cannot be properly understood without dwelling on 
this familial onto-economy found in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. The 
question then arises what the familial process constituting the consciousness 
is like. In this regard, Derrida answers that it consists in the elimination of 
empirical singularity. It is in this context precisely that Derrida earnestly 
considers the struggle for recognition Hegel includes in the family potency. 
Concerning the recognition struggle, the following two points should be 
pointed out. The first is a basic determination of the recognition concept we 
can find in a consistent way in spite of the difference of its concrete 
explanations given by Hegel: consciousness—or self-consciousness—can be 
consciousness only if it is for another consciousness. Specifically, it is only 
by returning into itself from its other-being does the consciousness come into 
being. On the other hand, Hegel considers recognition a violent process; 
recognition has little to do with some cognitive, verbal activity, but takes 
place as the effective invasion of the other’s possession. Concerning this 
concept of recognition struggle, Derrida dwells on the point that Hegel does 
not consider the violent process in terms of some arbitrary decision of 
consciousness, but rather articulates the contradiction of natural things to 
explain it: the contradiction that a thing, the universal reality, opened to 
everyone, is nevertheless appropriated by a certain consciousness. Therefore, 
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we should say that recognition for possession of natural things is not 
sufficient, not appropriate for the elimination of the empirical singularity of 
consciousness. As Derrida suggests, recognition that results by such a 
struggle is no more than retribution of properties, reappropriation of the 
proper, which is thus the reappropriation of the singularity based on natural 
things. In this context, we should also say that, for Hegel, it is not simply by 
violating what is proper to the other, and by achieving recognition by this 
other of its possession of what was previously proper to this other, that the 
consciousness as the self-relating consciousness—not the empirically 
singular being—comes into being. So Derrida sees the necessity for Hegel to 
think of recognition struggle to the death: the struggle around the proper 
body and life, not around the possession of natural things. To put it another 
way, the only way of resolving the contradiction of natural things is to 
eliminate the singularity itself—not to reappropriate the proper, the 
singularity—which signifies the death of consciousness.  
 To recapitulate, that the Hegelian consciousness is constituted 
through the familial process first means that elimination of its empirical 
singularity is presupposed for its constitution. And then the conclusion 
Derrida draws from the reflection of the recognition struggle in the family—
the struggle for possession—would be that, for Hegel, the elimination occurs 
through the struggle to death. Then it seems that what elimination of the 
singularity means needs further explanation in regards to the struggle to 
death. So referring to the death issue again, Derrida devotes the last part of 
his interpretation of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 in dealing with the 
peculiar contradiction to Hegelian recognition through the other’s death. In 
short, the contradiction lies in that the consciousness risks its life when it 
aims for the death of the other. This is because to eliminate the other’s being 
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and singularity, within the logic of recognition, directly implies the 
elimination of the foundation of my being and singularity. Due to this 
inherent contradiction then, we should conclude that Hegelian recognition 
cannot in fact be realized. However, as Derrida points out, Hegel affirms 
sublation of this contradiction and elevation of the consciousness to the 
universal —to the consciousness as totality, which is, the people-spirit or 
even the absolute spirit. Or, the singularity of the consciousness is effective 
only when it relates itself to the universal, the spirit. So, Derrida states, “once 
relieved, the singular totality becomes universal totality, absolute spirit. It 
still exists as singular totality—‘family,’ ‘possession,’ ‘enjoyment’—but 
relates to itself only in an ideal mode and ‘proves itself as self-sacrifice.’ By 
this sacrifice, it sees itself, gets itself recognized in another consciousness, 















Taking notice of the particularity of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-
04 that Hegel presented it as a theory of consciousness, this paper aimed to 
make sense of Hegel’s concept of consciousness as well as the set of related 
problems and to follow his theory of three potencies of consciousness in 
detail. First of all, dealing with Hegel’s definition of consciousness as the 
middle—the unity of what is conscious and that of which it is conscious, of 
the active and the passive, that is, the unity generating such an opposing 
relation, it attempted to point out that Hegel opposed an epistemological, or 
psychological approach to consciousness. Rather, Hegel’s proposition was to 
consider consciousness at an ontological level according to what we 
examined; in the sense that consciousness is what actually exists, and more 
precisely that its existence is concerned with the very movement of the spirit, 
of returning from its externalization into nature to itself as true spirit. Then, 
through the following study on fragment 15 and Hegel’s theory of three 
potencies of consciousness, this paper drew the conclusion that 
consciousness was an anthropological theme for Hegel, referring to a human 
being who lives the world. In this regard, we saw that Hegel arrived at 
conceptualizing consciousness as an absolute singularity by developing his 
ideas on the first and second potencies of consciousness. To recapitulate, 
beginning with the problem of the elevation of consciousness out of 
sensation, Hegel argued throughout the first potency that the singularity of 
consciousness cannot be like animal self-sensation but rather consists in its 
negativity, meaning that the absolute singularity of consciousness consists in 
practically negating what it faces. This point was better clarified when Hegel 
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specified through the second potency the condition for consciousness to be 
able to effectively create a relation by conceptualizing the way it does in 
terms of the practically negative activity of consciousness. While the point 
became clear that Hegel’s anthropological understanding of consciousness 
overweighs practical rather than theoretical, or epistemic aspects of 
conscious activity in this way, we could also figure out, with the study on the 
third potency, that Hegel thematized the social, cultural, and even historical 
formation of individuals with the term of consciousness. This provided us the 
reason for defining Hegelian consciousness as a subject who lives the 
cultural and historical world by inheriting and transmitting tradition, 
following its practical determination as an agent living this world by desiring 
and laboring. Finally, we examined Hegel’s argumentation for the passage to 
the people-spirit through the ideas of recognition struggle to death.   
 In order to deal with Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy 
of spirit of 1803-04, the second part of this paper first attempted to overall 
outline the problem of Hegel’s system. Especially its circularity seemed to be 
the crux of the matter, of which we also tried to clarify how Derrida 
continuously and repetitively articulated it on various aspects; and in which 
context it finally converged into the problem of ‘not-yet-of-already’ in the 
absolute religion for Derrida. The second part of this paper was devoted to 
discerning Derrida’s two approaches in regards to the Hegelian system: the 
onto-theology in the Saint-Family and the speculative theory of Sittlichkeit or 
of the human family. First, we saw that, elucidating the Christian origin of 
the Hegelian concept of the spirit, Derrida gave a suggestive interpretation of 
Hegel’s ontological thought; according to which it was no more than 
ontological filiation. In this regard, we paid attention to the point that Derrida 
considered the Hegelian spirit above all as the dynamic, active power of 
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producing the ontological filiation. Meanwhile, we could also comprehend 
the ethical connotation of this ontological interpretation of Derrida; 
specifically, through the Derridian argumentation that the relation between 
an infinite being and a finite being by love, constituting the ontological 
filiation, could be applied to all relations of a finite being to another. Next, 
the second approach of Derrida to the Hegelian system seemed to be 
appropriately articulated through his interpretation of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. 
More precisely, Derrida thought of Hegel’s project of completing the system 
as the movement of the spirit as being crystalized through the plan of the 
speculative theory of Sittlichkeit. In this regard, we saw that Derrida clarified 
the location of Sittlichkeit within the system’s architectonic; where the 
externalized spirit as nature returns into itself to be the spirit for itself. Then 
the second step of Derrida’s dealing with Hegel’s Sittlichkeit was 
reconstructed in this paper as the elucidation of its speculative character—by 
emphatically interpreting how the concepts of love and death, as the 
principles of unification and of sublation respectively, grounds it. By 
discerning Derrida’s two approaches to Hegel’s system in this way, we could 
finally make sense of why Derrida pointed out the family as the core concept 
around which all circularity problems of Hegel’s system revolve—as the 
entrance to the system as well as the system itself. That is, in Derrida’s view, 
the family was the theme that involved the ontological filiation found in 
Hegel’s interpretation of Christian trinity; and which, as the principles of 
love and death, also grounded Hegelian speculative theory of Sittlichkeit. 
The final section of this paper concentrated on Derrida’s interpretation of 
Hegel’s theory of consciousness in his philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. First 
of all, a detailed study of the genus-process in the Encyclopedia seemed to be 
indispensable in dealing with the Derridian interpretation, because Hegel’s 
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conceptualizing of sex-relation as well as sexual difference appeared to be 
the key issue. So clarifying the point that the passage from the second to the 
third potency was highly significant for Derrida to interpret Hegel’s theory of 
the three potencies of consciousness, we examined how Derrida 
problematized it in terms of hierarchical dualism which had dominated 
western metaphysical thoughts since Aristotle. Through this examination we 
found that this problematization provided Derrida with the basis for arguing 
for the speculative character of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. That is, in Derrida’s view, 
Hegel’s Sittlichkeit was established on the sublation of the sexual difference; 
in the sense that Hegel considered love in marriage as the ontological 
principle of unification while dismissing the problem of sexual desire, and 
that the death of parents, of the male-female couple having a child, was 
considered essential for the Sittlichkeit. The final point we reflected on was 
that from his whole interpretation of Hegel’s theory of the three potencies, 
Derrida drew a general formulation for grasping Hegel’s dialectical sublation, 
that is, the reappropriation of absolute loss. 
 On the other hand, we observe that Hegel’s concept of consciousness 
has been mainly dealt with from, among Hegel scholars, the perspective of 
the methodology of the Phenomenology of Spirit. In this regard, the question 
has been frequently raised: how does the concept of consciousness presented 
in the introduction of the Phenomenology—what has its measure in itself for 
comparing its object to its knowledge of the latter—justify the methodology 
of the Phenomenology while enabling Hegel to develop his critique of 
knowledge under the sub-title ‘the science of the experience of 
consciousness’?
27
 Meanwhile, Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 has 
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been significantly considered within the framework of the development of 
Hegel’s project of the system and his idea of the spirit. And recently it has 
also received serious attention due to the concept of recognition developed 
therein.
28
 In this respect, this paper hopefully presented a comprehensive 
survey on Hegel’s concept of consciousness through examining the 
philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 while articulating its particularity and the 
related problems in his system therewith. Obviously the Hegelian 
consciousness does not seem to be concerned with the set of problems that 
we generally address with the term consciousness, such as perception, 
personal-identity, awareness of an object, or true knowledge of an object, for 
example. Then, the particularity of the Hegelian concept of consciousness 
probably can be made sense of from the perspective of anthropology—the 
anthropology constructed in a speculative manner in the sense that it 
considers the existence of a human being in terms of the movement of the 
spirit while opposing an empirical, psychological understanding of it. In this 
respect, Derrida’s interpretation is worth noting in that he ciphers out this 
speculative character of Hegel’s understanding of a human being. Certainly 
implicit in this interpretation is the critique that Hegel’s system still stays 
within the framework of traditional western metaphysics, of which we could 
not deal with in this paper.  
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헤겔의 의식 및 자기의식 개념과 관련하여 기존의 연구들은 주로 『정신현
상학』의 자기의식을 해명하는 데 집중했다. 주지하다시피 주노변증법에 대한 
코제브의 해석은 20세기 초중반가 유럽의 맑시스트들에게 미친 영향이나 
(Kojève 1947) 장 발의 불행한 의식 해석이 포스트-실존주의자들에게 미친 영
향은 지대했으며 (Wahl 1929), 최근 미국 헤겔 연구자들 사이에서도 헤겔 자기
의식 개념이 집중적으로 다루어진 바 있는데, 그 중에서도 특히 『정신현상학』
의 자기의식을 재조명함으로써 비형이상학적 헤겔을 옹호하려는 피핀의 시도
가 유명하다(Pippin 1989). 이에 비해 헤겔의 ‘의식’ 개념은 그 자체로 주제화된 
적은 거의 거의 없고, 주제가 되는 경우는 주로 『정신현상학』의 의식 장에서 
(감성적 확신, 지각, 지성) 헤겔이 대상 인식과 관련해 어떤 인식론적 입장을 
드러내는지를 탐구하거나 (Westphal 2009) 아니면 『정신현상학』의 서론에 나타
난 의식 개념이 어떻게 ‘의식의 경험의 학’이라는 『정신현상학』 의 서술 방법
론을 정당화하는지를 살펴보기 (Schlösser) 위한 것이었다. 그러나 헤겔의 의식 
개념은 그 자체로, 특히 헤겔 정신철학 및 체계 구성의 관점에서 중요하게 다
루어질 필요가 있다. 무엇보다도 주목할 사실은 『철학대계』에서 헤겔이 의식
을 주관정신의 두 번째 하위 범주로 구성하면서, 여기에 『정신현상학』의 전반
부 세 장, 곧 의식, 자기의식, 이성을 포함시켰다는 점이다. 따라서 『철학대계』
의 구성에 따라서는, 의식이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 
할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식을 포괄한다는 점은, 1803-04년 정신철학에
서 헤겔이 의식을 3 포텐츠들의 종합으로 설명하면서 그 두 번째 포텐츠로, 
『정신현상학』의 구도에서라면 그 내용상 ‘자기의식’에 해당하는 노동과 도구를 
들었다는 점에서도 분명하다. 이런 맥락에서 본 논문은 특히 1803-04년 정신
철학을 의식론의 관점에서 재구성함으로써 헤겔의 의식 개념이 정신철학에서 
어떤 의미와 위치를 갖는지 밝혀보고자 한다.  
1803-04년 정신철학은 헤겔이 1803-04년 겨울 학기에 ‘사변철학의 체계’
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라는 제목으로 준비했던 강의록의 제 3부를 가리킨다. 이 정신철학은 예나 시
절 헤겔의 체계 기획을 추적하는 데 중요한 문헌으로 평가되는데, 그것은 이 
정신철학을 논리학 및 형이상학, 자연철학, 정신철학의 3부로 구성함으로써 후
기 『철학대계』에서와 마찬가지의 체계 구상을 드러내고 있기 때문이다. 더불
어 이 정신철학에서 헤겔이 체계는 무엇보다도 정신의 체계이어야 한다는 테
제를 내세우고 이를 통해 셸링 동일성 철학의 영향으로부터 벗어나 체계 구성
과 관련하여 독자적 노선을 개척하고 있다는 점을 고려하면, 헤겔이 자신의 
철학적 여정 전체를 통틀어 끊임없이 다듬고 발전시켰던 정신 및 정신의 체계
에 대한 사유의 원형적 형태를 보여주고 있다는 점에서 이 문헌이 갖는 의미
는 각별하다. 그러나 본 논문은 1803-04년 정신철학을 정신 체계의 발전사라
는 문맥에서 조망하는 대신 ‘헤겔의 의식론’이라는 관점에서 재구성해보고자 
한다. 이러한 해석적 관점은 이 정신철학의 내용 구성을 통해, 즉 이 정신철학
에서 헤겔이 먼저 의식 개념 정의를 (의식은 정신의 개념) 앞세우고 그에 이어 
의식을 구성하는 계기들에 대한 구체적 이론을 (의식의 3 포텐츠: 기억과 언
어, 노동과 도구, 가족과 소유) 개진한다는 점을 통해 정당화될 수 있다. 이렇
게 1803-04년 정신철학을 헤겔의 의식론이라는 관점에서 재구성함으로써 우
리는 기존의 지배적 해석 경향, 즉 체계, 정신, 및 절대자와 같은 형이상학적 
주제들을 중심으로 한 해석을 넘어 의식 내지, 아래서 좀더 상세히 다루겠지만 
실천적이고 역사적 존재로서의 인간이라는 좀 더 구체적이고 실재적인 주제 
중심으로 헤겔 정신철학을 읽어내고, 이를 토대로 의식이 어떤 의미에서 어떻
게 헤겔의 체계 및 정신철학 전체와 관련해 중요한지 밝힐 수 있을 것이다.  
간략히 요약하자면 1803-04년 정신철학을 헤겔 의식론의 관점에서 재구
성하면서 본 논문은 무엇보다도 헤겔 의식 개념의 특징이 그 존재론적 의식 
정의에 있다고 본다. 요컨대 헤겔은 의식을 의식하는 것과 의식되는 것의 통
일로 정의하고, 이 의식은 의식하는 것과 의식되는 것, 능동적인 것과 수동적
인 것, 의식적 대립관계를 이루는 그 대립항들 중 어느 하나가 아니라 이 대
립관계 전체를 산출하는 매개적 전체라고 주장하는데, 이때 이 의식은 그러면 
외부 대상 인식과 같은 그 인식론적 기능으로는 이해될 수는 없고, 그 자기 
매개 운동을 통해 자기 존재를 산출하는 어떤 것으로 이해되어야 한다는 것이
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다. 이러한 존재론적 의식 이해를 토대로, 본 논문은 또 여기 정신철학에서 제
시되는 의식의 3 포텐츠론을 의식의 존재 및 행위를 이루는 서로 다른 세 계
기들에 대한 설명으로 재구성한다. 특히 이 세 계기들은 단지 의식의 존재 및 
행위를 이룰 수 있는 이러저러한 우연한 요소들의 단순 결합이 아니라 그 개
념적 논리적 필연성에 따라 좀 더 완전한 의식 규정을 도출해가는 일련의 연
속적 과정으로 이해되어야 한다는 것이 본 논문이 취한 재구성의 관점이다. 
1803-04년 정신철학에 대한 위의 재구성적 독해를 통해 본 논문은 마지막으
로 여기 제시된 의식론은 인간학으로 규정될 수 있다고 주장한다. 요컨대 여
기 정신철학에서 의식 개념을 통해 헤겔이 이론화하는 것은 결국 말을 하고 
노동을 하며 가족 단위의 경제 생활을 영위하고 문화적 전통을 전수하는 인간 
존재자다. 덧붙이자면 헤겔이 의식 개념을 통해 이론화하는 이 인간 존재자는, 
그 절대적 개별성이 말을 통해 외재화된 자기로 성립한다는 점에서, 감각 내
지 자기-느낌 수준에서 그 개별성이 성립하는 동물 유기체와 구별된다. 헤겔
에 따르면 또 인간 존재자가 산출하는 보편자, 곧 문화와 전통은 그 이념적 
성격 때문에 자연 유기체들이 유적 과정을 통해 산출하는 보편자, 곧 생물학
적 유와도 다르다. 이런 관점에서 본 논문은 1803-04년 강의록 자연철학 마
지막 단편을 다루면서, 여기 나타난 유기체 이해가 정신철학의 의식론과 어떤 
연속적 관계에 있는지, 또 헤겔은 여기서 동물 유기체와 인간 유기체의 차이
를 어떻게 설명하는지 해명한다.  
다른 한편, 헤겔의 의식론을 인간학으로 규정할 수 있다는 주장이 정당하
려면, 헤겔의 의식 개념이 인간 존재자를 가리킨다는 점 외에도, 헤겔 인간학
의 고유한 방법론적 특성을 개념적으로 규정하는 일이 필요하다. 왜냐하면 헤
겔의 의식론 내지 인간학은 그 대상 규정의 측면에서나 방법론 측면에서나 모
두 일반적 의미에서의 인간학 (내지 인간학), 즉 다양한 인간 생활 현상에 대
한 경험적이고 문화적 탐구 일반에로 환원될 수 없기 때문이다. 이 점과 관련
해 본 논문은 몇몇 연구자들의 (데리다 1974, 부르조아 2000) 관점대로 헤겔
의 인간학을 ‘사변적’ 인간학으로 규정하는 것이 타당하리라는 관점을 취한다. 
이때 ‘사변적’이라는 것은 일차적으로는 이 인간학이 그 다루는 대상이 경험적 
현상도 아니며, 그 방법론 역시 경험적으로 정당화될 수 있는 것이 아니라는 
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점을 의미하지만, 그 근본적 의미는 무엇보다도 정신철학의 문맥에서, 특히 헤
겔에게 의식이 정신 운동의 매개자요 담지자라면 어떤 의미에서 그러한지 해
명함으로써 밝혀져야 할 것이다. 본고는 이 지점에서 데리다가 『조종』에서 보
여준 1803-04년 정신철학 해석이 헤겔 의식론 및 인간학의 사변성을 탁월하
게 개념화, 문제화했다고 보고, 본 논문의 2부에서 데리다의 1803-04년 정신
철학 해석을 상세히 다루어 보고자 했다. 『조종』의 주요 주제는 사실 ‘헤겔의 
체계’로, 그 전반부의 초점은 헤겔 정신 개념의 기독교적 내지 존재-신학적 
기원을 밝히고 이 정신의 체계를 특히 인륜성의 첫 계기인 가족 개념 중심으
로 재구성하는 데 있다. 그리고 데리다가 이렇게 전반적 수준에서 헤겔의 체
계 문제를 재구성하고자 할 때, 1803-04년 정신철학은 특별히 중요한 의미를 
갖는데, 그것은 데리다가 바로 이 텍스트 독해를 통해 위 두 측면의 문제를 
연결하고, 그럼으로써 또 “절대적 상실의 재전유”라는 개념으로 헤겔 체계 전
체에 대한 성격 규정을 시도하기 때문이다. 따라서 본 논문의 2부에서는 우선 
(1) 『정신현상학』, 『논리학』, 『철학대계』를 중심으로 헤겔의 체계의 문제점들
을, 특히 시작과 끝의 순환성 내지 체계로의 도입과 체계 전체의 동일성이라
는 문제를 중심으로 개괄하고, (2) 데리다가 『조종』 전반부에서 헤겔의 체계 
문제를 어떻게 정신의 존재-신론과 (Saint Family) 사변적 인륜성론 (인간가족) 
중심으로 재구성하는지를 정리한 후, (3) 이 재구성을 위해 데리다가 어떻게 
헤겔의 1803-04년 의식론을 해석하는지 살펴보고자 한다. 본 논문에서 시도
한 독해에 의하면 헤겔 인간학의 사변성에 대한 데리다의 해명에는 1803-04
년 정신철학에 나타난 의식론의 세 번째 가족 포텐츠로부터 『법철학』에서의 
가족론으로의 확장이 필연적이다. 본 논문는 또 그중에서도 특히 데리다가 헤
겔의 사랑과 죽음 개념을 그 가족론 전체를 떠받치는 개념적 핵으로 제시하고 
또 헤겔 식 변증법적 이행의 탁월한 사례로 해석하고 있다는 점에 주목해, 이 
해석을 자세히 분석함으로써 헤겔 식 인간학의 사변성에 대한 좀 더 구체적 
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